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ABSTRACT
This dissertation charts the ways in which migrants from the Austro-Hungarian
Empire crafted new forms of identification in the United States, complicating
their relationships with their home and host states. Transatlantic migration and
migrants’ heightened nationalism were, I argue, causative factors in the
dismantling of the Habsburg Empire into ethnically-based states after Word
War I. Rather than focusing on a single ethnic group, Migrant Nation-Builders
looks broadly at early multilingual immigrant institutions, Austro-Hungarian and
American perceptions of panslavism, and the splintering of immigrant
institutions in the United States along linguistic lines. The project traces the
long arm of the homeland authorities, especially the Hungarian government, in
trying to manage migrant loyalty in America, and follows return migrants from
the United States back to East Central Europe to track their influence on
domestic politics. Finally, it examines the dual effects on migration of new
borders in Eastern Europe and restrictive immigration legislation in the United
States.
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Introduction
“[Immigrants] thought of themselves as fighters, lovers, poets, dancers, singers,
and children of the Almighty before it occurred to them that they were also members of
definite national and political groups,” Slovene-American author Louis Adamic wrote in
his 1932 book, Laughing in the Jungle.1 This dissertation will explain how immigrants
came to think of themselves as “members of definite national and political groups” by
explaining the relationship between mass transatlantic labor migration from AustriaHungary to the United States and the rapid spread of separatist nationalism, leading to the
Habsburg Empire’s dissolution. In addressing this relationship, we learn about United
States history, Central and Eastern European history, migration history, ethnic history,
diplomatic history, and the history of nationalism itself. The story features an ensemble
cast of governmental officials and migrants, and is set in both the North America and
Central and Eastern Europe.
Previous generations of scholars sometimes argued that national oppression in
Eastern Europe caused emigration, citing examples like Štefan Osuský, who migrated to
the United States as an adolescent and became a leading Slovak politician in adulthood.
According to Osuský, members of Slavic minorities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire like
himself migrated to the United States because of an oppressive national climate at home.
“In spring of 1905 the [Hungarian] minister of education, Count Apponyi, came to the
lyceum to pay an inspection visit,” Osuský explained. “He came to our class when we
had Latin. Latin was my favorite subject and I was very good in it,” he continued. “After
the exam Count Apponyi called me and asked me in Hungarian, ‘What is your name,
1

Louis Adamic, Laughing in the Jungle: The Autobiography of an Immigrant in America
(New York: Harpers & Brothers, 1932), 104.
1

young lad?’ I answered, ‘My name is Osuský.’ ‘Where are you from?’ ‘From Brezová.’
He replied: ‘Brezová, isn't it the nest that breeds all the revolts against Hungarians? You,
however, are going to be a good Hungarian!’ He didn't ask me whether I'd be a good
Hungarian citizen, but simply if I'd be a good Hungarian,” Osuský reflected. “I
remembered the words of my father's not to mix into politics. . . . I paused a little to think
about the best answer. Obviously, I could not agree to be a good Hungarian, I could not
even force myself to say anything like that, so I remained silent.’”2 Osuský no doubt
experienced this incident of Count Apponyi’s national chauvinism, but his personal
trajectory — feelings of national animosity spurring migration — are, I argue, not
representative. For the vast majority of migrants, migration came first, followed by a
swelling of separatist nationalism while abroad.
Much more typical, I argue, is the story of Andrew Lichanec, who immigrated to
the United States from Klenóc, Austria-Hungary in 1913.3 When he arrived in
Logansport, IN, ethnicity and language very suddenly took on a new significance in his
life. “I spoke more Hungarian at that time,” he explained to an interviewer for the Ellis
Island Oral History Project. But when he arrived in the United States, his uncle told him,
"You're not a hunky, a Hungarian.” This negation of a Hungarian identity in America
meant that Lichanec had to learn not one but two new languages and take on multiple
new identities. To fit what should have been their mother tongue and ethnic affiliation in
Austria-Hungary, his father told him to learn Slovak. “So here my father was teaching me
2

“Czech Republic and Slovakia - Štefan Osuský, . . . ideas defining a free society,”
(Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, n.d.).
3
This dissertation will use the official place name of the location in the time period that
is being referred to, recognizing that this is an imperfect approach. In many cases I will
indicate what country that municipality is in today. Very large cities, like Vienna, will be
referred to by their standard English name. In quotations, I will retain the author’s usage.
2

Slovak, then I went to school, they were teaching me English. And I tell you, I had a little
problem there,” he recalled. Lichanec himself, like his father, began to identify nationally
as a result of his migration and the proliferation of Eastern European nationalisms in
migrant communities.
When migrants from Austria-Hungary came to the United States in the late
nineteenth century, as Lichanec’s story illustrates, their identifications frequently
sharpened, dissolved, and coalesced again. Lichanec and his family members became
more culturally Slovak as they became American. Countless migrants from the AustroHungarian Empire experienced similar ethnic fashioning and refashioning. At churches,
social clubs, bars, butcher shops, and newsstands from Connecticut to Michigan, migrant
nationalists persuaded those they deemed co-nationals to join them in building up a local
exclusive ethnic community and lobbying for the best interests of their “nation” back in
Austria-Hungary. But which possible articulation of ethnic identity an immigrant would
choose – German, Austrian, Hungarian, Jewish, Slavic, Bohemian, Moravian, Czech,
Slovak, Czechoslovak, Ruthenian, Polish, Ukrainian, Transylvanian, Romanian,
Yugoslav, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Wend – was not as forgone of a conclusion as it
may seem to readers today.
The United States was a critical venue for the nurturing of new identities among
migrants and encouraging political action. In the United States, migrants encountered
multiple American regimes of categorization, a free immigrant press, increased mobility
and opportunities for association, and limits on the powers of the Austro-Hungarian
government in clamping down on ethnic separatism. Upon arrival, many individuals
prioritized their home regional or religious identity over an ethno-linguistic one, as the
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national movements of many Slavic peoples in Central and Eastern Europe were still in
the making. Rather than all having a clear national identity upon arrival, the experience of
living abroad inspired the national identity of many immigrants from Austria-Hungary.
Some maintained hybrid identities or remained indifferent to an exclusive ethnicity, but
over the course of the early twentieth century the strengthening of national movements on
both sides of the Atlantic transformed many of migrants into nation-builders. The success
of American immigrant nationalists determined, to a large extent, which national projects
in Central and Eastern Europe would achieve states and which would not, in concert with
the World War I priorities of the United States government. American bureaucrats had a
sizable influence on which Eastern European groups came to be considered sufficiently
defined or cohesive nations and therefor potentially worthy of a state at the close of
World War I. The Immigration Bureau, the U.S. Census, and social scientists all had
different and evolving conceptions of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but the roster of nations as the U.S. saw
them in the 1910s was codified in the Versailles Treaty. This dissertation will reconstruct
the transatlantic debate over identities that started in controversy and led to world war,
with lasting consequences for migrants well into the twentieth century.
This project joins a small group of works that looks at the process of ethnic
identity formation (also referred to as “ethnicization”) for the Austro-Hungarian Empire
from a transatlantic perspective. While scholars have already argued that the experience
of migration was significant in inaugurating or augmenting the national or ethnic
consciousness of some Europeans, they have yet to fully explain the significance of
nation-building abroad for a multiethnic state like Austria-Hungary where nationalizing

4

projects were fiercely contested. The role of migration in national identity formation is
different for immigrants coming from a unifying state like Italy, on which many scholarly
models are based, than for a splintering empire populated by people increasingly
identifying as different ethnicities.4 Historians have observed the pride that many
American immigrants displayed once their co-nationals in Europe achieved an
independent state, but have been less attuned to the role of those immigrants in attaining
that state, not to mention the hardships that new state borders created for immigrants
from the so-called “belt of mixed populations.”
Since the research for this project began in 2012, several significant new books
have appeared that make this study one of a cohort of critical scholarly appraisals of
North American-Austro-Hungarian migration, and new studies in relevant subfields have
undergone a “transnational turn,” further informing this project and the questions it asks.
Nicole Phelps’s U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference, Tara
Zahra’s The Great Departure, and Annemarie Steidl, Vladimir Fischer-Nebmaier, and
James W. Oberly’s From a Multiethnic Empire to a Nation of Nations. Together, these
works have thoroughly updated the history of migration from Austria-Hungary to the
United States, reflecting several historiographic developments.5 The study and writing of
4

For analysis of the Italian case, see Mark Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy
Abroad (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008).
5
Phelps, U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference: Sovereignty
Transformed (Cambridge, Mass,: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Zahra, The Great
Departure: Mass Migration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016); Steidl, Fischer-Nebmaier, Oberly, From a
Multiethnic Empire to a Nation of Nations (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2017). Also
worthy of mention are Brian McCook, Borders of Integration: Polish Migrants in
Germany and the United States, 1870-1924 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011) and
Ulf Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State
since the Late Nineteenth Century (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2016), which focus
on geographically adjacent areas and include parts of the former empire. Before this new
5

history has benefitted tremendously in recent decades from the transnational turn,
revealing overlooked global connections and new opportunities for research and
interpretations. This is evident in U.S. immigration and ethnic history in the increased
attention to migrants’ home states; in Eastern European history in the proliferation of
studies of borderlands and the interconnected histories of lands formerly encompassing
the Habsburg Empire; and in the reconceptualization of U.S. diplomatic history as the
study of “America and the world.”
Scholars of nationalism have delved more deeply into how ethnically-based
definitions of nations have been historically constructed and have argued against the
omnipresence of firm ethnic descriptors and ahistorical tellings of nation’s origins. In the
process, they have conceptualized a variety of expressions of identification that defy rigid
ethnic categories, including hybrid identities and the concept of “national indifference.”6
Much of the migration literature on migrants from Austria-Hungary, until recently, was
written before the rise of critical nationalism studies and focused on single ethnolinguistic group. While a tight focus on a narrowly defined community can have many
generation of literature, classic works from the 1980s included the works of Julianna
Puskás (on Hungarians), M. Mark Stolarik (on Slovaks), and Paul Robert Magocsi (on
Carpatho-Rusyns). Notable works in the intervening years include subsequent books by
Puskás, Stolarik, and Magocsi; June Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism and
Robert Zecker, Streetcar Parishes; and several books by Tibor Frank and Steven Béla
Várdy. Significant works on European migration include studies by Leslie Page Moch
and Josef Ehmer, et. al., European Mobility. Full ctiations can be found in the
bibliography.
6
For theoretical frameworks, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Ernest
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, and the works of Anthony D. Smith and Rogers
Brubaker. Notable studies on the evolution of ethnic identities in the Habsburg Empire
and its successor states include Pieter Judson’s Guardians of the Nation, Jeremy King’s
Budweisers into Czechs and Germans, Tara Zahra’s Kidnapped Souls. A forceful
articulation of the place of the United States in these processes is Kathleen Neils Conzen,
David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli, “The
Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.,” Journal of American Ethnic
History 12, no. 1 (1992), 3-41.
6

benefits, many of these studies drew strict and somewhat artificial boundaries around the
groups that they were studying, ignoring evidence of multilingualism, integration with
other Austro-Hungarian migrants who spoke different languages, and the coalescing of
communities around religion and place rather than ethnicity. “With few exceptions . . . ,
those who have described the process of ethnicization have either totally ignored
evidence of mixed identities during the wary stages of immigrant settlement or, because
of the spares and inconsistent nature of the evidence, at best have dismissed it with a few
passing comment,” historian Béla Vassady noted.7 Works that treat immigrant
communities’ embrace of panslavism at the turn of the twentieth century, for example,
remain very few. Many turn-of-the-century nationalists admitted knowing that nations
were at least partly constructed, even if they believed that blood mattered. Migrant
journalist and author Thomas Capek described famous poet Ján Kollár as “By birth a
Slovak, by affiliation a Bohemian, but by preference a ‘Slavonian patriot’”8 Many
transatlantic migrants could be described in similarly varied ways, and many considered
themselves Americans on top of their mix of European identities. This work builds on
recent studies by nationalism scholars to showcase a range of ethnic self-identifications
7

Bela Vassady, Jr., “Mixed Ethnic Identities among Immigrant Clergy from Multiethnic
Hungary: The Slovak-Magyar Case, 1885-1903,” in The Ethnic Enigma: The Salience of
Ethnicity for European-Origin Groups, ed. Peter Kivisto (Philadelphia: The Balch
Institute Press, 1989), 47. Vassady was one of the few historians, until recently, who
directly addressed this historiographic problem directly in own work. Despite the
challenge of multiple language and sometimes competing narratives, Ewa Morawska’s,
For Bread and Butter, Dominic Pacyga’s Polish Immigrants and Industrial Chicago,
Josef J. Barton’s Peasants and Strangers, Michael P. Weber and Roger Simon’s Lives of
their Own, and David C. Hammack, Diane L. Grabowski, & John J. Grabowski, eds.
Identity, Conflict, and Cooperation also grappled with these questions on the city level.
“The streets of Chicago created ethnic consciousness in a peasantry that had tended to
identify with their village and region rather than the larger concept of Poland,” Pacyga
concluded (xv).
8
Thomas Čapek, The Slovaks of Hungary: Slavs and Panslavism (New York:
Knickerbocker Press, 1906), 18.
7

and governmental labels, from individuals who described themselves by region of origin
or religion rather than ethnicity to the most ardent separatist nationalists.9
Modern historiography about the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and its
successor states faces an uphill battle against powerfully nationalist historiographies.
Even scholars who accept the constructedness of ethnicity struggle against a current of
primordialist views and narratives that focus on national foundings. Particularly
problematic is the concept of Austro-Hungarian governmental sources and especially
interwar Hungarian histories require carefully reading to distinguish the imperial bugaboo
of panslavism – synonymous with disloyalty, agitation, and betrayal – from panslavism
as concerted action among individuals from different Slavic-language-speaking groups
from within and sometimes without Austria-Hungary to argue for autonomy or formal
recognition within the Empire. Panslavism historically, in Europe and the United States,
has taken many forms, from a Russian-led movement to unify all Slavic-speakers; to
Austro-Slavism, usually proposing a tripartite rather than dual configuration for the
Habsburg lands; to South Slav (later Yugoslav) and Czecho-Slovak alliances.10 In all of
these forms, opposition to panslavism and Slavic nationalisms one thing that Austria and
Hungary, still adjusting to and seeking to protect the dualism of the monarchy, could
largely agree on, especially in their foreign policy in the United States.
The reasons for Austria-Hungary’s dramatic dissolution remain a central question
in Central and Eastern European historiography; this study argues that transatlantic
migration must be part of the answer. Although studies looking at the rise of nationalism
9

This work also reappraises terms like “panslav” and “magyarone” that were once
common in describing political affiliations in relation to nationalism but have fallen out
of use since. See, in particular, Chap. 2.
10
Alexander Maxwell, Choosing Slovakia: Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language
and Accidental Nationalism (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009).
8

in the Habsburg Empire have examined every possible factor contributing to heightened
separatist nationalism, analysis of the place of emigration and return migration in many
of these studies is surprisingly sparse. A secret memorandum from the Hungarian
Undersecretary of State to the Prime Minister in 1902 clearly explained, “For the
institution of national statehood it is absolutely necessary that the ruling race . . . become
the majority of the population. . . . Providence . . . has granted another population factor
which has significantly raised the proportion of the Hungarian element at the expense of
the nationalities,” he continued. “This important new factor is the mass emigration of the
non-Hungarian population.”11 Austrian and Hungarian governmental authorities
recognized great significance of emigration in the functioning and the politics of the
Empire, and historians of nationalism in the Habsburg Empire can no longer sideline
migration. Around 3,547,000 emigrants departed Austria-Hungary for overseas
destinations between 1876 and 1910, amounting to 7–8 percent of the 1910 population.12
While Pieter Judson’s recent The Habsburg Empire: A New History makes a compelling
case for an empire brought asunder by military defeat rather than undermined by internal
ethnic tensions, external ethnic tensions in the form of separatists nationalism among the
Empire’s emigrants in the United States played an important role in the shaping the postwar future of Austria-Hungary.13

11

Quoted in Puskás, Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide: 100 years of Hungarian Experience
in the United States (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2000), 90. See also Monika Glettler,
Pittsburgh-Wien-Budapest: Programm und Praxis: der Nationalitätenpolitik bei der
Auswanderung der ungarischen Slowaken nach Amerika um 1900 (Vienna: Austrian
Academy of Sciences, 1980), 401-6.
12
[William P. Dillingham], Emigration Conditions in Europe (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1911), 351.
13
Pieter M. Judson, The Habsburg Empire: A New History (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2016).
9

Aggregately, migrants from Austria-Hungary were the fourth-largest contributor
to the United States in the two decades before the First World War, but their significance
in American history and historiography is often understated. This is particularly the case
when they are divided up by post-war national group. Austro-Hungarian migrants joined
Irish, Italian, and German workers in transforming industrial labor in America, and were
among the central subjects in many of the famous incidents of and classic literature on
U.S. immigration history and labor history.14 Scholars of U.S. migration and ethnic
history as well as scholars of U.S. foreign affairs have all turned their attention to issues
of mobility and the relationship between migrants and their home and host
governments,15 showing a strong convergence of interests in to subfields that previously
had little in common. This dissertation makes a compelling case for the benefits of
further integrating migration history and diplomatic history to ask new questions and also
to find new sources to answer old ones.
This study draws on archival material from both sides of the Atlantic and brings
together governmental sources and sources produced by migrants themselves. The
holdings of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, the Austrian State
Archives, and the Hungarian National Archives, particularly underutilized by previous
scholars, are rich repositories of information on both governmental affairs related to
14

For examples, see hallmark studies Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of
the Great Migrations That Made the American People (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2002), John Bodnar, The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in
Urban America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), and John Higham,
Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers University Press, 2002).
15
Recent studies that have informed the methodology of this work, alongside those
already mentioned, include Donna Gabaccia, Foreign Relations; Erez Manela, The
Wilsonian Moment; Roger Daniels, Coming to America; Mae M. Ngai, Impossible
Subjects; Madeline Y. Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home; and many others
cited below.
10

migration and on Central and Eastern European migrants’ lives in America. While
Austria-Hungary’s linguistic diversity and its status as two states under one emperor-king
pose several challenges to historical study, it also has some archival benefits: many
documents appear in both Vienna and in Budapest or in both German and Hungarian,
creating a second opportunity to decipher difficult handwriting or faint type, and
materials collected by various branches of the Austro-Hungarian government were
routinely translated into German and/or Hungarian from a host of languages.
Governmental sources are put in conversation with the personal papers of individual
migrants found in small archives across the United States, records of immigrant clubs and
churches in the United States, and a wide variety of newspapers.
Understanding the process of Central and Eastern European nation-building in the
United States requires exploring a series of overlapping and intersecting histories, which
unfold in the chapters that follow. Chapter 1 explores multilingualism and the founding
and dissolution of multiethnic immigrant organizations in the United States, charting the
timeline of ethnic splintering in America compared to back home. Chapter 2 traces the
long arm of government of Austria-Hungary in affairs of the Empire’s subjects in the
U.S., as well as the American government’s views on migrants from Eastern Europe and
Austro-Hungarian governmental interference on U.S. soil. Chapter 3 follows return
migrants back to Austria-Hungary, analyzing homeland governments’ competing desires
to entice migrants home but exclude individuals and ideas that they perceived as a threat
to the imperial order. Chapter 4, set primarily during World War I, reveals the turn to
separatism among migrant nationalists and the expansive role that some of them received,
with the help of the U.S. government, in determining the post-war order. Finally, chapter
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5 analyzes the dual effects of new European borders after 1918 and American
immigration restrictions passed in the early 1920s on Central and Eastern European
immigrants in the United States. Post-World War I borders, accompanied by the
staunching of the flow of new immigrants by the war and restrictive quotas in the United
States, together recast the relationship between many immigrants and their homelands.
Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the First World War peace treaties remained a
contentious issue in the interwar era for many migrant groups whose nations were losers
in the settlement, and affects politics even into the present.
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Chapter 1
Austro-Hungarian Migrants and Ethnicization Abroad
Migrants to the United States from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were notoriously difficult to categorize. The
Empire was home to over a dozen linguistic groups, with varying degrees of affiliation to
a group identitifcation based around language or the idea of a nation. As we will see
below, religious and regional identities were far more salient for most migrants than
ethno-linguistic ones, particularly in rural areas. Nationalism was concentrated much
more heavily among the bourgeoisie, and even there it competed and often coexisted with
cosmopolitan imperial patriotism. Many migrants were multilingual in various ways, able
to communicate in two or more of the empire’s many languages. Yet for decades,
scholars assumed a natural, preexisting, even biologically determined ethnicity among
Austro-Hungarian subjects, both at home and as migrants to the United States. Part of this
assumption comes from official sources. Austro-Hungarian census records and U.S.
naturalization records list only a single nation of origin or mother tongue, so statistical
information on the multilingualism of imperial subjects is famously hard to come by. The
vast majority of immigrant studies discussed a single ethnic group, and assumed that
migrants had a fixed national identity before stepping foot in the United States. The
dismantling of Austria-Hungary made such an approach seem appropriate, as many
Slavic nationalist projects achieved states. Furthermore, many of the sources that
historians rely on to write migration history were written by committed nation-builders,
who continually called on their fellow migrants to reorient their worldview to a national
identity. Histories thus frequently gloss over the abundant evidence of other affiliations
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and cooperation among those who might later consider themselves members of different
nations. This chapter will illuminate the process by which many migrants from AustriaHungary came to develop a more fixed, exclusive ethnic-national identity as a result of
their migration to and their time in America. I argue that migration to the United States
was, for many, a critical process for forging an ethnic affiliation. Migrants who arrived in
the United States with a fixed, conscious national identitfication were the exception
rather than the norm.
Migration abroad was the key factor in people’s ethnic fashioning and
refashioning. “National consciousness among the immigrant peasants was much stronger
than among those who had staid in the old country,” historian Julianna Puskás explained
of migrants from the Kingdom of Hungary near the turn of the twentieth century.
“Forming ethnic groups was the first step in the process of adaptation, and it was here
that many immigrants first became really aware of their Magyar consciousness.” Puskás
suggested “the pressure of the prejudices of American society” as the key factor in the
development of their national consciousness.16 Puskás’s language, however, still
suggests that Magyar consciousness was an innate thing that Hungarian migrants
inherently had in themselves somewhere and had to discover. M. Mark Stolarik, foremost
among the historians of Slovak America for decades, complained of the “common
American error” “incorrectly label[ing]” Slovaks as Hungarians.17 Stolarik’s framework,
like that of countless historians of his generation who wrote Eastern European migration
16
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history, employs “ethnic origin” as the primary category of analysis long before many
migrants themselves recognized national identity or ethnicity as the primary way of
identifying who they were. Historians must consider each migrant on a full spectrum
from nation-builder to nationally indifferent. Each underwent a constant evolution in his
or her place on this spectrum and was influenced by factors like class, family, and what
communities they are migrating from and to. Indeed, even long ago a few scholars
astutely noted that the “borders between Croat and Slovene identity,” for example,
“which seem so firm now to scholars of ethnicity and then to nationalists, were capable of
great elasticity”18 and that nation-building was a “complex, erratic, paradoxical
phenomenon within immigrant communities from the heterogeneous ethnic regions of
Austria-Hungary.” Beginning in the late nineteenth century, nurturing a national identity
seemed to become a moral imperative in many nationalist circles. Nation-building is
revealed to be a much more elastic process when we look at the views and choices of
migrants themselves alongside those of competing governments and blustering nationbuilders. As one historian described it, nation-building and national identity formation
were “complex, erratic, paradoxical”19 As Conzen, Gerber, Morawska, Pozzetta, and
Vecoli synthesized in “The Invention of Ethnicity” in 1992, scholars now see ethnicity as
created rather than primordial, and this study agrees. Ethnicity is “continuously being
reinvented in response to changing realities both within the group and,” in the case of
migrants, “the host society.”20
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This chapter will discuss, first, the fluid, mixed identities of Austro-Hungarian
migrants through their multilingualism, arguing that one’s dominant language did not
simply equate to an obvious ethnic affiliation for an individual. This began to change as
migrants began to identify increasingly be ethnicity. Governmental agencies in Europe
and the United States externally categorized them according ever-changing national,
ethnic, and racial labels, contributing to the stiffening of ethnic categories. The
ethnicization process was due not only to blatantly political national activity in the United
States, but also to the changing relationship between religious and ethnic identity and the
soft power of migrant social institutions. All of this culminated in the splitting of
migrants’ early multiethnic institutions and their individual association with a single
ethnicity, based primarily on tongue. The timelines for the politicization of ethnic
identification and separatism in the United States unfolded earlier than in East-Central
Europe. Rather than fleeing from a nationally repressive, crumbling empire, migrants
came to the United States seeking opportunity and in the process changed the way they
saw themselves both individually and communally.
It is critical to remember that migrants seldom considered nationality in their
decisions to migrate; their motives were overwhelmingly economic. Although political
complications stemming from national identification figured prominently in the
emigration of a notable few, push factors for most migrants were dominated by concerns
relating to work and taxes, followed by land. In 1904, the Hungarian government
collected reports from the sheriff of each county that had seen high rates of emigration.
County officials were tasked with explaining the causes and magnitude of emigration and
what changes could potentially stem its tide, breaking down their discussion into different

16

language groups. The causes that the county officials cited were overwhelmingly
economic. Their proposed solutions dealt at length with the struggles of agricultural
families, particularly as they related to their tax burden, the availability and unavailability
of work at different times of the year, and landlessness. In Bereg County, the sheriff
proposed a decrease in taxes and reform of interest laws, governmental coordination of
off-season home production of baskets and straw products to generate off-season income,
and public assistance for obtaining more and better farming implements and machinery.
Some sheriffs explained that speakers of different languages tended to cluster around
certain occupations that faced somewhat different economic challenges or labor needs in
many counties; for example, local Hungarian-speakers were more geared toward farming
and local Slovak-speakers more geared toward herding. But others stated that the reasons
for emigration were the same for the area’s Slovak-, Rusyn-, and Hungarian-speakers
(when they could even be distinguished). Ethnicity was not a salient push factor for
emigration in any of the county reports. The closest were some Hungarian-speaking
migrants from Zemplén County, who chose to migrate to the United States after seeing
that some Slovak-speakers had made good money abroad. Even as Budapest officials
asked about nationality in the migration equation, village and county officials continually
responded with answers about occupation and class (seasonal unemployment and high
taxes), reflecting the factors that migrants themselves cared about the most.21 Migration
itself changed all of this.
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The Multilingual Migrant
Multilingualism was a fact of everyday life in much of Austria-Hungary and
among its migrants. Immigration to the United States was particularly strong from the
northern counties of the Hungarian Kingdom, where Slovak, Rusin, Hungarian, German,
and Yiddish were all spoken. Bohemia, Transylvania, and Vojvodina were also linguistic
borderlands, and German was widely spoken in many cities and larger market towns,
even in areas that were not otherwise German-speaking. The Empire’s extensive school
system contributed to multilingualism. With public schools supplemented by a host of
religious schools, instruction could be received in an array of languages. Even in nonGerman-speaking areas, German knowledge expanded through the school system.22 As
German was the primary bureaucratic language of Austria, all those with aspirations to
work in government and civil service learned it. But German was far from the only
language used in official matters. Emperor Joseph II’s attempts to make German the
official language of the empire in 1784 produced an aggressive backlash among the
nobility in Hungary, who used Latin as the official language of Parliament and favored
the use of Hungarian instead, thwarting the greatest opportunity to implement a single
imperial language. Hungary’s Nationalities Law of 1868 mandated official recordkeeping in Hungarian in the Hungarian half of the Empire and enumerated minority
language rights in areas where at least one fifth of the population requested them; while
the promised minority language rights were honored only selectively, the law nonetheless
heightened multilingual knowledge.23 An 1880 decree made Czech a language of
22
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administration in Bohemia, elevating the status and careers of civil servants who spoke
both Czech and German.24 The Imperial & Royal Army encouraged multilingualism,
giving all soldiers a working knowledge of German-language commands, authorizing the
use of other regimental languages, and allowing for greater social mobility for nonHungarian speakers than most other occupations in Hungary.25 So, too, did imperial
commerce, which connected disparate parts of the empire through trade.
Migrants, not surprisingly, then, had rich and varied linguistic histories, reflecting
the richness of the linguistic genealogies of their families and the richness of the
linguistic landscape in Austria-Hungary. Statistics on multilingualism in Austria-Hungary
are sparse and sometimes highly politicized,26 but migrant testimonials offer an
abundance of evidence on their multilingualism, changing language use, and challenges
in identifying themselves. Migrant George Zemanovic’s father had spoken Slovak at
home, Hungarian at school, and German while serving in the Austro-Hungarian military;
he always “reverted” to German to cuss. His mother spoke Slovak and Hungarian, which
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she learned while living with her sister in Budapest.27 As Yolan Szency Batta, from
present-day Santovka, Slovakia, remembered, “when I came out I spoke Bohemian good.
Bohemian and German . . . and Hungarian.”28 Adolph Norman, from present-day
Bratislava, was schooled in Hungarian, German, and Hebrew, and perhaps also spoke
Yiddish.29 John Chomos, describing his home village of Vășad in Transylvania,
explained, “This is at the juncture of the Hungarian and Roumanian border. . . . [B]order
town people talked both languages.”30 “[In] the part of Europe we came from, the
Balkans,” Mimi Pintorich explained, in addition to “Slavish,” “we understood German,
we understood Hungarian.”31 Knowledge of a variety of languages was widespread and
utilitarian in a multi-ethnic empire.
Migrant Louis Zauneker’s multilingualism defined his encounter with America.
On the one hand it eased his passage, as he could communicate widely with other
migrants. On the other hand, it prompted difficult questions about his personal identity
once he left the Hungarian-Yugoslav borderland and arrived in Cleveland. “I made some
friends on the ship,” he explained to an interviewer. “They spoke every language that you
could think of, and I could speak German, I could speak Hungarian, and Slovanian [sic].
So I could speak to those people. So I wasn't completely lost.” Rather than seeing himself
as voyaging alongside a bunch of “others,” Zauneker shared a common lot and common
27
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languages with his fellow travelers. Rather than disdaining speakers of other languages
and being glad to abandon Europe to leave them behind, he seems unproblematically
indifferent to languages and nationality. It was only upon his arrival in the United States
that he had trouble explaining who or what he was. Trying to enroll in school, he
recalled, “I remember the first thing [the teacher] asked me what my name was. … In
German my name was Ludwig Vukan, in Hungarian it was Lajos Vukan, and in
Slovanian it was Laici Vukan, and then when I came to America, they asked me what my
name was” and he did not know how to answer. While Louis Zauneker’s facility across
three languages and his identification with three different names might be more fluid and
flexible than many other migrants, his multilingualism and his questioning of his identity
as it related to language were widely shared.32
Adding English was, of course, the most common next step for migrants, but
some migrants learned new European languages in preparation for or as a result of their
migration. As we learned in the introduction, Andrew Lichanec learned Slovak not in
Europe but in America, as he was learning English. Migrant Irma Willishitzs Schmidt’s
mother sent her to live with an aunt to learn German before bring Irma out to America,
presumably to expand her job prospects. Once over, she quickly got a job doing
housework in a German-speaking home, and eventually married a German immigrant.33
Emery Kanarik, whose Budapest family spoke Hungarian, used Slovak at the market, and
learned German and Hebrew in school, benefitted from his multilingualism in American
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to earn his livelihood in German translation.34 One migrant settling in central New Jersey,
added Hungarian to her linguistic repertoire of Slovak and English, communicating with
neighbors around each others’ kitchen tables. The Bécsi Magyar Ujság, a Hungarian
newspaper published in Vienna, reported in 1884 that Slovaks in America were
“fervently learning Hungarian” to make them more desirable to employers, to
communicate on the job with Hungarian-speakers or perhaps to take advantage of the
better impressions among some employers of Hungarian workers over Slavic ones.35
Ethnic neighborhoods coalesced in countless American cities, but rather than
enclaves, they were cultural meeting grounds not entirely unlike the diverse areas than
many Austro-Hungarian migrants came from. Cleveland featured churches from nearly
half a dozen groups “all within a one-mile radius of that center point of the West Side
Market at the corner of West 25th and Lorraine:” Hungarian Calvinist, Irish Catholic,
German Lutheran, German Catholic, and Slovak churches all in close proximity.36 Mimi
Pintorich, whose family settled in Bridgeport, Connecticut, observed that “in our area it
was . . . Hungarian and, uh, Yugoslav community, ” with Italian-Americans also in the
immediate area.37
The linguistic pluralism of individuals and communities gave migrants more
options, whether in marriage, business, recreation, or worship. Historical sociologist Ewa
Morawska found intermarriage rates as high as 25-30% for Slovaks and Rusins in
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Johnstown, PA at the turn of the century.38 In New Brunswick, New Jersey in 1905, ingroup marriage between Hungarians was common (only Budapest and Cleveland had
more Hungarian speakers), but women listed in the local census as Hungarian were
married to men born in Austria, Bohemia, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the U.S.
Hungarian men were married to women born in the same places, as well as England and
Canada.39 Beyond marriage, other facets of community life made ethnic blocs porous.
“Whomever did have an establishment better be able to talk two or three languages to be
able to maintain a good [business],” John Chomos remembered.40 “I was singing in every
club,” regardless of language, Philomena Skapik recounted, “with the Hungarians, with
the . . . Bohemian[s].”41
Austro-Hungarian migrants’ multilingualism eased the difficulty of learning
English for many of them, as they were already used to learning and juggling multiple
languages. “The language [English] was so easy to me compared to German,” Emery
Kanarik recalled.” “It was marvelous. German had all these rules about feminine gender
and neutral and masculine gender, . . . Your nose has to have a gender. It's just
ridiculous. . . . English, compared to this, was a cinch.”42
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When, with successive generations, knowledge of multiple European languages
waned, served not simply to Americanize Europeans but as a language that facilitated
continued communication between disparate Austro-Hungarian communities. In
Cleveland’s Buckeye Road neighborhood, at one time the largest concentration of
Hungarian-speakers outside of Hungary, English offered a neutral language of
communication. “When we stepped out” in Buckeye, John Chomos recalled, “we spoke
English to my Slovak friend, or to my Irish friend, or to my German friend.”43 The
Cleveland Board of Education’s “Many Peoples, One Language” campaign promoted
English in a multicultural city. The advertisement for adult English and citizenship
courses featured the text in multiple languages, including English, Italian, Polish,
Hungarian, and Hebrew, all in the same text size. The image featured an obviously
immigrant couple, but without any specific markers of European national dress.44 While
language policies favoring German and Hungarian in Austria and Hungary were favorite
grievances among nationalists – American social scientist Emily Balch explained that
nationalists in Europe “indignantly repudiate the use of languages which they understand
perfectly well”45 -- nationalists seldom complained about the predominance of English in
the United States.46 While some might lament the loss of the languages of the
motherland, even to the most ardent nationalists, learning English had fewer overtones of
national betrayal.
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Ethnic Categorization in the Migration Bureaucracy and American Racial Science
As migrants left Austria-Hungary and entered the United States, countless
European and American officials, fellow passengers, new neighbors, and employers
asked them to explain their national background. Austria-Hungary’s dualism and its mix
of nationalities stymied American officials and social scientists. The American
classification system of aliens in migrant records contributed to the ethnicization of
migrants by often requiring that they articulate (or be assigned) a single race, nationality,
mother tongue, or other marker of national identity. The categorization schemes of the
U.S. Immigration Bureau, ethnographers, and racial theorists on both sides of the Atlantic
indeed created the spectrum of ethnicities that outsiders would recognize. The U.S.
government and social scientific community employed evolving classification systems
that expanded and contracted and lumped migrants very differently in the decades
between 1880 and 1930. Racial theories assigned essential characteristics to migrant
groups and touted ethnic traits that made them appear to be better or worse employees.
These types of theories and competition for jobs sometimes recast labor competition
ethnically. Migrants’ rivalry in the United States for jobs and Americans’ goodwill were
easily confused with homeland “hatreds,” but in reality these American situations were
creating or heightening European antagonisms, rather than reflecting or continuing
them.47
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The U.S. Immigration Bureau’s categorization scheme was particularly
influential, despite being wildly inconsistent and rather unorthodox. In 1902, the
commissioner for the Royal Hungarian Commission of Agriculture, wrote to T.V.
Powderly, the U.S. Commissioner-General of Immigration, to complain about the
Immigration Office’s misunderstanding of Austria-Hungary’s dualism: Until 1899,
migrants were categorized as coming from Bohemia, Hungary, or Austria. “Though this
division was incorrect from the diplomatic standpoint,” he explained, nevertheless it was
easy to show the exact number of the Emigration of Hungarian citizens and of Austrian
citizens,” presumably by adding the figures for Bohemia and Austria together. “AustriaHungary consisted since 1867 of two separat [sic] monarchies . . . ; there is no AustroHungarian Government, and no Austro-hungarian citizenship, there are only Hungarian
citizens, and Austrian citizens.”4 8 From 1899 to 1910, the list of options included
“Bohemian and Moravian,” “Bulgarian,” “Croatian and Slovenian,” “Dalmatian,
Bosnian, and Herzegovian,” “German,” “Hebrew,” “North Italian,” “Magyar,” “Polish,”
“Roumanian,” “Ruthenian” (other places written as “Russniak”), and “Slovak.” Needless
to say, some of these descriptors had more staying power than others. After 1910,the list
was revised to reshuffle some of the categories, eventually eliminating northern Italian
and combining several Balkan groups.
Geographic and nationality designations were further complicated by the breakup
of the Empire after 1918 and the creation of new states, which will be discussed further in
chapter 5. Post-war practices add another layer of complication and ambiguity to pre-war
nationality designations. Migrants were assigned to quotas based on the state that their
48
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place of origin now belonged, not by nationality,49 but US citizenship paperwork began
to include additional information in the 1920s to clarify migrants’ pre- and post-war
homelands and “race.” Gergely Dorkó of Mollenaur, PA, who received his naturalization
in April 1920, was still listed with a previous naturalization as Austria-Hungary, which
had ceased to exist as a political entity in 1918. A few years later, Louise Kroncsis of
Canton, OH who became a citizen in 1929, was listed as “race Magyar; former
nationality Rumanian,” adapting to the increased complexity of borders in the post-war
era.50
American social scientists, some of whom were deeply interested in migrants,
likewise contributed to enscribing as well as muddling the nationality categories of
America’s East Europeans arrivers. In Margaret Frances Byington and Paul Kellogg
Underwood’s Homestead, part of the Pittsburgh Survey, the used “Slav” as a “generic
term to include Magyars and Lithuanians, as well as those of the Slavic race.”51 The
Dillingham Commission’s “Dictionary of Races or Peoples” entry for “Slav” sought to
analyze the “many-sided Slavic stock” by the “numerous ‘races’ which comprise it.” The
“Classification of Slavic Tongues” included an Eastern & Southern Division of Russian,
Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian, and Slovenian, each with numerous sub-categories, and a
Western Division of Bohemian (of which Tsekh [sic], Moravian, and Slovak were subcategories), Polish, and Lusatian (Wend). Dillingham commented that the list was “of
Slavic languages, not of physical races,” noting that Bosnian and Herczegovian had been
omitted, and raising questions over the exact placement of Macedonian, Bulgarian, and
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others. The Dictionary’s entry on Slovaks raised the issue of whether Slovaks were
actually Moravians or Czechs, and attempted to explain the diversity of Slovak dialects.
As social scientists of all stripes – ethnographers, linguists, sociologists, anthropologists –
and policy-makers published their findings, the options of nationality categories
expanded and shrank, affixing some into the position of a “race” and others as only
speakers of a “dialect.” This was dependent, in large part, on group size, the number of
people in the United States to study, and the ability of some writers of a “nationality” or
“race” to publish in English about it to gain an American social scientific audience.
Social scientists scrambled to discover the truth, largely blind to their own role in
creating the categories of East European nationalities.
The US press used a jumble of governmental, social scientific, and local labels
(sometimes migrant-generated, sometimes nativist slurs), expanding but further
inscribing the dominance of ethnic categories. Outbreaks of labor unrest or localized
violence among migrants were often ascribed to old ethnic hatreds in the American press,
rather than disputes over real issues in migrants’ American lives. The Washington Post
reported in1903, for example, that the city of Whiting’s “Slavs engage[d] in battle.” “On
one side are Servians, Hungarians, and Croatians. On the other side,” it continued, “are
those designated by the generic name.” All the police could deduce were that the
“contest[,] begun in Europe,” was now being “fought out on the soil of Indiana,” a highly
unlikely transatlantic continuation of a homeland brawl in the Midwest.52 In white
American parlance, “Hunkie” and “Bohunk” did not strictly slur Hungarians and
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Bohemians, respectively. The terms reflected Americans’ ignorance of the migrants in
their communities, but also the reality of migrant communities’ national ambiguity.53
Bureaucratic and other categories of nationality were selectively embraced and
challenged by migrants, depending on local conditions and the development of national
movements in their vicinity. Historian Josef Barton found that Cleveland’s Serbs, Croats,
Slovenes, Slovaks, Poles, and Hungarians developed some pride in a “hunky” identity.54
The multilingualism and lack of a firm ethnic identity of migrants confounded migration
bureaucrats and Americans, and the shifting official definitions of what “nationality” or
“race” continually influenced the roster of peoples migrants might belong to. Immigrant
nationalists could use governmental or social scientific evidence to lend legitimacy to
their national projects and bring others in to the nationalist fold. But as even the social
scientists noted, many of the debates about nationality and race were muddled by
religion. It was in churches, most of all, that migrants would be ethnicized.

Joint Institutions and the Parting of Ways: Migrant Churches Form and Split
From 1890 to the outbreak and aftermath of the First World War, scores of
previously multi-ethnic institutions in the United States split into more linguistically
exclusive institutions and hundreds founded by and for single groups. Churches, clubs,
and societies had begun more inclusively, only to splinter along developing ethnolinguistic lines near and after the turn of the century. The parting of ways could take all
forms, from an intentional separation to the slow building to dominance of a single
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language group. The dramatic effects of turn-of-the-century nationalization demand that
we answer why migrants from Austria-Hungary were initially willing and eager to found
multi-lingual institutions in the United States and why, at points both before and after
World War I, many parted ways. Furthermore, we must explain why this history of early
multiethnic roots was successively written out of the historical record. Churches are the
most effective venue of migrant life to tell this story. Anniversary yearbooks, along with
other institutional records, shed light on organizations’ multiethnic or multilingual
foundings, and also illustrate how these early collaborations were jettisoned from
institutional histories with each passing anniversary. Hungarian-Slovak Protestant
churches founded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the most
common but by no means the only category of collaborative ventures among AustroHungarian migrants that later split into ethnically exclusive institutions.
“The First Magyar and Slovak Evangelic Lutheran & Reformed St. Paul Church”
in Pittsburgh was among the first churches, if not the first, founded by Austro-Hungarian
migrants in North America. According to a church history from 1960, “This unnatural
union, which the Hungarian and Slovak brethren founded, collapsed” within two years in
a “split of nationalities.”55 The division of the church into the “Slovak Lutheran Church
of Braddock” and the Calvinist-denomination “Pittsburgh and Vicinity First Hungarian
Reformed Church” within two short years might suggest a simple split by nationality, but
that notion ignores the reasons behind the church’s joint founding itself and the rapidly
changing conception of what would have been considered “natural” in the 1890s. For
migrants coming to the Pittsburgh area, interactions among Hungarian- and Slovak55
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speakers was by no means exceptional. The title page of the church’s original collection
book celebrated “God’s help” in the church’s founding, in both Hungarian and Slovak;56
the collaboration seems to have been completely genuine. The Lutheran and Reformed
[Calvinist] union, however ethnically or linguistically coded, was the result of a
compromise, as the two churches’ future denominational distinction also suggests; while
Lutherans and Calvinists both preached the gift of God’s salvation through faith alone,
Calvinists believed that faith itself was a gift that God gave only to a predestined few.
Eight miles stood between the church in Pittsburgh and the new Slovak church in
Braddock, indicating that distance and growing numbers in the city’s vicinity also
prompted the planting of the new Braddock church. Pastor Francis Ferenczy is said to
have brought together Hungarian and Slovak Reformed peopled from a number of
surrounding towns that he visited, including Homestead, Duquesne, and Rankin, all of
which subsequently developed stand-alone churches in the coming decade.57
Furthermore, a number of Slovak-speaking parishioners in Pittsburgh continued to
worship with the First Hungarian Reformed Church, which continued to hold six Slovaklanguage services a year.58 Thus, to interpret the 1891 split of the Pittsburgh church as an
ethnic fissure does not completely stand up in retrospect.
While the Pittsburgh church split very early in its history, as many other hybrid
undertakings did once they had the financial wherewithal to do so, a number of multiethnic churches remained intact well into the twentieth century. The heightened
nationalism of the First World War and the subsequent peace settlements became the
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impetus for severing long-standing unions into separate entities. American migrant
churches pursued disunion partly as a response to new European borders and geographies
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. As the ecclesiastical centers of power shifted away from
Europe to American-based denominations, multi-ethnic churches faced new challenges
and overwhelmingly pursued the single-nationality option that we mistakenly assume
they had chosen from the outset. In many ways like the Pittsburg church, the Perth
Amboy Hungarian Reformed Church, founded in 1903 by Felvidék – or upland area –
migrants from Hungary, is a classic example of a collaborative ethnic institution. In the
album for the church’s twenty-fifth anniversary, celebrated in 1928, the historical profile
for the church noted that “the Slovak speaking Reformed element took an active part in
the churchlife from the very beginning.”59 Slovak language services were offered one
Sunday a month and even expanded as late as 1911. What, then, went wrong? “In 1924
the Slovak members, who had been connected with the church from the very beginning,
seceded from the church. This action was taken by them on account of the political
troubles and antagonism in Europe. The Slovak Reformed people here,” it continues,
“were influenced by Bohemian Presbyterian ministers and their secession was made in a
peaceful manner. The great majority went into the Presbyterian Church and a few
remained with us who were satisfied with Magyar services.” Doctrinally nearly identical,
the split was much more clearly ethnically motivated.
These few short lines are profoundly telling in the ways that they confirm postwar nationalism but at the same time subtly challenge narratives about ethnic exclusivity.
First, the cooperative venture lasted for over twenty years. Second, the source claims that
the split was prompted by European, rather than local, circumstances. Third, the split is
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said to haven been caused by outside agitators in the form of Czech clergy, rather than
disputes originating from within the community. Existing documents make it hard to
definitively confirm or deny these latter two causal factors, but the church’s early history
nevertheless suggests decades of unremarkably peaceful shared history, followed by a
seemingly velvet divorce. A bifurcating institution often yields a second set of documents
from which to examine the institution’s history, in this case in the form of a 1951 Golden
Jubilee Book of the Slovak Calvinist Presbyterian Union, which has a chapter on the
church coming out of the Perth Amboy split. The history therein clarifies for us the
breakdown of the administrative roles that Austro-Hungarian governing bodies had
played in immigrant churches and how that brought about ethnic separatism. When the
Perth Amboy pulpit became vacant in 1923 with the bilingual pastor, Reverend
Nánassy’s, return to Europe, there was no longer a mother church mechanism to secure a
bilingual minister and only Hungarian-speaking candidates applied for the position. It
was then that Slovak speakers withdrew from the church and arranged for a Slovak
Presbyterian minister from Jersey City to hold weekly services for them, founding the
Slovak Presbyterian Church of Perth Amboy.60 The Slovak yearbook speaks rather
amicably about the split, as though a bilingual successor to Rev. Nánassy would have
continued a viable union. A sizable faction of the remaining Hungarian-speaking
congregation splintered off to found the John Calvin Magyar Reformed Church just a
mile away over disputes about American denominational affiliations; not all splits were
national.
The Perth Amboy case leaves us with as many questions as answers, but suggests
a clear alternative to Pittsburgh’s rapid, though also rather amicable, division along
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ethno-linguistic lines: a long-standing union with a post-war split. This alternative lends
evidence to the interpretation that it required some ethnically divisive catalyst to drive
multi-lingual congregations into difference national camps. As in Perth Amboy, it was a
staffing problem that split the Slovak and Hungarian Calvinist Church in Mount Carmel,
Pennsylvania. While the original minister had been bilingual, like many of the
parishioners, and offered services in both Slovak and Hungarian, his successor could not
preach in Slovak, angering many of the Slovak-speaking members who saw their nativelanguage services disappear. In that case it was the Hungarian-speaking minister and
some members who left to found their own church, leaving the original church to the
Slovak-speaking congregants.61
In other cases churches’ multilingual foundings were rewritten to fit national
tropes. These retellings of church histories can seem blind to the different priorities of
early migrant communities and the constructedness of national projects. At the start of
the twentieth century, “the Slovak Calvins living in Greater Cleveland . . . were …
worshipping God in three different Hungarian churches,” a history of the Slovak
Calvinist United Presbyterian Church in Lakewood, Ohio explained. “Even their names
were enrolled in the membership of those churches.” While the author recounts this as a
cause for dismay, the integration of Slovak- and Hungarian-speakers in both work and
social life was completely normal in the Cleveland vicinity (as it had been in northern
Hungary). Why do these later yearbooks scoff at interethnic worship? The proposal to
found an exclusively Slovak Protestant congregation arose in 1917, well into the war,
followed the founding of an exclusively Slovak men’s fraternal lodge. The creation of an
ethnically exclusive social space in the form of a fraternal club apparently prompted
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dissatisfaction with the lack of a comparably exclusive religious space. The yearbook
states in no uncertain terms that “when Men’s Lodge No. 33 was organized and the
people had an occasion for frequent meetings which afforded them opportunity to
exchange their views, the enthusiasm [‘to organize an independent Slovak Calvinistic
Church’] was revived.” 62 By 1917 many Slovak-speaking Americans and Hungarianspeaking Americans hoped for different outcomes for the war.
It is easy to forget that amid growing national separatism and linguistic
differentiation, ethnic churches also increasingly had to accommodate English. Many
later-generation immigrants were multilingual in the sense of a single East European
mother tongue and English, with parishioners no longer speaking other languages of the
Empire. Holding a joint Hungarian-Slovak service would no longer be a mutually
understood sharing of linguistic affinities as it had been at the outset, but instead a dated
practice. The minister and presumably some older church members could continue to
play a bridging role, but finding truly trilingual clergy — fluent in Hungarian, Slovak,
and English — was an even taller order and increasingly difficult with U.S. immigration
restrictions enacted in 1924.
Clergy, we see, were highly influential in the national disposition of migrants. As
educated and often middle-class professionals, clergymen were overwhelmingly
multilingual and initially among the most significant go-betweens between migrant
communities and homelands; at the same time, they were also more likely to be
nationalists than their parishioners, and many occupied influential community leadership
positions to spread nationalism. Some persisted successfully in their roles as cultural
intermediaries and leaders of peaceful multilingual congregations; others committed
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themselves whole heartedly to a national cause; others returned to Hungary. “Many
shifted back and forth in identity,” historian Béla Vassady explains, “greatly frustrating
and irritating both their Slovak and Magyar compatriots.”63 “Apparently,” Vassady
continues, “Hungarian and Slovak observers alike had difficulty accepting the fact that . .
. the shifting of ethnic identity more often reflected practical opportunism and community
politics than ideologically motivated nationalism.”64 Indeed, Vassady’s observation of
community politics is crucial: the language mix, nationalist sentiment, political tenor, and
everyday concerns were widely different in a majority-Slovak congregation of Pittsburgh
versus the mixed congregation of Bridgeport, Connecticut versus a primarily Hungarian
parish in Indiana. Because of all of these factors, as well as their personal sentiments,
clergy could be found all along the political spectrum from Habsburg loyalist to ethnic
separatist.
Two points on this spectrum that deserve special attention are so-called panslavs
and magyarones. Clerics’ nationalism could be expressed in conflicting ways in their
relationship to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy: loyalty to the Hungarian government
and/or the Habsburg monarchy, indifference to politics, or support for ideologies that
gave greater autonomy or a new state for the Empire’s Slavs or emerging ethno-linguistic
groups. Slovak-speaking clergy were present, for example, among Czech-oriented
“Panslav” groups, exclusive Slovak nationalist groups, as well as pro-Hungarian
“Magyarones.” This plurality among the largely Catholic Slovak clergy (who, we should
note, very often preached to non-Slovak-speaking parishioners) illustrates some of the
many ways migrants themselves chose to align themselves nationally and politically, and
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how clerics’ nationality views could be politically significant. “This great aggregate of
humanity in a strange land” one Hungarian government official noted, “is for the most
part in the hands of the priests, owing to the profoundly religious spirit of the Slovaks. . .
. This great moral factor, however,” he lamented, “is unfortunately wielded against us. . .
. Only seven [of the Roman Catholic congregations are] presided over by patriotic priests
[loyal to the Hungarian government], while the Slovak and Bohemian priests of PanSlavic sympathies, hailing from the Western Highlands lead the other 35.”65
Political Magyaronism was widespread among a segment of emigrant clergy in
the United States, as were accusations of panslavism. Middle-class professionalization in
Hungary’s growing school system, economic system, and urban cultural modernization
were the sine qua non of pro-Hungarian Magyaronism and also anti-Hungarian Slavic
nationalisms. Culturally chauvinist elements of Magyarization abounded and chaffed at
many rising intelligentsia, while others experienced its benefits far more than its
repressions. Among Rusin intelligentsia, according to John-Paul Himka, “the Magyarone
orientation” was characterized as “natione Hungarus, gente Ruthuenus; that is,
Hungarian as far as political consciousness and high culture was concerned, with some
room for an oral Ruthenian vernacular, colorful ethnographic peculiarities, and
Lokalpatriotismus.”66 This offered an elevation of status and an acceptable expression of
Rusin national pride. For clergy in northern Hungary, Magyaronism could share political
underpinnings with Austro-Slavism, believing, at least for the time being, that the Slovak
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nation’s interests were best served within Hungary. The Hungarian government promoted
Magyaronism among emigrant clergy through kingdom-wide Magyarization in mid-late
nineteenth century Hungary broadly,67 and specifically through the intentional selection
of clergy loyal to the government to serve emigrant congregations, which will be
discussed further in the subsequent chapter.
Nationalists and governmental officials feuded endlessly over whether specific
priests were too Magyarone or too panslav, loyal or traitorous Slovaks or Hungarians.
Long before historians like Tara Zahra, Pieter Judson, Jeremy King, and others began
analyzing the side-switching, hedging of bets, and seemingly contradictory behavior of
the so-called “nationally indifferent,” in Europe, Monika Glettler and Bela Vassady
identified the lives of Jozef Kossalko, Ignác Jaskovic Ferenc Dénes, Imre Haitinger, and
other priests, mostly from the Kassa diocese, as archetypes of ambiguity. These men
engaged in Slovak national life in the United States, serving multilingual congregations,
working for Slovak-language newspapers. But they did not seek political quarrels with
the home government; for example, their papers were politically neutral or proHungarian. Kossalko and Dénes were both active in the First Catholic Slovak Union,
undermining their otherwise largely Magyarone credentials. But when Kossalko founded
the First Catholic Slovak Union, he intended it primarily as a religious alternative to the
secular National Slovak Society, emphasizing religious over national community.
Particularly among clergy, but also their congregants, religion and nation could be
intertwined; for most migrants, like priests, religion initially won out. A Magyarone
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political orientation reflected a “complex, enigmatic nature” and featured “frustration and
mental anguish” for priests68 when the development of East European nationalisms in the
United States pressured many of them in increasingly nationalist communities to take a
side. Some embraced Slavic nationalism confidently and their congregations followed,
while others continued to emphasize their religious mission in the facing of rising
competition from secular nationalist organizations.
These cases raise the counterfactual but fascinating question of how the ethnic
tagging of migrant institutions, already begun by the turn of the century, would have
played out without the acceleration of national separatism spurred by World War I.

Immigrant Institutions and the Ambiguities Beyond Ethnic and Religious Identities
As East European migrant communities became more established in the United
States, other forms of association and socialization joined churches in migrants’ lives of
leisure. Migrant organizations flourished, most of which were religious or religiously
affiliated, but some of which were secular. Many migrant organizations sought to nurture
their members’ home culture(s), being a bridge into increasingly political nationalism
and, for some, active nation-building.
The disjointed correlation between religion and ethnicity across Austria-Hungary
was a defining factor in the Empire’s diversity, cohesion, and division and this disjointed
correlation has an equally important history among migrants in the United States. In
Austria-Hungary, Catholicism unified under one Church many imperial subjects who
spoke an abundance of languages in geographically disparate parts of the Empire. Some
Protestant denominational affiliations in Hungary had marked linguistic affiliations, such
68
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at the association between Reformed Calvinism with Hungarianism and Greek
Catholicism’s strength in Rusin-speaking areas, but these correlations were not without
exceptions or complications. For example, most Slovak-speaking Protestants were
Lutheran but some could be found in Reformed worship communities, particularly in
borderland regions. Hungary promoted “Jewish” as a religious affiliation, not an ethnic or
racial one, in contrast to most other areas of Europe, encouraging Jews to also identify
themselves with an ethnic nation.69
Whereas migrants’ primary group affiliation in Austria-Hungary came from
confession, the development of national projects abroad transferred the locus of identity
to ethno-linguistic group. This transition was never complete and unfolded in different
ways in different places, but this greater emphasis on national affiliation vis-a-vis
religious affiliation in describing oneself to others was widely shared among migrants
and also reflected in the organization of migrant institutions. Although the American
immigrant congregations discussed above prioritized geography, denomination, and
shared languages in founding churches, in the years leading up to World War I ethnicity
around a single shared language became the dominant form of migrant organization.
Religious affiliation was central to the identity of many Europeans and, as we
have seen, an imperfect fit with national affiliations. In interviewing older migrants,
Morawska found that “an old immigrant, asked about his nationality (ethnic background)
would hesitate, ponder and then alternate between the two” – in this case Rusin and
Slovak -- “correcting himself back and forth and adding to his own confusion by
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declaring religious adherence (Roman Catholic or Greek Catholic).”70 Migrant John
Chomos, while identifying as a Hungarian, went to a German Lutheran church, becoming
Lutheran although he had been raised a Greek Catholic.71 Mark Stolarik found in
Bethlehem, PA that Slovak-speaking Greek Catholics took on a Rusin identity when they
affiliated with the Rusin-majority Greek Catholic church, instead of the Slovak-speaking
Roman Catholic church72, valuing their Greek Catholicism over their Slovakness. This
adoption of a Rusin identity was not necessarily purposeful, but a community-based
evolution or forging of identity tied to local circumstances and expression of worship. An
excellent local priest or the geographic proximity to a church building could draw
congregrants.
Religious affiliation far outweighed language of instruction for many parents
when approving of marriage partners or choosing schools for their children. In
Homestead, “the only Catholic school was St. Michael's, and it was a Slovak school,”
Elizabeth Martin (nee Feczko) remembered. “So we had to learn the Slovak language, the
English language, because we only knew Hungarian.” A teacher at the school, Sister
Alberta, used her own multilingualism to help the students who did not speak Slovak. “At
lunchtime she would take all these Hungarian children into her office and she would
translate or have us repeat or read.” Despite the additional difficulty of learning a new
European language that the family did not identify with, Elizabeth’s mother, Mary
Feczko, considered it worth it for her daughters to have a Catholic education. While Mary
Feczko prioritized confession over language, her experiences in Europe might have
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indicated that an additional language of instruction did not have to mean any negation of
her family’s first language, and objected to the coupling of a national judgment with her
religious choice for her daughter’s schooling: when registering Elizabeth for the school,
the “Catholic Slovak . . . pastor had written down F-E-C-K-O and that sort of angered my
mother because she wanted a Z in it,” a more Hungarian spelling.73 With the priest’s
intervention, Mary Feczko’s school choice became about ethnic politics at the same time
as religious education.
Organizations founded around either shared confession, perceived nation, and
language struggled with issues of inclusion and exclusion, national activism and national
indifference, their secular purpose and their religious purpose, even as they gained
enormously in membership and popularity. We can track migrants’ enthusiasm for ethnic
cultural life and nationalist projects through membership, events, and also monetary
contributions. A range of organizations and causes – family, local churches and
associations, and homeland projects – competed for working migrants’ meager leisure
time and donations. As we know, immigrants were most likely to invest their time in
labor to send money back across the Atlantic specifically to family, but investing in
ethnic-American institutions would strengthen the community there and do good work
through churches, parochial schools, and cultural organizations. Leaders attempted to
simultaneously build up institutions for the benefit of migrants personally but also for
“the nation.” One Slovak-American estimated that “welfare societies” had paid out a
“grand total of . . . over $250,000,000” by 1944, and that the publishing of SlovakAmerican newspapers cost half a million dollars annually. Alongside the commonly
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recognized organizations of mutual benefit societies and churches, clubs like the Czech
and Slovak Sokols were important in building national life abroad. In addition to
strengthening “physical culture,” the “Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol of the United
States’s aim was “to educate and instruct its members in the Slovak language and
history,”74 subjects that were routinely deemphasized if not excluded from education in
Hungary and, of course, American public schools.
Many secular organizations, like churches, started out serving a wider subset of
the multilingual Austro-Hungarian community, though these too were sometimes quickly
made ethnically exclusive. Newark’s First Hungarian Sick Benefit Society, a very early
Austro-Hungarian immigration organization, was founded by a mixed membership of
Hungarian-, German-, and Slovak-speakers. A Budapest newspaper reported in 1884, as
reported by the newspaper Amerikai Nemzetőr, that “The society’s name is Hungarian,
conversational language Slovak — and it’s [sic] books are administered in German; but
whatever they do or say — their feelings are Hungarian and [they] are proud that they are
Hungarian, as the colors on their badge also indicate.” One of the long-term goals of
Hungarian members of the group, the article continued, was its “operative
Magyarization.”75 (What “operative Magyarization” means is unclear, but it raises many
questions.) By the late 1890s, one of the Bohemian sokols (gymnastics clubs) in Chicago
had broadened to become the “Bohemian-Slovak Falcons.”76
Impulses varied among communities as to whether service to the nation was part
of their service to God, or if God was best served through institutions that served a
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broader swath of the migrant community with national questions put aside. Often times
very local circumstances in the make-up of the migrant community or the activity of
particularly ardent nation-builders dictated how this would be balanced. The Johnstown,
PA newspaper Cerkovnaja Nauka, published by the Greek Catholic church, addressed
both the Slovaks and Rusins77 who made up the membership, serving one Catholic
community in two languages. To immigrant nation-builders, migrants should not have to
compromise their nation. If there were no congregation in their mother tongue, rather
than use an “other’s,” they should found one. Thus, in New York City, conversely, the
existence of an older Slavic (primarily Czech-speaking) community and the
comparatively lesser importance of specific Protestant denominational differences
prompted instead the founding of ethnic churches. It helped, of course, that the city had
large enough of a population to host a number of Eastern European churches. The first
Hungarian church in New York opened membership to all Hungarian immigrants
regardless of religious affiliation78, including Protestants, Catholics, and a self-professed
Jew among their initial members. Chicago’s Bohemian community, on the other hand,
struggled to forge a pan-Bohemian community unobstructed by religious quarrels. “In all
important national undertakings, and especially at festivities, the Bohemians should act in
harmony,” the newspaper Svornost declared in 1884.
In this way we will create a good name among other nationalities. On these
occasions to classify ourselves as good Catholics or Liberals would be an
absurdity. Having these ideas in their minds, the Bohemian Sokols [gymmastic
clubs] have invited the Bohemians belonging to the Catholic church to their
festivity thus emphasizing that the Sokols are not sectarian in matters of religion.
Every good and honest undertaking and this one too, will always find a
destructive individual, whose desire is to keep the local Bohemian community
divided into two hostile groups and who endeavors to fire again the hatred of one
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Bohemian for another. … Every lawful citizen is welcomed by the Sokols,
whether he be a Catholic, Protestant, or an unbeliever; as long as he conducts
himself properly he will be treated with honor and respect.79
Nevertheless, many nation-based organizations were divided by religious or
political affiliation, even as nation-builders hailed the unity of the nation as the most
worthy goal. Despite the founding of a secular National Slovak Society in Pittsburgh in
1890, the First Slovak Catholic Union was founded later that year as well as its women’s
auxiliary in 1892, followed by the Slovak Evangelical Union in 1893 and the Slovak
Calvinist Union in 1901. For the founders of these organizations, a religious affiliation
set them apart from the secular National Slovak Society. Politics, of course, played a
prominent role in all of this. According to June Alexander, Father Kossalko founded a
Catholic alternative to the National Slovak Society because he was a Magyarone and
“opposed Slovak nationalism”80, but also because he feared that part of the process of
Americanization was Protestantization. By 1902, according to Alexander, the National
Slovak Society had just over 41,000 members, while the First Slovak Catholic and Ladies
Union had roughly the same number and the Protestant Slovak Unions had 10,000.
Religious societies thus edged out a secular society in migrants’ choices, though other
factors like the quality of insurance, publications, advocacy, local access, and social
factors certainly played a role alongside religious priorities.
Nationalists also had to fight an uphill battle against continued national
indifference. The immigrant press was full of entreaties for migrants to support projects
for their communities, churches first and foremost but also newspapers themselves,
benefit societies, clubs, and discreet events like lectures. In turn-of-the-century Chicago,
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for example, local Bohemians were asked through the paper to contribute to a home for
the elderly and an orphanage and to attend T.G. Masaryk’s lecture series. Articles calling
for support of these institutions and events did not hide their disappointment when
donations and interest were limited. “Already there has been much complaint about the
indifference of our citizens toward the ‘Home.’ . . . . Everywhere, in everything, we see
an almost staggering indifference to the undertaking,”81 the editors of Denní Hlasatel
complained in 1901. When T.G. Masaryk came to offer lectures at the University of
Chicago the following year, the paper once again complained about Chicago Bohemians’
tepid commitment to hear an emerging leader. “Hardly anyone attends his lectures at the
university and when he lectures among us, we burden him with useless questions . . . .
Unionists, socialists, catholics, liberal and protestants can have profit and pleasure from
the professor's lectures, but they must not expect Mr. Masaryk to be a referee in our
quarrels and arguments.”82 That newspapers engaged in continual entreaties and
admonitions suggests that migrants’ commitments to national projects was rarely as great
as nation-builders would have liked, especially until promoting national life found the
proper way to piggy-back on activities or institutions that offered migrants other benefits
in their daily lives.
East European Jews warrant special consideration in the place of religion and
ethnicity in migrant life. While Judaism and Yiddish helped forge a Jewish-American
community among Jews coming from all over Europe, the often German- and Hungarianspeaking Jews of Austria-Hungary sometimes did not speak Yiddish, and were therefore
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set apart from Jews who did.83 One migrant from Poland observed, “The Hungarian, and
maybe Roumanians . . . spoke only Roumanian or Hungarian. . . . . They don't speak
Jewish or they don't, I never hear them.”84 The economic and social benefits of
Hungarianness in Hungary created a substantial Jewish-Hungarian population that
defined itself as Jewish religiously but Hungarian culturally, an identification that
migrants carried to America with themselves. Historical sociologist Ewa Morawska
noted that Johnstown’s Hungarian-speakers “counted as ‘theirs’ the Jewish Hungarian
professionals,” who “not only served the Christian Hungarian community in Johnstown,
but took active part in the Hungarian national and cultural celebrations and even in the
church events. In no other East European group in the city — although they all dealt
regularly with Jews in business and sought their professional services — did social and
cultural relations reach such a degree of closeness.”85 Many other Hungarian Jewish
immigrants confirm this. “We landed in Yorkville because that's where the Germans and
Hungarians lived,” Lazarus Salamon explained. “Most of the Jews landed on the East
Side but we were closer culturally to the Germans and Hungarians. We would rather mix
with them than with Russian Jews. We were too far apart. . . . A lot of Jews from the East
Side went to the Bronx, but the Hungarian Jews, . . . they came to Astoria.”86 “I cook
Hungarian way. I bake Hungarian way. That's my custom,” Julia Blau, who arrived
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Yoland Jacobowitz, stated simply.87 This phenomenon of considering oneself religiously
Jewish but culturally Hungarian was ubiquitous and spoke to Jews’ greater integration
into Hungarian society compared to many other areas of Central and Eastern Europe.
Other Jewish American migrants could not always understand this duality. “A
Russian/Jew and an Hungarian/Jew are in my opinion two different worlds and one does
not and can not understand the other,” one mother explained. “My own daughter, who
was born in Russia, married an Hungarian/Jewish young man. She adopted all the
Hungarian customs and not a trace of a Russian/Jewish woman remained with her.”88 The
plight of the Russian Jewish mother speaks powerfully to the primacy of religion over
ethnicity in migrants’ affiliations; she presumably made no objections to the marriage
since her daughter had succeeded in finding a Jewish man, but found cultural/ethnic
reasons to lament the union after the fact. Jews remained integrated in the HungarianAmerican community much longer than others, though the abundance of JewishAmerican organizations, with their own brand of Jewish nationalism, drew them away
from Hungarian circles.
In time, nation-builders and immigrant communities found ways for national life
for the social purpose of the migrant community and political activism on American and
homeland issues to synergistically support each other. With a firm national community
with a rich social life and political clout, some consolidated national groups could seek
alliance with either other consolidated national groups on projects of shared interest or
87
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feel that they could safely expand their aspirations without threatening the identity of the
core.
Slavic migrant contributions to Slavic American churches, societies, schools, and
sokols could be interpreted by Hungarian governmental officials from a nationality
politics standpoint anywhere on a spectrum from nationally tagged or proud but
innocuous, to dangerously pan-Slavic. Migrant donations to Slavic organizations back in
the Habsburg Lands, for example to the Matica Slovenska, were even more directly
worrisome and seemingly confirmed Austrian and Hungarian governmental officials’
fears about the threat that migration and the development of Slavic nationalism abroad
posed to the Empire’s stability. When American Slovaks donated modest sums to the
Russian Red Cross in relief aid in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War, Hungarian
officials looked into this as seemingly obvious evidence of panslavism.89 When
Croatians protested against Hungarian rule in the city of Agram, today Zagreb, Chicago
Bohemians expressed Slavic solidarity against Austro-Hungarian power. “It is our duty as
Bohemians, to make collections for the benefit of our Croatian brothers and help them in
their battle with the savage Hungarian hordes. Croatians live among us, associate with us,
and participate in all our national undertakings,” Czech-language paper Denní Hlasatel
reported in 1903. Reminding readers that Croat Chicagoans had supported Bohemian Day
in 1893, the paper declared “it is now time that we showed, that we sympathize with the
unfortunate Slovak nation, which is being set upon, destroyed and murdered, and that as
true Slavs we stand with them.”90 With the Austro-Hungarian government’s concerted
effort at the ‘containment’ abroad of all things Pan-Slavic, voluntary donations of any
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size funding potential threats to the social order and any type of coordinated Slavic
activity immediately raised alarm.

Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen that much East European “ethnicization” and nationbuilding took place in the United States, phenomenally accelerated by transatlantic
migration. Governmental and social scientific bureaucracies, immigrant churches, and
secular immigrant institutions all contributed to the rise of “nationality” or “ethnicity”
becoming the primary way that many migrants (though by no means all) described
themselves. By 1903, the Austro-Hungarian government and Hungarian officials in
particularly decided to act more purposefully. In the subsequent chapters, we will see,
first, how the homeland Hungarian (and to some extent Austrian) government responded
to these developments, and subsequently how some of these East European national
developments were spread back to the Habsburg Empire.
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Chapter 2
The Long Arm of Austria-Hungary: Managing Migrant Loyalty in the United States
Austria-Hungary’s leaders perceived mass migration as a population crisis and
were thus highly interventionist in its response to trans-Atlantic migration to try to
maintain the loyalty to the Empire of migrants in America. The Austro-Hungarian
government initially opposed emigration but subsequently decided instead to insert itself
into the migration process, to both restrict and facilitate migration in ways that would
theoretically protect citizens but still serve the countries’ needs. Historian Tara Zahra has
argued that “As policymakers recognized that they could not completely seal their states’
borders, they increasingly sought to control and redirect emigration for the good of both
migrants and the state. Two strategies,” she continues, “served these goals: transforming
mass emigration into purposeful forms of ‘colonization,’” – planting and nurturing
settlements of citizens elsewhere– “and expanding social protections for citizens abroad,
creating what amounted to new transnational welfare states.”91 But Austria-Hungary’s
intervention was more aggressive than that, particularly in regard to nationality politics:
governmental intervention sought to keep migrants loyal to their home governments and
to quash the threat of competing nationalisms. This chapter will explore the very active
role that the Austro-Hungarian government — especially the joint Foreign Ministry and
the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office — played in overseeing migrant loyalty in the
United States beginning in 1902 until the outbreak of world war, to examine both its
successes and the protests it inspired.
The Foreign Ministry and branches of the Hungarian government used a number
of methods to address the challenges that accompanied migration (like the depopulation
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of some villages and changes in the labor supply) and integrate themselves into migrants’
lives abroad. Their tactics began at home and subsequently travelled across the Atlantic.
The first method was legislative, to control the terms of legal exit and attempt to channel
emigration through certain sanctioned routes. Intervention then followed migrants
overseas: the government integrated itself into the migration bureaucracy at multiple
levels, putting people on the ground in the United States to watch and work on the
government’s behalf, and finally attempting to integrate the home government into
migrants’ American lives through the press, church, and cultural events and institutions.
Austria-Hungary operated way-houses for migrants in New York City, utilized a large
and growing consular network in the United States itself, subsidized a number of
immigrant newspapers and social organizations, sent religious figures to serve migrants’
spiritual needs, engaged in cultural education and propaganda, advocated on behalf of its
subjects in serious labor problems, and, most controversially, spied on migrants,
particularly those whose ideas were perceived as a threat to the Empire. The AustroHungarian government would be involved in migrants’ journeys in all phases – from
departure through the duration of their time in the U.S. to, for some, their return.
Austria-Hungary’s responses to emigration and its actions in the United States
reveal some of the challenges of the Empire’s dualist structure in responding to an issue
with both foreign (and therefore joint) and domestic (and therefore separate) implications.
While the dual monarchy shared a military and set joint foreign and economic policy,
domestic affairs were handled through separate parliaments in Austria and in Hungary.
Emigration was not simple to categorize as an exclusively foreign or domestic affair, as it
inherently blended the two. The Empire operated unified consulates in various locations
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in the United States, serving migrants from both Austria and Hungary, but emigration
was just as much a domestic affair in relation to the depopulation of counties, different
official Austrian and Hungarian ports of embarkation (Trieste and Fiume, respectively),
and different internal needs for labor. Thus, an examination of the long arm of AustriaHungary inevitably includes Austrian initiatives, Hungarian initiatives, and also
concerted efforts.
Hungary concerned itself with emigration and migrants’ lives abroad much more
actively at the outset of twentieth century than Austria. Governmental approaches
differed in the two halves of the Empire on how to manage loyalty and diversity; while
Austria experimented with constitutional equality and the distribution of representation
for constituent peoples (for example, the Moravian Compromise of 1905, which
apportioned seats between German- and Czech-speakers in the Moravian Diet), Hungary
pushed for cultural identification as Hungarian (regardless of “blood”) to build a more
unified and homogenous nation-state. As the emigration of Hungarian-speakers from
Hungary picked up in the last years of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the
twentieth, after early years of migration dominated by Slovak- and Rusin-speakers,
Hungarian officials became increasingly concerned with maintaining the modest
statistical majority that Hungarian-speakers recently held within the Kingdom. Thus,
Hungary participated with Austria in the functions of the joint Foreign Ministry’s
initiatives, but also pursued more intervention in the lives of its migrants abroad under
the purview of the Prime Minister’s Office and other Hungarian ministries outside the
Foreign Ministry that did not require consensus with Austrian officials.
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The Austro-Hungarian government sought to address the emigration crisis
through several measures, some of which seemed to or really did contradict each other.
To limit and control legal migration, Austria-Hungary would define the laws surrounding
emigration and support it by providing designated domestic ports and a series of migrant
services to facilitate to the process. The Empire essentially traveled across the Atlantic
with migrants to support them in their lives abroad bureaucratically, religiously, and
culturally. The home governments nurtured ties between the homeland and America, to
keep migrants loyal in their time abroad and welcome them home when they were ready
to return. But Austria-Hungary’s long reach across the Atlantic could just as easily be
manipulative as supportive, especially to Slavic nationalists. Austria-Hungary’s efforts to
maintain the loyalty of the Empire’s citizens consistently backfired.
The controversy surrounding Hungary’s transatlantic campaign for migrants’
loyalty is encapsulated in a scathing 1906 remark from U.S. Immigration Bureau
inspector Marcus Braun, who had himself immigrated to the United States from Hungary.
He described the position of the Hungarian government as follows: “Let them gather in
the American dollars, but let us continue our paternal (?) supervision. Let us prevent them
from assimilating with the American people; . . . let us insist that they, instead of
becoming Hungarian-Americans, remain American-Hungarians, let us edit for them their
newspapers; let us teach them by our own teachers and preachers; let us continue our
control over them.” “The Government of Hungary,” he concluded, “went about the
accomplishment of these purposes with a vengeance.”92
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Emigration as Perceived Crisis
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian government
spoke of transatlantic emigration as a growing crisis. Europeans had migrated seasonally
for centuries, but transatlantic labor migration, while sharing some similarities with intraEuropean labor migration, posed new challenges. Transatlantic migrants went further and
stayed longer; ultimately, their movements transformed many migrants’ home villages
and their relationship to it.93 Authorities treated emigration as a “crisis” (rather than as an
opportunity, as many migrants did) because of uncertainties it introduced to central issues
in Austro-Hungarian politics, including population (particularly in regard to the tax and
labor base), nationality, and military questions. “That a nation like that of the Magyars
loses yearly a percentage of its inhabitants by emigration is a very deplorable affair,”
U.S. Immigration Bureau inspector Marcus Braun observed. “The Magyar patriot has
indeed reason to weep over the fate of his country,” he continued. Mass migration on
such a great scale “threatened the very life of the nation.”94
Population was a concern to Austro-Hungarian governmental officials in both an
absolute and relative sense. Emigration, one official explained, threatened “not only
Hungary’s population with catastrophe, but also its great power standing.” As Zahra has
explained, “In an era in which demographers saw population as a measure of political,
economic, and military strength, these numbers induced panic in the halls of government
and beyond. . . . To many, the loss of millions of workers represented a disgraceful
symptom of underdevelopment, poverty, and imperial decline.”95 Emigration was
perceived to effect the Empire in so many ways that it prompted leaders from all walks of
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life to object to the changes it would bring. Conservative military officials and
landowners, who in Hungary were often also members of the tax-exempt aristocratic
parliament, were particularly concerned. “The most harmful” effect, one official
explained, was the threat to Hungary’s ability to defend itself with the loss of men
eligible for military conscription, particularly in areas around Kosice, Zagrab, and
Pozsony/Pressburg where the army was trying to strengthen recruitment. Emigration also
caused the “total disintegration” of families and “threaten[ed] the state’s economic
strength with serious danger,” the official continued. The most robust workers emigrated;
as they were usually young men, this further impeded the establishment of new families.
Hungary thus stood on the brink of depopulation, many feared, not only from the loss of
emigrating individuals but due to its perceived long-term disruption to natural population
growth. If mass migration were to continue unchecked, “Hungary, like the monarchy,
would be unable to keep pace in peopling with the other great powers.” In its effect on
defense and economic strength, emigration, officials feared, would “induce the decay of
the monarchy’s world standing.”96
The issue was not just how many people were leaving; it also mattered who was
leaving. Emigration in general, officials argued, had to be curtailed or controlled, but
with special attention to maintaining the numerical supremacy of Hungarian speakers,
estimated at roughly 51-54 percent of the population in the 1900 and 1910 censuses.
Authorities became alarmed when emigration, initially higher among Slovak speakers
from Hungary’s northern counties, began to catch on among Hungarian-speakers as well.
Some lawmakers, in fact, saw emigration as a means to Hungary’s linguistic
consolidation; Undersecretary of State Count Kuno Klebelsberg explained to Prime
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Minister Kálmán Széll that “Providence . . . has granted another population factor which
has significantly raised the proportion of the Hungarian element at the expense of the
nationalities. . . . This important new factor is the mass emigration of the non-Hungarian
population.”97 Thus, he concluded, it was “not opportune” to hinder their emigration.98
Hungary’s governmental programs to entice return migration, discussed more fully in the
next chapter, focused heavily on Hungarian speakers. Governmental attempts to manage
migration were by no means limited to the titular nation, but maintenance of a
Hungarian-speaking majority was imperative.
High governmental officials feared the grave implications for the economy of
migrants’ lost labor potential, while local officials, in many cases, were quicker to see the
economic benefits of emigration despite its political and societal costs. Baron Louis de
Levay, Royal Hungarian Commissioner of Education, explained that emigration drained
the base of taxpayers and laborers who could “very profitably be employed at home.”99
Many Hungarian officials would have agreed, of course, that the tax base would be
weakened but disagreed about employment prospects. Village mayors frequently cited
lack of remunerative employment, at least seasonally, as migration’s primary cause.
Villagers sought work abroad primarily because their seasonal jobs did not earn enough
to pay their expenses and high property taxes, which overwhelming burdened the
peasantry because of aristocratic exemptions.100 The government claimed it had already
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begun to take measures at home for industrial development, land settlement, and
parceling projects, but insisted that curtailing emigration was the “responsibility” of the
royal Hungarian government, to serve as a “counterweight” to this “destructive
migration.” Since emigration fever was still so great, the operations would have to be
carried out in America as well, so that “we can hold on to emigrants not yet saturated by
ideas dangerous to the state, and, when possible, have return migration.”101
After several years of rhetorical opposition to emigration, the Hungarian
government concluded in 1902 that migration to the United States could not be stopped
and was actually in the country’s economic interest, bringing in about “100 million
crowns yearly.” “But it must be prevented from expatriating the people emigrating,”
officials insisted. Thus, while the government continued to restrict emigration and control
its “manner and route” to best benefit Hungarian businesses and governmental coffers, it
endeavored “to keep Hungarian patriotism alive in the emigrants and to bring back all
who have finished making their living.” Prime Minister Kálmán Széll promised the
establishment of a “bureau or institution in American itself for the protection of
emigrants, to keep the Hungarians in America good Hungarian citizens.”102 While these
measures might quell fears at home about permanent depopulation, and did try to
eliminate corruption by steamship ticketing companies sending agents to the countryside,
they raised new concerns about government paternalism and ran counter to Americans’
desire to see migrants Americanized. Historian Julianna Puskás astutely observed that the
outcry in Hungary over emigration was not exclusively about emigration itself, but the
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“catalogue” of social and political tensions it brought into clearer focus,103 including
divergent national projects.

Crisis Management through Legislation
In 1902, Austria-Hungary began to take more decisive action to curb and control
emigration, first through legislation and subsequently through more on-the-ground
means. The Hungarian Parliament passed the Emigration Act in 1903, which outlined
measures to curb emigration, channeled migrants who chose to leave Hungary to the
Hungarian port of Fiume on the Adriatic, temporarily banned the usual routes via German
ports, and laid out the government’s initiatives to maintain migrant loyalty in America.
Austria promoted travel through its domestic port of Trieste, served by the Austrian
Lloyd, Austro-Americana, and Canadian Pacific Railway steamship lines. As former
Hungarian Parliament member Louis de Levay explained to North American Review
readers three years after the law’s passage, the purpose was to “restrict emigration (as far
as possible), and to lead the inevitable current of emigration into a channel that would . . .
remove entirely the abuses from which the country and people have sorely suffered,”104
by which Levay meant “the daring activity of foreign agents and their native
accomplices” in swindling poor Hungarians to emigrate for the sake of commissions. The
law and subsequent reactions to it reveals Hungary’s desire to become a protector in the
emigration process, but also the power of money to trump ideology among politicians
legislating migration. The law proved highly controversial and highlighted divisions in
Hungarian political camps. Mass emigration persisted, and in fact grew exponentially.
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The law spurred new abuses even as it attempted to resolve others and became a model
for emigration restriction in neighboring countries.
Legislation and other governmental attempts at control of migration put the
Hungarian government in the compromised position of profiting from the migration of its
own citizens or, worse, outright corruption. In an open letter to the parliamentary
committee on emigration from 1905, author G.Z. scathingly characterized the Hungarian
government’s involvement in the emigration business through the 1903 law as “legalized
barter in human beings.” It was one thing to protect emigrants from Hungary from known
North German Lloyd agents and promote its own port to offer migrants a domestic,
economical alternative; it was quite another, G.Z. claimed, for the government to claim
an interest in migrants’ welfare but operate under the philosophy “Emigration from our
country is heavy, let us make it profitable.” “As a consequence of these orders,” he
charged, “… the hyenas of emigration ply their nefarious business under official
protection.”105 Prime Minster Széll “was guided by noble intentions” in preparing the
emigration bill, but his successor, István Tisza, exhibited “unseemly haste” in granting a
monopoly on passenger shipping to the English Cunard Line out of the Hungarian port of
Fiume and to the Central Ticket Office in sales, all of which enriched investors in these
government sponsored monopolies at the expense of the exodus of the country’s own
population, all in the name of the good of the country.106 To start, Fiume was not well
positioned or sufficiently developed to become Hungary’s only legal embarkation point.
“I yield to none in my ardent desire to see our Hungarian port prosper materially,” G.Z.
explained, “but it is impossible not to notice the unfortunate geographical location of that
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port for the transportation of our emigrants”; while the ocean trip from Bremen to New
York took ten days, from Fiume it took eighteen or more. Furthermore, rather than
limiting migration, the law and the accompanying monopolies for Adria Shipping
Company, Cunard Line, and Central Ticket Office, employing “commission-hungry
officials,” were responsible for the record-breaking numbers of emigrants from Hungary
in the years immediately following its passage. G.Z. sarcastically explained that the
outcome of Tisza’s “patriotic and beneficent exertions” was that Central Ticket Office
stocks were “now quoted considerably higher!” 107 The law was a mess, and migrants
continued defy it and flock to German ports when they could.
Baron Levay’s defense of the 1903 law in the North American Review was
intended to rectify “misrepresentation” of it in the American press, but many of his
arguments confirm why the law was so controversial. Levay explained that the law
attempted to staunch the emigration crisis by “restraining . . . individuals who attempt to
propagate the emigration idea among the people” – namely German shipping company
agents. This included an “interdict upon speeches in public meetings recommending
emigration, and upon advertisements, placards and notices in newspapers,” resulting in
“two months’ imprisonment and heavy fines.” Levay admitted that the Hungarian
Government, in doing so, “has gone to the extreme limits of a free state against its free
citizens,” but justified it to protect the country from “irreparable economic and moral
injury” and “to respect the laws of foreign Powers, especially those of the United
States.”108
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The United States Bureau of Immigration paid special attention to European
migration and the effects of foreign legislation by sending agents to explore the situation
on the ground. The Hungarian government did not take well to the arrival of Special
Immigrant Inspector Marcus Braun, sent to find out more about the 1903 Emigration Law
and migrant conditions in Europe more broadly. Working for the Immigration Bureau,
Braun, who had been born in Hungary, traveled throughout Europe — from London in
the west to Odessa in the east, from Hamburg in the north to Fiume in the south —
looking into European countries’ and shipping companies’ compliance with U.S.
immigration laws, particularly the exclusion of unfit migrants. Hungarian paranoia about
Braun’s mission and findings created an international incident: while in Budapest, Braun
accused Hungarian police of tampering with his mail. He was detained for the outburst,
setting off diplomatic drama over his treatment as an agent of a foreign government.109
Braun offered only mild critiques of Austro-Hungarian management of
emigration, just a small part of a continent-wide report. But he levied a much stronger
critique in his subsequently published pamphlet, which also reprinted a scathing
assessment of the Hungarian government’s legislative solution by a member of the
Hungarian Parliament. Braun’s initial findings on Hungarian emigration exposed the
work of migrant traffickers luring peasants to emigrate from the countryside, and also
other smaller-scale problems like the premature issuing of American passports to women
claiming to be the wives of male migrants who had already become US citizens, without
the proper proof of their marriage and the husband’s American citizenship.110 Braun’s
report praised Austria-Hungary’s opposition to contract labor migration and local
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officials’ clear public records of paupers, who were ineligible for a passport. Braun’s
report — far more concerned with the wrongdoings of steamship company agents and
subagents — could hardly be considered a smear campaign against Hungary. Far more
damning was his 1906 pamphlet, Immigration Abuses: Glimpses of Hungary. Braun
openly critiqued the Hungarian government, which had wronged him and jeopardized his
standing in the U.S. Immigration Bureau. “Instead of making Magyarland a land worth
while to live for, one also worth to die for,” he explained, the government had instead
pursued repressive policies in the 1903 law and other misguided attempts to addressing
the emigration crisis.111
Hungary’s attempt at a legislative solution to the emigration crisis thus failed
practically, politically, and diplomatically. Various aspects of the law proved both
ineffective and controversial with the public, western steamship companies, and the
American government, and furthermore was nearly impossible to enforce. Hungarian
citizens continued to emigrate via the closer German ports that offered shorter
transatlantic journeys and cheaper fares. Criminalizing emigration routes did little to
create goodwill among migrants and a desire to return, one of the central goals of
addressing the emigration crisis in the first place. The government would have to
consider other means to maintain migrant loyalty.

Managing the Crisis through Migrant Services
The migration of hundreds of thousands of migrants back and forth across the
Atlantic was accompanied by a considerably smaller but significant migration of imperial
bureaucrats to European ports and across the Atlantic. Foreign governments spent the
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equivalent of hundreds of thousands of dollars and governmental man-hours on
emigration management, aiming to check in with migrants in every phase of their journey
from their home village to their new American community, and hopefully back again.
The Austro-Hungarian government successfully integrated itself into many aspects of the
migration bureaucracy at official and also unofficial levels to channel and oversee
migration; block, assist, and keep an eye on migrants; and keep migrants in an imperial
orbit.
Whereas late 19th-century migrants’ interactions with homeland officials might
have ended with the state railway conductor as they crossed the border into Germany, the
intent of routing migration through Trieste and Fiume was to keep migrants in Austria
and Hungary as long as possible for the government’s and purportedly their own benefit.
As we saw above, Hungary’s attempt to consolidate ticketing and ship contracting in
governmental hands was one of the greatest failures of the governmental response to
emigration. Nevertheless, the services that Austrian and Hungarian officials tried to offer
at their national ports of Trieste and Fiume are significant. The greatest innovation at the
Fiume port was the Hungarian government’s facilitation of strict medical examination of
migrants before they embarked on ships, screening for trachoma, skin diseases,
tuberculosis, physical disabilities, and other conditions that were grounds for exclusion
under U.S. law, sparing migrants from making the long journey only to be rejected at
Ellis Island and forced to immediately travel back home.112 Thus, Austro-Hungarian
officials tried to lead migrants by the hand from the Trieste and Fiume docks to their
ships, and be the first to welcome them in New York.
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The Austro-Hungarian government joined other European governments in
establishing quasi-governmental immigrant homes in the United States. The homes each
had an official agent at Ellis Island to advise new arrivals and offered subsidized food
and lodging to migrants staying overnight in New York before continuing on to their final
destinations or for a longer period of time as they sought permanent lodging and
employment in the city. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry supported at least three
homes, with the state purpose of preventing imperial citizens from being swindled. The
curious division of these houses – one for German-speakers from the Empire, a
Hungarian Home for migrants of all nationalities from the Kingdom, and a “Polish”
(Austrian Pole) house for Catholic Slavic-language-speakers broadly – shows the ways in
which the relationship between loyalty, ethnicity, and religion were very much in flux
and inconsistent between Austria and Hungary. The inconsistencies between linguistic,
territorial, and religious divisions among the homes show Austro-Hungarian
government’s attempt to bureaucratically manage the contested nature of identity among
Austro-Hungarians. Clearly the nationality politics that were being actively debated in the
Empire about language, race, and citizenship were also being played out across the
Atlantic.
As quasi-governmental but officially American-based institutions, the Emigrant
Houses also illustrate the power dynamics and profound disagreements between AustroHungarian officials and various American parties. The Foreign Ministry had to work
through American boards to operate the homes, and it sometimes disagreed with the
Americans about who was to be served and at whose expense. U.S. Immigration and
Health Department officials also influenced the homes’ histories, forcing their temporary
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closure and stranding migrants in the short term, but ultimately bettering conditions by
demanding renovations for reauthorization. Operated by ethnic Americans, subsidized by
Austria-Hungary, and overseen by U.S. Immigration Service officials, the Emigrant
Houses operated at the confluence of transnational interests and power.
The Leo House was charged in 1904 with overseeing “immigrants of German
tongue, without difference of race or religion, coming hither from the Austrian Empire.”
The home received a quarterly stipend of 1250 Austrian crowns to subsidize operating
costs.113 Contracting with the pre-existing immigrant house, the Leo House, placed
certain restrictions on who the home was willing to house in exchange for the
governmental subsidy; it had previously operated as a German Catholic institution. The
agreement with the Austrian Foreign Ministry dropped the religious affiliation, but when
the Rector of the House, Urbam C. Nageleisen, was asked by the Austro-Hungarian
consul general whether the home would also accept “Italians and Rumanians, hailing
from Austria,” he replied that “the House is not sufficiently large and spacious enough to
accommodate more than those of the German tongue.” Nageleisen’s letter explicitly
excluding those of the “Latin race” exhibits the slippage between “race” and “tongue.”114
But even a stipulation that migrants be German speakers would not make for a monoethnic clientele. As we saw in chapter one, imperial subjects, especially from urban areas
and major market towns, often used German as the language of business and secondary
education; Leo House’s successor listed, among its guests for March 1913, Croats, Poles,
Bohemians, and Rusins, ostensibly all also German speakers.
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The different parameters at the Hungarian House reflect both the different
priorities of the Hungarian government and different conditions dealing with Americanbased operators of the home. Inaugurating a new institution rather than contracting with
an existing one, the Hungarian Relief Society had much more liberty in deciding who the
home would serve. Dominated by ethnic Hungarians, the home nevertheless would house
all migrants hailing from the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary within the AustroHungarian Empire, “without distinction of nationality.”115 The new Hungarian House
opened in 1909 to much fanfare from the immigrant press in New York, among both
Hungarian-language and German-language papers.116 Advertisements were printed in
Budapest for distribution to potential migrants in Hungarian, German, Slovenian,
Romanian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovak, and Ruthenian, anticipating and actively soliciting
among all the peoples of the Kingdom.117 This by no means suggests that Hungarian
officials or the Hungarian Relief Society were embracing ethnic equality. Rather, the
Hungarian government’s aims were to simultaneously provide migrant services to
Hungarian subjects and to limit minority subjects’ potential ethnic separatism by offering
services in a Hungarian orbit.
And yet the Hungarian House still became a subject of ethnic tensions. Slavic
nationalists tried to have the Hungarian House investigated by U.S. officials on at least
two occasions in 1910, likely affiliates of the “Slavonic Home,” an immigrant aid house
not affiliated and in competition with those subsidized by the Imperial and Royal Foreign
Ministry. According to Hungarian Home president Morris Cukor, false allegations were
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made against the home directly to U.S. officials by a “pronounced Pan-Slav” with ties to
the president of the Slavonic Home.118 In the scramble to offer influential migrant
services, the nationality politics of the Hungarian Kingdom were being played out in New
York.119
The Polish St. Joseph’s Home provide for the final segment of the Empire’s
migrant population. As with the Leo House, the Foreign Ministry contracted with an
established institution to house Slavic-language-speaking migrants, presumably just those
from outside Hungary. The majority of migrants served there were likely Polish-speakers
from Austrian Galicia, but also migrants from the handful of other Slavic-languagespeaking groups in Austria who did not also speak German. Thus, Austria’s approach to
dealing with the linguistic diversity of migrants differed drastically from the Hungarian
tactic of keeping all citizens under the same roof. Still, a Polish-led home was an
arguably safe choice from a nationality politics standpoint. Although it is unclear why the
St. Joseph’s home was selected for the contract, Polish-speakers were less frequently
involved with the panslavic separatist movements that the Empire so feared.120
Austro-Hungarian sponsored houses did not have exclusive rights to migrants’
business; a number of private houses competed with the government-supported ones,
even without the benefit of subsides, to further nationalist aims. “Self-identified Polish,
Slovak, Czech, or Hungarian associations, homes, and cooperative societies increasingly .
. . encouraged migrants to think of themselves as Polish Americans, Czech Americans,
or Hungarian Americans, rather than as loyal subjects of the Austrian Kaiser,” Zahra
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explains. These national homes were “founded precisely on the rejection of Austrian
patriotism,” Austrian Consul von Ploennies lamented.121 The failings of the Leo House to
accept all Austrian migrants further undermined Austria’s ability to compete with
ethnically-oriented houses. The Leo House’s inability or unwillingness to accept Italianspeakers from the Austrian half of the Empire would inadvertently have routed them to
Italian houses operated by the Society for Protection of Italian Immigrants or the Italian
Benevolent Institute. With the Italian government, like the Austro-Hungarian
government, actively pursuing a close relationship with its migrants abroad, the
possibility that Italian-speaking Austrian subjects, primarily from the region surrounding
Trieste, would associate with an Italian institution and seek unification with the new
Italian state was a reasonable threat.
The Emigrant Houses were thus places of both ethnic coexistence and
contestation. Of the thousands of pages of archival material on the homes, the only
mention of ethnic conflict is bureaucratic – the Slavonic Home’s alleged sabotage attempt
– not ethnic violence between migrants themselves. Subjects of the same crown arriving
across the Atlantic, the peoples of the Emigrant Houses had more in common than their
divergent paths in America and the new states formed after the First World War suggest.
Rather than a multiethnic anomaly, the transnational spaces of the Emigrant Houses in
New York City reflect the realities of diverse empires and the increasingly globalized
world accompanying mass transatlantic migration.
Through sponsorship of the Emigrant Houses the Austro-Hungarian could, if
indirectly and imperfectly, continue to protect and channel migrants in their formative
first days in the United States; after that, the task fell primarily to political and religious
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agents of the Austro-Hungarian government, specifically consuls and clergy. Consuls and
consulates in foreign countries had initially fulfilled economic functions, but transformed
to fulfill more political roles as migrants joined trade as the main concerns between
states. Austria-Hungary’s first consuls in the U.S., for example, were not AustroHungarian diplomats, but rather American businessmen who would coordinate and
promote Austro-Hungarian goods on the U.S. market. Their duties rapidly transformed
to issuing visas and proof of citizenship and managing migration affairs. As historian
Nicole Phelps has argued, in the age of mass migration states “began to claim jurisdiction
over their citizens anywhere in the world, and they expected their claims to sovereignty
over the bodies of their citizens to trump territorially based claims to jurisdiction.”122
With a series of consulates abroad, Austria-Hungary and the United States could
coordinate complicated affairs of citizens in that country.123
The number of Austro-Hungarian consulates in the United States to assist and
oversee migrants mushroomed dramatically in the 20th century, performing a number of
duties with both practical and ideological purposes. Alongside Washington D.C., New
York, and Philadelphia, by the outbreak of World War I the Empire had operated
consulates in Chicago, Cleveland, Buffalo, St. Paul, Charleston and Clarksburg in West
Virginia, along with Pittsburgh, Hazelton, Uniontown, and Wilkes-Barre in
Pennsylvania.124 For migrant workers who intended to return to the Empire, these
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consular services were important resources. Practically, consuls could advocate on behalf
of Austro-Hungarian citizens in problems with citizenship, labor, and international
exchange. Their areas of assistance varied from helping migrants connect with family
members in the United States to helping deceased clergymen’s families return home.
Consular offices also facilitated the payment to family members back home of migrants’
insurance benefits when they died in mining accidents. The consuls did not take a
particularly pro-active role in ameliorating labor conditions, resolving strikes, or
addressing widespread employer abuse, but they did help migrants hold companies
responsible for paying benefits. Consular offices also promoted imperial loyalty among
migrants and surveilled anti-Habsburg or anti-Hungarian activity at the Foreign
Ministry’s instruction. Many aspects of the American Action program were coordinated
through consular employees, who collected reports from loyal ministers and sent articles
from the American immigrant press hostile to the Empire back to the Foreign Ministry.
Even if migrants were largely unaware of consular offices’ role in surveillance of
nationality problems, they found other reasons to complain about the consular officials.
In 1911, the Czech-American National Council asked Bohemian deputies serving in the
imperial diet in Vienna to lobby for more Czech speakers among the Austro-Hungarian
consular agents in the United States.125
Back home, the Austrian and Hungarian governments and the Foreign Ministry
attempted to influence migration and migrants’ experiences in the United States by
nurturing relationships with American consuls (and later ambassadors) in Austria and
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Hungary. In some cases, U.S. consuls in the Empire actively negotiated the citizenship
status of Austria-Hungarian migrants with the Austrian and Hungarian governments,
especially in regard to migrants who had already begun the process of applying for
American citizenship – a testy situation that was usually negotiated on a case-by-case
basis. The number of U.S. Consulates in Austria-Hungary expanded rather modestly in
number but greatly in the breadth of their activities and the volume of work with the
onset of mass migration. The United States initially had its consulate-general in Vienna
with only a consulate in Budapest, a fact that rankled Hungarian politicians. Vienna was
elevated to the status of an embassy in 1902 while Budapest was elevated to consulategeneral in 1904. The two-year delay had offended some Hungarian politicians, who
resented the United States’ fundamental misunderstanding of Hungary’s sovereignty in
the dual monarchy. The U.S.’s commercially oriented consulates in Trieste, Prague,
Reichenberg, Carlsbad, and Fiume now turned more and more of their attention to
migration, particularly in Trieste, Fiume, and Budapest.126 Successive consul-generals in
Budapest proposed the addition of a consular office in Kassa, the largest city in upper
Hungary where the largest number of migrants came from, but a Kassa office never
materialized, largely because of U.S. budgetary constraints. Hungarian migrants had to
continue to travel to Budapest to call on the American government, an outcome that
likely pleased the Hungarian government since American visa services and foreign
advocates would not be as accessible to upland migrants.
As we have seen, Austria-Hungary’s bureaucratic presence in emigration is
difficult to overstate; agents or members of the Austro-Hungarian government could be
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involved in every phase of migrants’ transatlantic journeys, became increasingly
accessible on the ground in the United States, and were there when migrants returned
home. The imperial military, in particular, kept close track of the return of male migrants
of age for military service; migrants were able to gain the assistance from the United
States government only if their American citizenship was confirmed. While the
Hungarian emigration law had been largely a failure, Austria-Hungary’s bureaucratic
presence in migration was organized, decently funded, and pervasive.

Managing Political Loyalty on US Soil: Political Intervention and the American
Action
Austria-Hungary’s intervention in migrants’ American lives grew over the early
years of the 20th century, sometimes in concert with the Foreign Ministry and consular
service and, in other cases, somewhat outside it. Through this mix of interventions,
Austria-Hungary subsidized arguably necessary migrant services for all subjects of the
Empire, while simultaneously suppressing Slavic nationalisms, at home and abroad. The
“American Action” was one of at least three organized programs the Hungarian
government was pursuing to deal with a growing crisis of loyalty to the Kingdom. Other
initiatives addressed the situation of Hungarians living in Croatia-Slavonia (which the
kingdom administered) and Romania (which it did not).127 These actions, taken as a
whole, indicate a broad effort to promote political loyalty at the periphery. The
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Hungarian government’s sincere interest in the welfare of its migrants can be viewed as
tainted by assimilationist nationality aims, just as in Hungary itself. The American Action
program, operated through the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of
Religion and Public Instruction, was the most active at attempting to maintain migrant
loyalty abroad through the political press, churches, and cultural events and institutions.
The following section will explore the long arm of the Austro-Hungarian government in
attempting to maintain the political loyalty of migrants from Austria-Hungary, primarily
through the American Action but also other initiatives.
The main goals of the American Action were to bolster Hungarian identity abroad
to encourage return-migration of Hungarians and to assure that Slavic return migrants
were not openly antagonistic to Hungarian political leadership and did not bring openly
oppositional ideas back to Europe; the Action’s goals, as we will see below, would
quickly come into conflict.128 Attempts to strengthen the Hungarianness of Hungarians
living in the United States antagonized leaders of Slavic national movements and
simultaneously gave Slavic nationalists opportunities to publicize their grievances before
the American press and public. This only further confirmed Austria-Hungary’s
perception of the need to combat panslavism and Slavic national projects in America. The
American Action addressed migrant Hungarian-, Slovak-, and Rusin-speakers in
somewhat distinct campaigns, subdivided further by religious denomination.129 Since
many migrant communities, as we saw in the previous chapter, were linguistically mixed,
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the subdivision of the Action’s program sometimes aided rather than retarded the division
of the Austro-Hungarian emigrant community into distinct camps.
Although much of the work of the Action could be conducted through the Prime
Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction, foreign financial
transactions could not, bringing the joint Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry into the
program’s administration and into migrant services more expansively. The actual
expenditures for the Action had to be paid out of Foreign Ministry accounts. The Foreign
Ministry was on the same page in many of the issues relating to the press in particular;
subsidizing organs of the immigrant press was among the most effective investments of
the Foreign Ministry in managing migrant loyalty abroad.
By offering financial support to newspapers, awarded first and foremost for
“patriotism” and fidelity to the Empire, the Austro-Hungarian government could assure a
patriotic message and that the right kind of information would be passed on to its
subjects. One Slovak-language newspaper, the Slobodni Orel, justified the continuation
of its government subsidy by explaining that it sent free copies of the paper to heavily
panslav areas, to try to sway the readership back to imperial loyalty. In another case, from
1914 when the First World War was in full swing and the stakes for the Empire high, the
Foreign Ministry offered 20,000 crowns in start-up costs and a 4,000 crown annual
subsidy for a pro-monarchy newspaper to circulate among South Slavs in the United
States.130 Austria-Hungary’s support of the immigrant press emphasized the centrality of
information, influence, and patriotism in the Empire’s intervention in the United States.

130

HHStA, PA XXXIII, 99.
75

The American Action’s Religious Work
Since churches were often the most significant ethnic organizations in migrants’
lives, they were the best venue for the state to promote homeland loyalty. AustroHungarian governmental concern about imperial loyalty and the threat of panslavic
nationalism in the United States was widespread, but among no groups more than
minority newspapermen and the clergy. Very early on, Hungarian nationalists pinpointed
churches as crucial sites of nation-building in the United States; through otherwise holy
religious observance, Hungary’s migrants would be politically compromised. The
Budespesti Hirlap (Budapest News) reported from the Amerikai Nemzetőr (American
Guardian) as early as 1884 of the political danger associated with Hungary’s Slaviclanguage speakers associating with other Slavs in the United States and called on the
government to intervene. “Hungarian Slavs . . . are forced to listen to the homilies of
other denominations and Czech panslav missionaries. . . . The problem also grows in that
the Slovak brothers in America fall entirely into the hands of Polish and Czech panslav
priests and stuffed with these ideas they return to the homeland. To help with this
problem is such an important national interest that we call it to attention not only of the
clergy but the government also.”131
The architects of the American Action recognized the centrality of migrant
religious institutions and used churches and the clergy as their primary conduits of
intervention. The files of the Prime Minister’s Office contain an elaborate table of
Catholic priests serving churches of Hungarian migrants, featuring their name,
nationality, their national conduct or attitude, congregation, where they went to seminary,
what diocese they had served in in (Austria-) Hungary, whether they had ever been fired
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from a post, whether they had taken any action in regard to the formation of an Eastern
European diocese in the United States, and various other notes. The column on
nationality and national conduct illustrates the full range of government diagnoses of
panslavism, from “Slovak Angry panslav” to “very suspicious” to “Hungarian-Slovak
loyal,” with additional notes to denote the level of threat over whether or not they
“scribble” in the press and evidence of alcoholism; others were merely labeled “American
Pole.” A subsequent report from Nuber, the consul in Pittsburgh, categorized Slovak
priests serving in the U.S. into three groups: those under Father Januschek of Scranton,
who had appointed a large number of young panslav clergy in America; and those under
Jankola and Stass, who founded a Catholic newspaper in which Hungary and Hungarians
were attacked in articles.132
Austria-Hungary had limited influence over how new American congregations
chose their ministers – indeed, the process was rather ad-hoc in the late nineteenth
century – but the Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction and homeland religious
authorities tried to influence the process in whatever way possible, often by using allies
among the loyal clergy. Braddock, PA parish priest Béla Kazinczy came in person to the
Austro-Hungarian consulate in Pittsburgh on 11 April 1902 asking that three patriotic
Slovak-speaking priests who could also speak Hungarian be sent to Charleroi and
Dusquesne, PA, which had started their own congregations. His account is clearly
refracted through the lens of the consul’s own nationalism. “From a Hungarian cultural
perspective, and the state’s interest,” Nuber passed on to his superiors, “it would be
important that a good Hungarian-feeling Slovak-speaking roman catholic priest would
end up in these two communities. . . . the leadership of these new communities fall into
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the hands of a Czech, Moravian, or Slovak panSlav priest.”133 Thus, the Hungarian
government worked through the Reformed Church of Hungary and through the Catholic
Archbishop of Esztergom to place ministers and priests loyalty to the monarchy in new
and vacated clerical posts in the United States. This created an international contest over
clerical vacancies that brought Austria-Hungary into greater contact and sometimes
conflict with the Vatican, American Catholic officials, and American Protestant
denominations that saw these immigrant churches as a fruitful mission field for
themselves.
The most tangible outcome of the American Action was Hungary’s subsidizing of
Hungarian churches, particularly Reformed churches. The localized funding of Calvinist
congregations could make their finances uncertain. The Hungarian government made the
salaries of clergy serving in their congregations livable by supplementing their church
paycheck with a government stipend, and by subsidizing an education back in Hungary
for clergymen’s sons. So vital were these supplemental salaries from the Reformed
Church of Hungary that the clergy fell into dire financial straits when the First World
War prevented them from receiving these stipends.134
By far the greatest ecclesiastical expense was the Hungarian government’s
refinancing of Hungarian-American church loans through the General Credit Bank in
Budapest.135 Churches founded before 1905 often had mortgages with American banks,
facilitated by American Reformed or Presbyterian mission projects, but many
congregations later formally joined the Reformed Church of Hungary and took advantage
of mortgage refinancing. The Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction was aware that
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financial support was the only real way to entice churches away from American
denominations to pursue union with the mother church, and therefore frequently offered a
few hundred dollars in outright grants for building and improvements, alongside the
thousands in loans.136 Bringing emigrant churches under the umbrella of the Reformed
Church in Hungary enabled homeland religious leaders to more effectively assure
patriotic candidates served as ministers. The Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction
and the Prime Minister’s Office considered the massive costs of taking on these loans
well worth the national and spiritual benefits of ecclesiastical union, and the potential
benefit of thwarting Slavic separatism.
The Hungarian government’s meddling efforts did not go unnoticed and
unprotested by Slavic nationalists. In 1902, a group of Slovak and other Slavic priests
serving in America published a secret message from an officer at the Hungarian Ministry
of Religion and Instruction, Ferenc Komlóssy, to the Archbishop of Esztergom, the head
of the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church. It detailed steps the Church might take to
assure the loyalty to the Hungarian state of minority priests serving in the U.S. How
Slovak- and Ruthenian-American priests came to possess a copy of Komlóssy’s letter is
unclear, but it quickly became the central document in a Slovak-American propaganda
war and Hungarian attempts at damage control. The priests published it in two pamphlets,
the aforementioned Hungary Exposed and a similar volume, titled Memorial Presented
by the Roman Catholic Priests of Slovak Nationality,137 specifically to the Cardinal
Archbishop and Bishops of the United States. The volumes, one Hungarian official noted,
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were printed with “mournful” black covers.138 On the same cover of Hungary Exposed,
the Slovak and Ruthenian priests identified themselves as the “Irish of Hungary.”
Hungary Exposed illustrates the backlash against the “American Action” and how the
United States had become a new front in the nationality politics of the Hungarian
kingdom. A host of questions abound in these documents that are pertinent to AustriaHungary’s interventions abroad more generally: Was there an effective and unobtrusive
way to maintain the loyalty of former imperial subjects on American soil? Whose
responsibility was it to oversee the best interests of migrants coming from Hungary:
priests themselves, the Vatican, American Catholic officials, or Austro-Hungarian
officials? What role, if any, would American public opinion play in identity politics
among immigrants from the Empire?
Speaking from the government’s perspective, Komlóssy justified keeping Slovakand Rusin-speakers from the Kingdom now in America “under surveillance in the interest
of their spiritual guidance,”139 a statement that reveals the inherent tension between
benevolence and chauvinism in Hungary’s migrant welfare. The Vatican seemed to agree
to the necessity of serving migrants abroad; the Hungarian government had already made
arrangements with the Congregation of Propaganda Fide to appoint an Apostolic
Delegate from Hungary to Washington D.C. to oversee emigrants.140 “This great
aggregate of humanity in a strange land,” Komlóssy explained, “. . . is for the most part
in the hands of the priests, owing to the profoundly religious spirit of the Slovaks.” “This
great moral factor, however,” he lamented, “is unfortunately wielded against us.” Only
seven Roman Catholic parishes were presided over by patriotic priests, he complained,
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“while the Slovak and Bohemian priests of Pan-Slavic sympathies, hailing from the
Western Highlands lead the other 35.”141 Simply put, the predominance of Western
Slovak priests in American congregations was pushing Slovaks closer to Czechs and
other Slavs and away from Hungary. Komlóssy complained of “schismatic bishops”
based in San Francisco and Alaska who lured Ruthenian-American congregations to join
the Orthodox Greek Catholic denomination in the U.S. “Inasmuch as part of the
immigrants intend returning to Hungary,” Komlóssy reasoned, “there is imminent danger
that those whom the Russian propaganda has moved to secede, may on their return spread
erroneous views among their co-religionists at home.” Komlóssy offered two solutions:
the government should “prohibit the emigration of . . . hostile spirited priests,” and the
bishop should send only “well-meaning priests speaking the eastern Slovak dialect”
[emphasis added] to fill vacancies and new posts. He included a list of parishes where
patriotic priests might be sent in the future. Priests who were loyal to Hungary could be
used to report on panslavic activity and the conduct of their less trustworthy and even
traitorous colleagues.142
The priests’ most scathing charges against the Hungarian government called the
document “highly pernicious,” featuring accusations of “espionage,” “coercion,”
“intimidation,” and, most damningly, “discouraging [immigrants] from American
citizenship.”143 The intended secrecy of the document was quickly recast as evidence of
“plotting” and “scheming.” In their Memorial, the Slovak priests highlighted the threat
that Hungarian surveillance and intervention posed to the Americanization of immigrants
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and to American sovereignty. Komlóssy’s suggestions, they explained, “would seriously
interfere with the rights and privileges of eccleasiastical [sic] authorities in the United
States.” “From the time they land at our sea ports,” the priests assured American
audiences, “our Slovak people recognize one country only –that country is the Republic
of the United States.” Komlóssy’s order, they charged, “retards the natural process of
Americanization among our Slovak and Ruthenian fellow countrymen.”144 The preface to
Hungary Exposed and the priests’ Memorial also reveal the tension between their appeal
to American sensibilities about immigrant assimilation and their obvious discontent at
Hungarian governmental attempts to thwart the Slovak nationalist project. The priests
charged that Komlóssy’s interest in the spiritual welfare of Eastern Slovaks was
insincere. “Under the guise of the spiritual necessities of the faithful,” they charged, “it
really aims at the political tutelage of the Slovaks and Ruthenians of the Greek rite in the
United States. ‘Well meaning priests’ does not mean pious, good and efficient priests” to
Hungarian officials, they complained. “A priest of the Slovak nationality may be ever so
painstaking in the discharge of his function,” but “if he preaches to his people in Slovak
and instructs them by means of their native language, in which after all they can best
commune with their God, he is doomed to fail.”145
The pamphlet authors claimed that officials in Budapest were attempting to limit
the use of the Slovak language. But the Hungarian government’s grievance was
articulated not against the use of Slovak itself. Indeed, Komlóssy’s letter called for more
Slovak-speaking priests for Slovak-American congregations, and even suggested sending
Slovak-speaking nuns as part of their American mission work. The problem of language
144
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for the Hungarian officials was framed, intentionally, as a matter of “dialect.”
Congregations of Eastern Slovaks in America needed priests who spoke the Eastern
dialect, an arrangement that would conveniently shelter those congregations from priests
who spoke the Western Slovak dialect or Czech and were more likely to hold panslavic
or Slovak nationalist views.146
In the wake of the publication of Hungary Exposed, the issue of language and the
geography of panslavism concerned Austro-Hungarian officials assigned to American
affairs. One government communiqué lamented that, before emigration began to the
United States, panslavism had been unknown in the northeastern counties of Hungary,
where the eastern dialect of Slovak was spoken. The allegedly panslav, western Slovak
priests serving in America now comprised an expansive network of aid organizations
seeking to “ply” the people with wide-circulating Slavic-American newspapers, and even,
he suggested, pálinka [distilled brandy] dispensers, all leading the Eastern Slovaks astray.
In this way, he stated, “the returning Eastern Slovaks take the dangerous seedling [of
panslavism] to heretofore immune soil.” The “Roman Catholic Priests of Slovak
Nationality” who wrote the open letter to the American bishops, were, according to
Hungarian officials, not really all “Slovak.” Among the twenty-nine signatories, seven
were identified as Czech, one as Moravian, one Polish, and one German. Of the
remaining eighteen signers, sixteen were western Slovaks and only two were eastern
Slovaks.147 The relatively high number of those listed as “Czech” and the variety of
“Slavs” made it easy to label dissident priests panslavic. But what Czech, western Slovak,
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eastern Slovak, panslav, Magyar, Hungarian, and American all meant as labels in 1903,
as we know from Chapter 1, is not as clear-cut as labeling priests by nationality makes it
seem. Indeed, the Hungarian government itself was relying on this multiplicity of
meaning, intent on convincing Slovak-speakers at home and abroad that Slovak language
use or identification and Hungarian loyalty were not mutually exclusive.
The two American newspapers that covered the conflict – the Washington Post
and the Boston Evening Transcript – reported very differently about the dispute. The
Washington Post largely took the Slovak- and Ruthenian-American accusations against
the Hungarian government at face value, quoting heavily from the pamphlet and offering
little additional information. The headline for the article, “Priest Exposes Plot,” echoed
the priests’ language in calling Hungarian actions a “scheme.” The most severe charge,
according to the Post, was the Budapest government’s efforts to “Prevent the
Americanization of Slovaks and Ruthenians.”148 The headlines, however, were more
critical than anything in the article itself. The headlines in the Boston Evening Transcript
struck a much more mixed note. The mildly condemnatory title of “Hungary Active Here
. . . Tries to Retain Hold on Slavonians and Ruthenians,” was quickly followed by much
more amenable subheadings “No Objection to Their Becoming Citizens, Seeks Loyalty
Only of Those Likely to Return.” The Boston Transcript relied on Joseph Horvath, then
editor of the Hungarian-American newspaper Szabadság, for additional insights on the
situation. For him, the defection of Hungarian Greek Catholic churches in America to
branches of the Russian Orthodox church in the U.S. was not as much a matter of
political panslavism, as the Hungarian government feared, but expedient practice in
linguistically mixed immigrant congregations and the practical lure of Russian financial
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support for churches. Horvath’s reframing of the issue put the emphasis not on the
invasive actions of the Hungarian government in Slavic churches in the U.S. but
specifically on emigrants likely to return to the Empire. “The purpose of this edict was
not to make of Hungarians in this country less loyal citizens of America,” he assured
American readers. “The purpose was only to avoid sowing the seed of disloyalty among
those liable to go back to Hungary.”149 But Szabadság was by no means free of
propaganda; the paper received subsidies from the Hungarian government and regularly
denounced panslavic activity. While there is no evidence that Horvath had consulted
Austro-Hungarian consular and other officials on how to respond, a man in his position
would be skilled in the art of making Hungary’s intervention seem innocuous. In a
recurring theme of the American Action, it is questionable whether the intensive backlash
by Slavic nationalists made Hungary’s interventions in American worthwhile.

“Be Ever Loyal to Your Country”150: Cultural Propaganda and Backlash
The American Action and Austria-Hungary’s long arm in the United States
featured consistent use of cultural propaganda. Communities of migrants from AustriaHungary hosted visiting dignitaries and some groups received banners and statues from
organizations in the mother country. Events surrounding these items and people featured
prominent cultural symbolism, from the traditional Hungarian goulash and Dobos cake
served at visiting journalist Géza Kende’s farewell supper to the concerts of Austrian
music held in conjunction with the Chicago World’s Fair. And yet these cultural
celebrations also became flashpoints for national protest. The celebrations for a visiting
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Hungarian official knit the Hungarian-speaking community in the United States together,
at the same time that it became an ideal opportunity for Slovak-speakers to protest his
policies back home and his presence in the United States. Alternating jubilation and
backlash met much of Austria-Hungary’s cultural propaganda, best seen in the arrival of
a ceremonial banner in 1902 and visits by Count Albert Apponyi, Hungarian Minister of
Education, in 1904 and 1911.
In 1902 the Hungarian Nationality League, an organization in Hungary, decided
to send a decorative flag to the United States “For the Hungarian Americans”151; it was
the first major event to bring large numbers of Hungarian-Americans together from
different sub-regions of the United States as a coherent immigrant community and with
an explicit symbol of the mother country. The celebrations planned for the arrival of the
flag and its tour between various Hungarian-American societies was highly successful in
nurturing public expressions of Hungarianness abroad, in the spirit (if not the
jurisdiction) of the American Action program. The gift of the flag also illustrates the
ways that migration heightened the national consciousness not only of emigrants but also
of those who stayed behind: a branch of the nation living elsewhere prompted a greater
perceived need to consolidate the Hungarian nation as a whole.
The dual meaning of “Hungarian” – one of ethnicity and one of citizenship – was
enormously significant in the reception of this gift. According to Tihamér Kohányi, editor
of the leading Hungarian-American newspaper, Szabadság [Freedom],
The flag that they are sending refers to the “American Hungarians,” all of
us, who were born in Hungary. The Slovak, the Croat, the Romanian, who
151
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believes in the sanctity of this flag, should not believe that those who are
planning this event or those who only speak Hungarian want to, with this
flag, distance those who do not speak Hungarian so, but are the Hungarian
homeland’s citizens.152
Kohányi was perhaps naive, perhaps disingenuous in calling for the participation of all
with “true patriotic feeling.”153 The imagery and culture of the event were decidedly
Hungarian in the narrow sense: one hundred young women dressed in red, white, and
green; a Ráckoczi march for the procession music; and speeches in Hungarian and
English, not in any of the kingdom’s other languages. The delivery of a flag, so often a
symbol of sovereignty, became a flashpoint for anti-Hungarian protest. The series of
receptions held for the flag succeeded in uniting American Magyars, but provoked
American Slavic nationalists. While Slavic opposition accomplished little in terms of
prompting American governmental opposition to the flag or the Hungarian government,
the sudden appearance of Hungarian symbolism in the United States, as we shall see,
galvanized more American Slavs into becoming immigrant nation-builders. Increasingly
segregated geographically and linguistically, the Empire’s former subjects were
increasingly diverging politically in North America.
The opponents – primarily Slovak-speakers and, according to one source,
Hungarian-speaking socialists – were quick to get their own perspective into major New
York City newspapers and to President Roosevelt, but to little avail. Anthony S.
Ambrose, President of the National Slavonic Society of the United States of America,
informed the U.S. State Department of the flag tour and alleged that it was a gift from the
Hungarian government, paid for “by official representatives of that Government” and
aimed at “prevent[ing] their [immigrants’] absorption into the great body of the American
152
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people.”154 Ambrose’s letter to State Department notified authorities and ensured that a
duty would be levied on the shipment, but otherwise failed to elicit objections from the
American government. The Springfield Republican, after reporting on both sides,
concluded that “the most jealous patriotic scrutiny fails to detect a menace to American
institutions in this banner of the Hungarian people.” Referring to it as a “banner” rather
than a “flag,” a verbal distinction that does not really exist in Hungarian, lessened its
association with sovereignty.155 The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office insisted to the
State Department that “the Hungarian National League which first started and carried out
this idea has been actuated in doing so by patriotic, and not political, motives.” “No
blame can be attached to anyone,” the Foreign Ministry official reasoned, “who exhorts
his countrymen, even when living in a foreign land, to be faithful to their native
home.”156 The State Department briefly looked into the details of the case, noting that the
German Emperor had bestowed a similar gift on German singing groups in Chicago, and
turned to other matters.157 But Slovak-Americans had cooperated in protesting Hungarian
incursions in the United States, a practice they would find reason to repeat again.
Hungarian Count Albert Apponyi’s American tours in 1904 and 1912 prompted a
similar set of reactions: jubilant Hungarian celebrations, Slavic protest, and no opposition
from the American government. The mixed reactions to Apponyi’s visit again illustrate
the contradictory outcomes of Austria-Hungary’s intervention abroad. An extremely
prominent member of the Hungarian aristocracy and government was coming to US soil
to personally nurture connections between the home state and the Hungarian
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communities abroad, strengthening the cohesion of the community and ties to the mother
country. But at the same time, Apponyi’s tour became a flashpoint for Slavic nationalists
to protest the government’s nationality policies at home and Apponyi’s chauvinism in
particular. Apponyi, for whom Hungary’s education laws colloquially known as the Lex
Apponyi were named, was also the aristocrat who had personally insulted Stefan Osusky,
prompting his emigration, discussed in the introduction to this dissertation. The lack of
response to Apponyi’s 1904 visit contrasted with his 1912 tour shows how rapidly
migrants were dividing into strict national camps in the United States. The backlash is
instructive in the ways that the American Action failed to stem Slavic nationalism and
even contributed to the sharpening of ethnic tensions between Slavic nation-builders and
the Hungarian state.
The primary purposes of Apponyi’s visits to the United States in 1904 and 1912
were to lecture at Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference and at various universities, and
to nurture Hungary’s ties with the United States government, but both featured numerous
occasions to engage in the cultural politics of Hungarian emigration and promote
Hungarian unity with the mother country. Apponyi met with Theodore Roosevelt during
both of his visits and spoke to both Houses of Congress in 1904. Western politicians
credited him with keeping the peace in Austria-Hungary’s fragile dualist compromise,
overlooking his chauvinism on minority policy. Apponyi’s tours fit neatly with the
American Action’s goal of promoting Hungarian identity abroad, not only because of
American respect for him but, like the traveling banner, cultural events that the
Hungarian-speaking community across the northeast and Midwest could participate in. A
particularly significant moment was Apponyi’s visit to the statue of 1848 revolutionary
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Lajos Kossuth in University Circle in Cleveland, which had been erected in 1902 by the
United Hungarian Societies, an umbrella organization for many of the Hungarianoriented clubs in the city. The statue’s unveiling in 1902 and accompanying parade
featured the participation of a number of the city’s nationalities, given Kossuth’s high
status among ’48-ers more broadly.158
Slavic protests during Apponyi’s visit in 1912 were particularly notable (as well
as troubling to Hungarian officials) because American Slovaks were joined by Czechs
and Poles, groups that would not have been affected by Apponyi’s educational laws in
Hungary. The Czech paper Denní Hlasatel reported that “the harassing of Count
Apponyi, the archenemy of the Slovak people” was the Cesko-Americka Tiskova
Kancelar’s (Czech-American Press Office) “outstanding achievement” of the year, noting
that the press effort “succeeded in minimizing the ill effects of the Count's visit to this
country.”159 Indeed, the Washington Festival Committee rescinded Apponyi’s invitation
to lecture after threats that protesters would “ruin” the event.160 Apponyi charged that “a
systematic Czech campaign . . . [to] make our Slovak emigrants, at least politically, into
Czechs” was responsible. While organizers feared massive Slavic protest at Apponyi’s
lectures in Chicago, they were uneventful. “The terrorism then practiced by the CzechoSlovak group,” as Apponyi phrased it, came later, in the newspaper coverage of the
event: “malevolent lies” of “uproar and wild disorder” at the lecture in the Chicago press,
even though the only altercation at the lecture itself, Apponyi claimed, had been one
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hostile question from Hungarian-speaking socialists who blasted Apponyi’s lack of
support for expanding the franchise in Hungary.161 Furthering the propaganda effort, the
Slovak National Committee compiled Count Albert Apponyi: The so-called Angel of
Peace and what he stands for in Hungary, “on behalf of the non-magyar immigrants.”162
The committee reprinted critiques of Apponyi by western intellectuals like R.W. SetonWatson, purposefully using “non-Slavs” as the “witnesses to truth” to convince
international audiences of Apponyi’s unwarranted reputation as an “Angel of Peace.”

Conclusion
Austria-Hungary’s transatlantic reach to maintain migrant loyalty in America
featured many successes in promoting migrants’ community and church life, particulary
for the Hungarian government in regard to Hungarian speakers. It may have bolstered the
imperial loyalty of some migrants at the individual level, but failed to keep the Empire’s
national projects from developing rapidly overseas. The Empire’s migrant Slavs
increasingly embraced conceptions of the nation that operated outside the bounds of
imperial loyalty, and forthrightly opposed it. Migrants increasingly viewed Hungary as an
oppressor, including those migrants for whom national oppression played no part in their
migration. Austria-Hungary’s long arm across the Atlantic provided vital services to early
twentieth-century migrants and to new arrivals, but many of those who had been in the
United States for a number of years and who increasingly supported Slavic national
projects chafed at the Empire’s cultural propaganda. When Marcus Braun himself
interviewed Prime Minister Tisza about Hungary’s emigration situation and suggested
161

Apponyi, Memoirs, 189-191.
[Slovak National Committee,] Count Albert Apponyi: The So-called Angel of Peace
and what he Stands for in Hungary (Cleveland, 1911).
162

91

that that the American Action’s distribution of patriotic literature, flag tour, and church
work created “friction among the various nationalities” coming to the United States from
Hungary, Tisza emphatically replied, “Why, we have to do something to protect
ourselves against Pan-Slavistic disturbances constantly going on and tolerated in the
United States.”163 At every turn, the competing goals of Austria-Hungary’s intervention –
to keep migrants loyal to the homeland and to mitigate the effects of separatist
nationalism overseas – worked against each other. And it was not America’s problem:
imperial officials worried about the consequences of heightened nationalism returning to
the Empire with return migrants, as we will see in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Bringing Migrants back Home: Americanization, National Activism,
and the Threat to Imperial Order
Migration to North America was a temporary affair for many Central and Eastern
European migrants at the turn of the 20th century, including those from Austria-Hungary.
Estimates suggest that in the early decades of mass transatlantic migration, before 1909,
17 to 27 percent of the Empire’s migrants returned to the Empire.164 U.S. Labor
Department counts of migrants who returned between 1908 and 1923, (broken down by
“race or nationality,”) suggest 66% of Hungarian migrants returned, 57% of Slovaks,
19% of Czechs, and 17% of Rusins. Despite the wide variety in statistics, the overall fact
remains clear: return migration was widespread.165 While Austro-Hungarian officials
initially opposed emigration and considered it disloyal to leave the homeland, their
attitudes changed. The economic benefits to the sending country, their inability to stop it,
and its potentially temporary duration inspired this change. Even as the Hungarian
government continued to discourage and police the exit of emigrants, Hungarian officials
began to actively promote return migration, particularly of desirable “patriotic” subjects.
As Hungarian officials reconciled themselves to the thought of emigrants who
might return, they began to try to mitigate emigration’s economic consequences, and to
influence nationality politics by encouraging particular categories of return migrants. The
rationale behind the American Action, we saw, had been in the words of the Prime
Minister, “to keep alive among emigrants national feeling and on that path the intention
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to return.”166 Furthermore, Hungarian governmental tactics to encourage return migration
emphasized maintaining migrants’ loyalty to their home country, a path which appeared
to justify, at least to themselves, governmental surveillance and intervention abroad,
particularly of Slavic national activity in the United States. “Patriotism” became the
primary criterion in assessing which migrants were most desirable to draw back.
The Austro-Hungarian government entertained a number of plans in the two
decades before the First World War to bring migrants home, many of which fell under the
auspices of Hungary’s established “American Action.” “Unlike its Austrian counterpart,”
diplomat and scholar Rudolf Agstner has written, “the Hungarian government actually
bore the cost of repatriating its co-nationals. One Hungarian official justified the expense,
arguing that it was necessary to "prevent the depopulation of the Holy Crown of St.
Stephen."167 The simplest proposal was to subsidize return journeys for migrants. The
Emigrant houses that the Foreign Ministry supported in New York City, discussed
previously in Chapter 2, could also be used for shuttling migrants back to the empire,
housing not only new arrivals but also those about to board ships home.168 Several small
cohorts of travelers made use of these direct subsidies, most notably “families left
destitute by the incapacitation or death of their principal breadwinner” in industrial or
mining accidents.169 These were only the most modest of much more extensive return
migration campaigns, which attempted to address a much wider array of governmental
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priorities and migrant actions.
Although return migrants could help mitigate some of the losses of transatlantic
emigration, they also posed threats to the imperial order. Some return migrants were
inevitably at odds politically with the government. This was especially the case for
Slavic-language-speaking migrants who had further developed a sense of nationalism that
opposed the empire’s privileging of German- and Hungarian-language institutions, and
migrants who developed more democratic beliefs in their personal theories of
government. The proliferation of separatist nationalism, democratism, and socialism were
all threats that the Austro-Hungarian government considered carefully in crafting return
migration campaigns.
Return migrants could help or hurt the empire both economically and politically:
emigration could drain labor and population, but could also be a source of remittances; a
return migrant might be one who failed and had spent her savings pointlessly on foreign
steamship tickets, or be someone who brought back skills and capital to invest in the
homeland economy. This spectrum of economic outcomes made it sometimes difficult for
governmental officials to decide how to act in regard to emigration and how to spin the
economic arguments for return migration. One ambassadorial report in the late summer
of 1908 observed that return migrants were “handsomely equipped with money,” while
other reports indicated that among migrants returning to Fiume the average carried far
less money back than what they left with and that the return of a few well off individuals
heavily inflated the average. Migrants who had been in the United States for 3 or 4 or
even 12 years were returning with just 6,000 crowns. In one batch of return migrants, 298
brought money back with themselves while 129 did not, raising the real concern that they
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could require public assistance. Lean financial times in the U.S. after the Panic of 1907
prompted fears of large wave of return migrants, as one official put it, a “panicky return
migration.”170
Hungarian governmental officials were eager to circulate tales of migrants’ poor
fortunes in the United States to discourage further emigration. The Kivándorlási Ellenőr
(Emigration Monitor) and Kivándorlási Értesitő (Emigration Bulletin) newspapers were
brimming with stories of migrants’ failures, from the penury of return migrants to
unfortunate cases of those who suffered or even perished on the ship en route across the
Atlantic. An article titled “Things to Know” warned, “everyone is mistaken, who hopes
that as soon as they arrive in America, they will immediately find work and that
employers will be grasping for them.” It further cautioned that steam and electricity had
already replaced many manual jobs and that the employers were responding to bad
economic conditions in 1903 by “strongly reducing their business and releasing workers.”
The ranks of the “desperate” and “unemployed” were expanding at a “frightening
rate.”171 Other issues of the bulletin shared statistics of mass unemployment in American
cities.172 Reports of migrants’ successes, like Ambassador Hengermüller’s 1908 report
emphasizing their accumulated wealth, threatened to arouse “suspicion” about the
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governments’ reporting on migrants’ misfortunes. In much the same way that the
government subsidized migrant papers friendly to the monarchy in the United States, so
too could they subsidize papers devoted to migration news to publish articles aligned
with their interests.
The politics of emigration and return migration intersected powerfully with
nationality politics. Hungarian governmental efforts to encourage return migration
explicitly strove to maintain Hungarian-speakers’ margin of population majority in the
kingdom. 54 percent were primarily Hungarian-speakers according to the 1910 census,
but as low 48 percent by some other estimates, worrying officials in Budapest.173 In
serving Hungarian-speaking communities, promoting patriotism and promoting
Hungarianness largely overlapped and were easily intertwined (at least to a point).
However, Hungary’s efforts at managing migrant patriotism and return migration were
not limited to those they considered ethnically Hungarian. Some officials sometimes
promoted the return of Hungary’s Slavic, German, and other migrants to the countryside
so long as those migrants were “patriotic.” But other officials argued that simply
excluding national minorities from return migration campaigns was more expedient. In
the end, Hungarian governmental programs that prioritized the return migration of
Hungarian speakers prevailed because they both addressed the goals of repatriation and
gave the monarchy a stronger position in homeland population engineering. Debates
inside the government show the slippage between theory and practice, as transnational
contests for identity lost out to the simpler task of attaining national goals through
exclusion.
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Interested parties in the United States recognized that migration for many
immigrants was temporary and that a sizeable minority would return home. As in
Austria-Hungary, officials, employers, and shapers of public opinion in the United States
disagreed on whether to accept the status quo of cyclical migration, prevent more
immigrants from arriving in the first place, or endeavor more strongly to make arrivals
into new Americans.

Labor, Land, and Money in Cycles of Migration
Issues of loyalty and nationality mattered in discussions of return migration, but
issues of livelihood, labor, and land were also crucial, and involved a host of AustroHungarian governmental agencies in the return migration campaign. As we saw in
previous chapters, Austria-Hungary’s joint Foreign Ministry coordinated affairs at Ellis
Island and worked with local institutions in New York City to house migrants traveling in
both directions. Hungary’s Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction worked actively in
the United States to maintain migrants’ loyalty in America. The governmental monopoly
awarded to the Central Ticket Office tried to keep the profits earned in the business of
emigration domestic, simultaneously enriching Hungarian noble members of parliament
who invested in it. When it came to return migration, other agencies, too, became part of
the effort, especially where there was money to be made. Hungary’s Ministry of
Agriculture looked to return migrants as prospective buyers for declining aristocrats’
surplus land, and the national postal service sought to get a share of the profits of migrant
remittances.
Many Eastern European individuals’ earning potential was limited by the
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unavailability of land, paucity of local jobs outside of agriculture, and high taxes on small
landholdings, pushing them abroad for work and wages to pay their taxes on their land at
home. These interrelated issues of work, land, and taxes in the monarchy reemerged
whenever governmental officials actually examined individual migrants’ choices.
Migrants complained to Dr. János Baross of the National Hungarian Economic
Association that the taxes on their small farms, just 3 to 10 holds of land, were higher
than their estates’ value! “Those among us who do not have land are much happier than
those who do,” explained migrant András Vojtoka from the town of Csicser. “The day
laborer earns what he needs to live, unburdened by taxes or debt, but we,” Vojtoka
continued, “could no longer bear the expenses.” Baross confirmed to his colleagues that
day laborers probably had it easier than smallholders with “dwarf” estates; the
“overfragmentation and pulverization of peasant estates” was among the main causes of
migration visible not just in Vojtoka’s home county but across the whole uplands region
and the whole country.174 When the Prime Minister’s Office surveyed sheriffs in counties
with high rates of emigration about what could be done to curtail it, many responded, not
surprisingly, that villagers frequently returned of their own accord once they could afford
to purchase land.175
Hungarian governmental and non-governmental agencies devoted extensive
resources and brainpower to examining questions surrounding emigration and return
migration. The National Hungarian Economic Society sponsored the Uplands Emigration
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Congress in the city of Miskolc in 1902, with participation by representatives from
county economic societies (essentially chambers of commerce), county officials, and
industry bureaus. The panels explored wide-ranging topics on emigration’s effects, from
economic affairs pertaining to the agriculture, forestry, mining, and viticulture industries
to the strengthening of the middle class, the partition of estates, taxes, and credit
systems.176 Congresses like this recognized the economic realities that pushed individuals
to emigrate and would have to be rectified to prevent further losses and draw substantial
numbers home.
The government’s plans and migrants own decisions both had to take into account
the changing availability of work on both sides of the Atlantic; changes in the American
labor market contributed considerably to pull factors drawing migrants to the United
States, but also pushing them home. Big strikes and industrial panics produced an uptick
in return migrants as the American labor market became either inhospitable or saturated.
The Panic of 1907 stands out as evidence to this: as tens of thousands of migrant workers
were laid off in industrial areas from Pittsburgh to St. Louis, Europeans flooded home by
the thousands.177 In response, the Interior Ministry requested that various Budapest public
works offices, included the water, landscaping, and cleaning departments, hire return
migrants whenever possible as day labor to deal with the emergency influx of
unemployed returnees. Newspapers regularly circulated this and other kinds of
intelligence about migration conditions. The Kivándorlási Ellenőr reported in February
of 1908 that the Cunard ship “Carmania” brought home 1,700 return migrants to Fiume,
departing back to New York with only 239, showing the extent of consequences of the
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1907 panic. It further reported that migrant families were lined up at the AustroHungarian consulate in New York, “begging” for travel fare home.178 Other papers
reported not only on job opportunities for industrial workers, but also advice on places
where work had become hard to come by. They encouraged workers to stay home, go
elsewhere, or go home for a time until prospects changed. Mining and other industrial
accidents prompted bursts of return migrants, whether fellow workers lucky to escape
death and inspired to head home, or families returning to Europe into the arms of family
after the loss of their breadwinner.179
As much as government officials bemoaned the emigration of industrial workers,
many workers were leaving precisely because there were too many of them for available
positions and that very fact made them difficult to draw home. Questions about return
migration featured a complicated interplay between agricultural and industrial work. The
Trade Minster reported to Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza in 1905 that vocational
workers had left Hungary mainly from the steel and machine sectors because of a surplus
of workers; drawing them home, as the Prime Minister wanted, would be impossible
because those industries remained saturated with labor.180 It was pointless for the
government to target industrial workers for return migration unless it wanted to invest
first in expanding the steel and machine industries to employ them. A subsequent note in
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the Prime Minister’s office files referred to the reality of the Trade Minister’s conclusions
as “unpleasant,” and archived his report.181 Seemingly intent on having a reason to entice
industrial workers home anyway, the government instructed the Hungarian Industrialists’
National Association to survey factories and identify those in need of “trustworthy and
hard-working” return migrant employees so they could concretely place returning
individuals in available jobs.182 The political will to encourage return migration, in this
case, was clearly far more important than any real economic need.
Until 1906, the government’s efforts had “endeavored only to keep the desire to
return migrate alive,” but had not yet engaged in actually implementing any return
initiatives.183 As the government’s efforts shifted from the realm of emotion to
facilitating return movement, its priorities shifted from migrants’ national feeling to their
pocketbooks. In laying out the return migration operation to the Foreign Minister, one
official consistently emphasized spending return migration funds on migrants who had
accumulated wealth in the United States. Hungary’s return migration campaigns featured
efforts to rescue unfortunate migrants from penury abroad, even as it sought to entice
economically successful migrants to return home and enrich the country.
The return migration proposal of the Ministry of Agriculture is particularly
worthy of attention as an example of the government’s concrete effort to promote return
migration. The central question was this: “How could we most practicably, avoiding state
intervention, sell land to Hungarians in America . . . and thus, through resettlement,
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somewhat offset emigration?”184 The greatest enticement, to make this “come true” rather
than be an “empty desire”, according to the Ministry, was to “plant opportunities for
return.” This meant concerted programs to provide not simply land but estates.1 85 One
Ministry of Agriculture official proposed having the state “unofficially” buy available
properties and sell them to Hungarian Americans, factoring in some management costs
that the state incurred. The favored alternative plan, which eliminated some of the
difficulties and potential for corruption of governmental land ownership, was for the
Ministry to create a compendium of parcels for sale, with information on how much was
required in down payment or how much could be taken out in loans.186 In the end they
landed on contracting out the Ministry of Agriculture’s program to a non-governmental
entity187, either the Magyar Gazdaszövetség (Hungarian Farmers’ Association), an
organization of medium-sized gentry and peasant landholders, or the Julian Society,
which had done resettlement work among Hungarian-speakers to Hungary from Slavonia
and Bosnia.
The Hungarian Farmers’ Association did indeed take up the task of “easing the
acquisition of estates” for return migrants from the United States.188 Familiarity with their
“patriotic activities” helped them secure the right to operate the program.189 The program
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was initially contracted for a few years, with a 30,000 crown yearly allowance.190 The
Kivándorlási Ellenőr reported in 1908 that 200 Hungarian Americans had applied to buy
land under the Hungarian Farmers’ Association’s program, and that they planned to
extend it to more Hungarian Americans and also Hungarians living in Romania, Bulgaria,
and Bukovina.191 Also eligible were would-be migrants who the Farmers’ Association
could prevent from emigrating by selling them program land.192 The paper further
reported that sixty-two properties/estates were currently for sale.193 Government-assisted
return migration had become a reality, however limited. The benefits of formulating a
return migration program in this way served nationalist, social, and economic goals alike.
Selling estates or even somewhat parceled estates to return migrants with cash, rather
than to local peasants, would be significantly less disruptive to local class hierarchies,
avoiding the unpleasantness of estate-holders having to sell their lands piecemeal to
locals who might have worked on that very estate.194 It also furthered Hungary’s intended
trajectory of increasingly mechanizing agriculture.
Governmental officials paid attention to community-building, knowing that
repatriation would be more successful if returnees were able to feel a sense of community
and pine for the often close-knit migrant communities they had left behind. Emigrants’
family members still residing in Hungary could be tapped to both lean on their relatives
in America to return and to spread word of the resettlement program. Rather than
engaging in boosterism, relatives in Hungary could accurately depict the land for sale,
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and lure back their families. Potential return migrants would be assessed for their
suitability to the Ministry of Agriculture’s resettlement program in their “financial
situation” (ability to put down a 50 percent down payment) and also their “psychological
morale/mood,” essentially their re-assimilability and patriotism.195
Implementing the government’s return migration program would require sending
trustworthy agents to larger Hungarian settlements in the United States to find individuals
open to relocating back to Hungary and wealthy enough to purchase land. Utmost care
would have to be taken to find agents capable of practicing great discretion so that they
wouldn’t spark a controversy over return migration propaganda.196 They planned to use
U.S.-resident ministers and priests already receiving stipends from the Austro-Hungarian
government to preach return migration from the pulpit. Governmental officials
recognized that this would not actually be in ministers’ best interest, since the size of
their congregations directly affected the financial health of the church and their personal
salary. Thus, they proposed either a commission system based on the value of land they
pushed (later rejected), raises for ministers for each of their congregants who repatriated,
or some other form of financial incentive.1 97 Indeed, M.P. Silvestri reported from
Cleveland, Ohio that summer that the ministers in the area, even those receiving a
government stipend, “would not gladly recruit” candidates for return migration, since
doing so would, “in the long run, undermine the very position of their parishes.”198
Instead the Magyar Gazdaszövetség used its own agent North America, a János
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Skotty, to operate the program, but with only modest success. Skotty spent a month
traveling around the United States trying to recruit migrants to buy land and return home
to disappointing results. While many applied for the program, few were willing to
actually commit to return migration. Magyar Gazdaszövetség director and M.P. István
Bernát pessimistically reported that “few drove to proceed past the application stage,”
either because the applicants did not actually desire to go home and buy land, or were
holding out for “the state to truly, caressingly, bait them home,” essentially with better
economic terms.199
The lack of immediate success with Skotty’s first round of recruitment
encouraged the Ministry of Agriculture and the Gazdaszövetség to ponder difficult
questions about the relationship between migration, love of country, land, and security.
What was the relationship between encouraging return migration and the land hunger
among peasants back in Hungary? Why was it that some migrants were willing to buy
farms on the other side of the world in the United States, but if and when they returned to
Hungary they only wanted to live in the place where they were born? Did American
farms produce better income and more stable living than estates at home?200
The relative lack of interest in governmental return migration programs among
migrants in the United States encouraged the Hungarian government to explore
expanding the program to Canada. There, one official concluded that success seemed
much more promising on account of Hungarians’ reported inability to get used to the
“inclement” weather and the much greater gender imbalance favoring men than among
Hungarian-speaking migrants to the United States. Encouraging return migration from
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Canada had the added benefit, for the Ministry of Agriculture’s program, that many more
migrants there were working in agriculture rather than industry, and were “weathered in
body and soul to hard field labor.” They were now skilled specifically in “machine-driven
intensive husbandry” and could become “master” models for the surrounding area’s
population at home.201 Implied, but unstated, in the report is that migrant farmers in
Canada could more readily imagine a future as farmers in Hungary than industrial
workers in the United States who had much more varied goals beyond a future of
husbandry.
It seems that most migrants, in the end, based their decisions to return on family,
economic, and work-related factors, not because of governmental enticement. Rather than
being discouraged by their time in the United States, the majority of those returned, even
if they would have ideally stayed, were of “pretty good morale.” In a governmental study
on the “psychological mood” of return migrants, many blamed the poor work
opportunities specifically on the presidential election in the United States in 1908 and
were of the opinion that in a short time jobs would be plentiful again.202 A minority of
migrants were, however, according to the study, quite disappointed by their migration
experiences or continuing poor fortune, and were nicknamed “Die Amerikamüden,” the
“weary Americans.” The report indicated that “work aversion” and “sloth” likely
contributed to their lack of success in the United States and continued troubles upon
arriving home, contributing to their psychological inability to “enhappy” themselves. The
most important finding from the study was that return migrants would migrate again once
they believed that conditions in the United States to find work improved. Thus, even as
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the government worked to encourage migrants to return back to the homeland, the cycle
of movement would simply begin again. Psychological factors had little salience
compared to opportunities for work.

Bringing Home the “Patriotic” Migrant: Return Migrants and Homeland Politics
The primary characteristic of a desirable return migrant, like a good citizen, was
being hazafias, a good son of the homeland. Hungarian officials sending correspondence
across the Atlantic in both directions frequently signed their missives, “with patriotic
affection.” Every priest or minister that that Hungarian government sent to shepherd
flocks of the religious faithful in the United States was inspected, first and foremost, for
their patriotism, their faithfulness not only to church doctrines but to the government. It is
no surprise, then, that this concept of patriotism, so ubiquitous in other realms of
governmental rhetoric, would be prominent in return migration campaigns as well.
Officials sought to restore the country in population and in spirit. It is no surprise, also,
that migrants who did not fit governmental definitions of patriotism would be excluded to
whatever degree possible from return migration campaigns.
Expectations for migrant patriotism were not completely consistent between the
Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Habsburg Empire. Officials in Austria formulated
their assessment of migrant loyalty primarily through friendliness to the monarchy,
Monarchie freundlich, as opposed to Hungary’s hazafias, an adjective to describe one as
a son of the homeland. Both concepts avoided ethnic criteria as their foundation, befitting
a multinational state, but the Hungarian concept of patriotism suggested a more active
love of and identification with the country. Austria’s articulation of friendliness toward
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the monarchy allowed for a greater perception of ethnic difference and rested instead on
an acceptance of the status quo in imperial power. (Though seeing eye-to-eye with the
government became of crucial importance in the Hungarian definition of patriotism,
also.)
Among return migrants, the most studied and most vulnerable to harassment by
homeland officials were men who emigrated without completing their compulsory
military service in the Austrian or Hungarian army.203 In terms of governmental efforts at
expanding return migration, however, the government’s enemies were not wayward
would-be soldiers, but migrants who held nationalist views that challenged Austrian and
Hungarian control in the Empire. Rising Slavic nationalisms in the United States and
easier implementation of governmental programs among Hungarian-speakers made
Hungarian-speakers the overwhelmingly prioritized targets of the major return migration
initiatives. On the practical side, Hungarian governmental agencies had the most ties in
place already with Hungarian-speaking Reformed and Greek Catholic institutions in the
United States, initially involving Roman Catholics only incidentally in some plans2 04; in
1908 officials sought to include Hungarian Roman Catholic priests as well in the
effort.205 Using existing channels for a somewhat controversial program made the
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expenses palatable.
But the targeting of Hungarian-speakers for return migration was about more than
just practicality; it featured an overt element of anti-Slavic prejudice and a goal of
population engineering. By advertising governmental return migration initiatives to
certain segments of the Empire’s migrants and not others, the government could recoup
some of the losses of emigration in ways that protected or heightened the plurality or
majority of Hungarian-speakers. This was true especially on the national level, as well as
in particular localities. The Interior Ministry identified Transylvania as an important
region to encourage return migration, as a way to bolster the ratio of Hungarian to
Romanian speakers.206
Even in the Ministry of Agriculture’s plans, where strengthening the country’s
agricultural sector would supposedly be the paramount goal, concerns about Slavic
nationalism were front and center. Minister of Agriculture Ignácz Darányi explained to
István Bernát of the Magyar Gazdaszövetség that migrants from the linguistic minorities
from northern Hungary should be excluded from purchasing land through the return
migration programs explicitly because of alleged panslavic views. “Since the return of
emigrated Slovaks is estimated at 19%, these people with panslav ideas slowly infest
Felvidék [counties now in southern Slovakia] in this territory already exposed from a
nationality standpoint — with the return of Ruthenians with Great Russian ambitions,”
he explained.207 The “strict keeping” of this stipulation was critically important, he
explained, because “our emigrants’ repatriation could easily produce the sad outcome,
that with the Hungarian state’s help, elements that stand in opposition to the Hungarian
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state idea would return, and these elements would close out from land acquisition those .
. . who represent the most acceptable material for settlement.”208 It was essential for “the
protection of our moral world” to exclude Slavic-language emigrants who had been
touched by “panslav agitation” abroad.
Writing Prime Minister Sándor Werkele in 1908, Darányi excluded Hungary’s
Slavic-language- and German-speakers alike. “Among our slav-speaking emigrants . . . ,
such exceptionally strong panslav agitation is taking place, that these persons’ abetted
return . . . is not bearable from the standpoint of the monarchy’s nationality situation or
the Hungarian state’s nationality/minority domestic peace.” While German-speaking
Swabians in Hungary were, from a nationality standpoint, of “good feeling,” “the
emigrated Svabs in the United States naturally melted into the. . . alldeutsch [all-German]
operation” there, which was incompatible with Austrian sovereignty. Thus, Germanspeakers would also be excluded from this first repatriation effort.209 While the Ministry
of Agriculture’s return migration program was initially concerned with the land and the
liquid capital of American return migrants, the program powerfully took on a nationalist
purpose by 1908.
Minister of Agriculture Darányi was also careful to clarify that the resettlement
program could only be executed “properly” if the “settlement’s moral foundation,
homesickness, not business interests,” guided its implementation. Such an emphasis on
homeland made for an uneasy fit when the program was outsourced to a private entity
whose mission was to support the wellbeing of mid-sized landholders. Preserving the
economic stability of the country’s agricultural sector in the face of mass emigration had
208
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been the point of the Ministry of Agriculture’s involvement in the return migration
campaign at the outset, making Darányi’s Hungarian chauvinism and this emphasis on
abstract homesickness and patriotism rather puzzling. The Ministry of Agriculture was
now peddling primarily in the business of patriotism rather than cultivatable land.
Hungarian officials were concerned not only about the return of physical
individuals promoting panslavism or Slavic nationalism, but also of writings by Slavic
nationalists being sent home. The Hungarian government had several tools at its disposal
to try to mitigate the effects of the return of undesirable people and materials. Local
officials were asked to report on the reappearance of specific individuals, as well as who
received mailings of known Slavic-American publications that had been identified as
agitative. Alongside the presses in Prague and in Martin, officials identified presses in the
United States as the source of newspapers, journals, and pamphlets distributed by the
“American panslav anti-national movement.” One policy adviser insisted to the Minister
of Commerce that “preventative measures” should be taken, because by the time these
material fell into readers’ hands it was too late to do anything about them. The postal
service, he advised, should track the return addresses of Czech-language materials
coming to Slovak-speaking areas of Hungary from America and Austria and, if possible,
obtain the list of subscribers to censor them more surgically.210
In addition to separatist nationalism, return migrants returned home with other
political ideologies that officials considered undesirable or threatening, regardless of their
professed nationality. Many of the changes that migrants generally underwent in the
United States were shared by Hungarian-speakers and Slavic-language-speakers: changes
in economic condition, heightened political consciousness and growing desire for a more
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democratic Hungary, and heightened modern class consciousness from working in an
industrial setting. Too radical a position in any of these areas was thought to make
migrants less assimilable to life back home and potentially a threat, thus subject to
surveillance and harassment by local authorities upon their return.211 “Patriotism” thus
signaled a non-threatening stance in nationality politics – a record clean of activism in
anything that could be labeled panslav – as well as a non-threatening stance to the
political and social status quo more broadly.
Back home, a host of political orientations were deemed threatening to the status
quo, from democracy to socialism. “You could see . . . that they returned with new social
ideas rather tinged with socialism,” one Hungarian official reported to the prime minister
in 1909. The examples he gave of this, however, were merely an entitlement to demand
“humane treatment” and their elation at being referred to by honorific titles like “Mr.”
even by authorities in the United States.212 The social leveling that officials feared from
return migrants was less of an immediate threat but more of a long-term one. On the
whole, before World War I, migrants did not actively seek to revolutionize Hungary’s
class structure and political system on their visits home, but did support more
democratically inclined candidates, as we will see in the next chapter, and start to
envision a more democratic future for Austria-Hungary. Return migrants’ social
revolutionary views did not find much fruition until 1918. The consequences of return
migration on separatist nationalism were apparent much more quickly, especially with the
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outbreak of World War I.

Return Migration and Interstate Politics
Drawing migrants home was a central priority in Hungarian foreign affairs, but it
was not without diplomatic dangers. The Ministry of Agriculture’s proposals were
extensively debated in governmental circles, taking “great care and forethought” to avoid
anything that would create “conflict with the American government.”213 Nevertheless, the
status of return migrants was among the greatest points of contention between the AustroHungarian and U.S. governments, and occupied a significant portion of the activity of
U.S. consuls based in Austria-Hungary. The mobility and tricky citizenship status of
return migrants plagued diplomatic discussions between the two countries for decades.
As Nicole Phelps, the preeminent scholar of U.S.-Habsburg foreign relations, has found,
massive transatlantic migration prompted an international debate on ideas about territorial
sovereignty versus sovereignty over one’s own citizens. Officials in both countries
attempted to align migrants’ physical location with their land of citizenship, but migrants’
propensity to move and to claim or denounce citizenships as fit their needs, made
standardization continually difficult.214
Austria-Hungary’s compulsory military service was central to controversies about
the return migration and citizenship of military-aged men.215 Austro-Hungarian and
American agreements on naturalization were laid out in an 1870 treaty that exempted
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migrants who acquired American citizenship from outstanding military commitments at
home, but thousands of migrants who made return visits home were not yet full citizens
and thus not covered by this treaty. And while migrants who had become American
citizens were legally exempt from Austro-Hungarian military duty on their return to
Europe, officials nevertheless hassled them, especially at the local level. Migrants
returning to Austria-Hungary with a U.S. passport or other documentary proof of
citizenship were fairly easy to spring if they were detained by European officials for
evasion of military service. Those who had only filed “first papers” for citizenship,
however, were not yet full citizens and therefore not entitled to assistance from American
officials.216 Migrants who had spent time working in the United States and become
citizens but returned for an extended period to Europe and had no proof of intention to
travel back could rarely receive the American consular assistance they desired.
As interstate relations between Austria-Hungary and her neighbors worsened with
the 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herczegovina and the ensuing wars, the government
tried to clamp down on the emigration of men of military age to keep the fighting force at
home. In December of 1912, the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior issued a temporary
ordinance banning the emigration of all eligible men who had not yet fulfilled their
military obligations.217 Hungarian officials opposed to emigration had long wanted to
address the liberality of the 1870 treaty. During the First World War, in desperate need of
soldiers, Habsburg officials began to interpret the 1870 treaty to mean that AustriaHungary’s migrants, as dual citizens once they became Americans, were still eligible for
mandatory military service at home. As the language of the treaty was vague on the
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matter, U.S. officials did not protest this change in interpretation, especially as the
diminishing opportunities for transatlantic travel made the issue moot.218
If migration to the United States was only temporary for many migrants, so too
could be the American citizenship they gained during their time in the United States. If a
migrant’s return to Europe was permanent, according to two new acts of Congress in
1906 and 1907, their American citizenship could be withdrawn. With no international
standard on dual citizenship, citizenship’s expiration, or expatriation, American and
European officials were often left to negotiate cases on an individual basis. “Many
naturalized citizens of Polish, Croatian, Hungarian or other origin, return to their counties
of their nationality for the purpose of taking up their permanent abode therein and when
the question of their military service is involved endeavor to obtain protection under the
cloak of forfeited American citizenship,” U.S. consul to Vienna Ulysses Grant-Smith
complained in 1916. “Had it not been for the present war, there is no doubt that many
such persons would have continued to reside in their former homes as American citizens
without any wellfounded claims as such.”219
Alongside evasion of military service, return migration sometimes dragged
American officials into Austro-Hungarian attempts to quash the spread of nationalism by
migrants returning to the Empire from the United States. Phelps analyzed the case of
Zdenek Bodlak, born in St. Paul, Minnesota to Czech parents, who moved to Prague to
study music and wound up in prison in 1914 for sedition against the Austrian
government. Although the American consul in Prague, Charles Hoover, opined that some
of the Austrian government’s methods at rooting out sedition would never be permitted in
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the United States, he recognized that return migrants, even as American citizens, had a
responsibility to abide by local laws. Furthermore, he had little sympathy for migrants’
interest in homeland national causes. Phelps summed up Hoover’s thinking as follows:
“If naturalized American citizens were more interested in Austrian politics than
American politics and went so far as to return to Bohemia to promote nationalist
ideologies, then they should not be able to hide behind the barrier of American
citizenship.”220
In all, American and Austro-Hungarian officials had nearly identical goals in
regard to migrants – making them loyal members of their country – which thus put them
in competition for the bodies of return-migrants and their confounding back-and-forth
travels. American consular officials were rather dismissive of return migrants who had
failed to conform to the expectations of American citizenship and embroiled themselves
in politics at home. American nativists and proponents of immigration restriction might
be glad to see migrants return to Europe once injured or too old to labor in the United
States so they would not become a public burden, but the preference was overwhelmingly
that migrants, while they could retain cultural affection to their homeland, reassign their
political allegiance to the United States. These ideas put Austro-Hungarian return
migration campaigns directly at odds with Americanization efforts in the United States.
American efforts to keep migrants ebbed and flowed with changes in industrial
labor demands, and with the contest between nativists and their opponents, including
Progressives and socialists. While American nativists applauded the return of every
emigrant to their place of birth, the views of Americans sympathetic to migration was
more varied. U.S. Special Immigration Inspector Marcus Braun, known to us from the
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previous chapter, blasted the Hungarian government’s interventionism in the United
States in his 1906 pamphlet Immigration Abuses: Glimpses of Hungary, specifically
critiquing Hungary’s efforts to draw migrants home. He suggested what Hungarian
officials told each other about the migrants: “Let us prevent them from remaining there
for good and let us insist that their stay out there be but temporary; let us insist that they,
instead of becoming Hungarian-Americans, remain American-Hungarians,” Braun
mocked. “And when they have earned enough to pay off the mortgages on their farms [in
Austria-Hungary] and their debts to the usurers, and have saved up enough to begin life
anew,” he continued, “let us receive them with open arms and kill the biblical fatted calf
in honor of their return.”221 Braun’s pamphlet reflected the interests of American thinkers
and officials who expected migrants, once the beneficiary of American jobs and social
services, to become Americans and continue to contribute to the American nation and
economy.
A final form of return migration worth considering in Austro-Hungarian-U.S.
relations is deportation. In 1903, the United States deported twenty-one Hungarian
citizens between the ages of 18 and 51 (average age 35) who had crossed the Atlantic to
Halifax and presumably attempted to enter the United States from Canada at an
unauthorized location. Eight were from Kincses, near Ungvar, 4 from Domba [sic], and
four from Déy/Decz [sic]. Twelve were being sent to Radnot (near Rimaszombat) and
seven to Lipto Sz. Marton.222 The majority hailed from Hungary’s northern counties,
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where agricultural output was low and economic investment was limited. While
narratives of deportation at Ellis Island tend to focus on migrants who were found unfit
for entry – for failing health exams or demonstrating their ability to not become a public
expense – pre-WWI histories talk little about the deportation of able-bodied workers.
Their arrival outside officially sanctioned channels reveals that, although the United
States accepted the entry of hundreds of thousands of migrants annually, it, too, legislated
the legal parameters for entry, well before the quotas of the post-World War I era. Not all
return migrants returned to Austria-Hungary of their own volition.

Conclusion
While the Hungarian government’s interest in migrant loyalty and patriotism
remained consistent, its direct influence on return migration was limited. Count Miklós
Bánffy, a huge proponent of return migration, was so disappointed with the lack of
success by 1910 that he dejectedly suggested either a final push to make it happen or
abandoning the return migration program altogether, despite it having been one of his pet
projects for several years.223 Bánffy wrote the Prime Minister, Count Károly KhuenHéderváry, that the administration had two choices: “Either to give up the action’s
resettlement branch once and for all and, in this vein, gradually decrease and completely
end the action,” or, “with a strong hand to compensate for the previous years’
shortcomings, initiate broad-ranging socio-political, population, and homeland action,
into which the Americans’ resettlement could be inserted.” Bánffy considered the latter
the “only proper road open to the government.” Chastising the prime minister for failing
to properly support the endeavor, Bánffy ended his letter expressing… “with anxious
223
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patriotic feeling I call … your attention to this affair’s importance” and “undelayable
importance without further delinquent omission.”224
The American Action program continued to promote loyalty to Hungary through
the First World War and even beyond into the early 1920s, hoping to draw migrants
home. In the case of still “patriotic” minorities (always greater in the Hungarian
governmental imagination than in actual numbers), they could join in Hungary’s fight to
recreate the dismantled kingdom. This effort largely failed. In the Hungarian Parliament
at the outset of 1916, members of Parliament, already looking ahead to the end of the
war, believed that there were “large numbers of Hungarians” who would “return to their
mother country after the war.” MP and University of Budapest economics professor Béla
Földes asserted that “Hungarians now in America did not feel at home there,” presumably
due to discrimination against Hungarians as aggressors in the war, and that they should
be “the first to be repatriated” and given opportunities to succeed upon their return.225
While many migrants who had intended their stay in the United States to be
temporary were essentially trapped in America for the duration of the war, such a
movement for mass return migration was wishful thinking in 1916 and far from accurate
by war’s end three long years later. The outbreak of war completely transformed the
circumstances surrounding return migration. The extended period of time migrants spent
in the United States during the war itself and the benefits of Americanization during the
conflict ensured that thousands of Eastern European migrants who imagined their stay in
America to be temporary would become permanent residents of the United States.
The introduction to restrictive immigration legislation in the United States
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likewise affected migrants’ decisions, as what had once been a revolving door
transformed into a gate, however porous, in the interwar era. With restrictions in place,
migrants, we will see in chapter five, migrated as “birds of passage” far less than they had
earlier in the century, fearing the gates might close more tightly behind them.
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Chapter 4
Nationalism Turns Separatist: Migrant Nationalisms and the Collapsing and
Coalescing of States in World War I
Migrant nation-builders are essential to understanding the transnational story of
Austria-Hungary’s destruction and the creation of specific nation-states out of its former
territory after World War I. Migrants’ nation-building activity in the United States before
the war allowed a select number of national projects that had been developing on both
sides of the Atlantic over the previous decades to emerge as nation-states by wars’ end.
Migrant nationalists’ creation of cohesive, distinct ethnic communities in the United
States in the late nineteenth century recast the western imagination of Austria-Hungary
from a jumbled mix of cultures arrayed under one emperor to a backward, unnatural
multiethnic empire with distinct, distinguishable ethnic components that were being
politically stifled. Nationalists both in Eastern Europe and the United States articulated
alternatives to empire: discrete ethnic nations. A high-stakes war allowed some of those
alternatives to become realities.
Migrant nationalists of different self-proclaimed nations did not have a level
playing field in gaining the ear of policy-makers. As wartime enemies, German- and
Hungarian-speaking migrants to the United States had little say in determining their
homeland’s fate, as the imperial government itself purportedly already represented
German- and Hungarian-speakers’ interests. Migrants’ roles from these titular nations
were limited to members of the U.S. wartime propaganda bureau, the Committee of
Public Information, and whatever initiative individuals took to write in the press.
Similarly, migrants whose national projects in the United States were not sizable,
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cohesive, distinct, or strategically significant enough — for example, Rusyn-Americans
— were likewise not granted the exceptional opportunities. Only migrant nation builders
like self-identified American Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles succeeded at the task of nation
building.
Migrants received a prominent role in nation-building when they could effectively
partner with homeland nationalists, rally their ethnic organizations in the United States
around the cause of statehood, and contribute to American war aims. Czech- and SlovakAmerican organizations had poised themselves well for these tasks, developing over
several decades distinct, active, interconnected organizations with personal ties to
homeland nationalists and politicians. Migrants had made Chicago a “hotbed of East
European exile nationalism” for several decades. In Chicago and New York, migrants
regularly protested the status quo in Habsburg politics. During wartime, they were also
fueled in their protests by the American government. While German- and Hungarianspeaking migrants felt pressure after the outbreak of war to defend their loyalty to the
United States and disown their homeland allegiances, “American authorities fostered this
nationalism,” historian Tara Zahra explains, “hoping to incite Austria-Hungary’s Slavic
minorities to rebel against their rulers.”226 Regardless of whether migrant nationalists
supported causes that succeeded or failed at war’s end, their activism in transatlantic
debates about nationhood, statehood, and citizenship warrant our further attention. Wartime necessity put important discussions of Eastern Europe’s post-war options on U.S.
soil. First Cleveland and then Pittsburgh became the self-titled cities of two foundational
agreements in the establishment of a Czecho-Slovak state because American-based
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nationalists had the luxury to act on state-building in ways that many of their European
counterparts simply did not have in the midst of war.
Migrant nationalists’ ethnic interpretations of Austro-Hungarian imperial
oppression melded with the United States’ wartime enemy, suggesting an ethnic solution
for the Empire’s post-war future in the form of supposedly more democratic nationstates, but we need not follow suit. This chapter holds, as Nicole Phelps has argued, that
the United States and other Allied powers saw East Europeans primarily in terms of
race227; therefore, ethnicity and nationality took on oversized importance in the conflict.
Providing a strong rebuttal to once commonplace arguments in Habsburg historiography,
historian Pieter Judson explains that “the existence of nationalist movements and
nationalist conflicts in Austro-Hungarian politics did not weaken that state fatally, and
they certainly did not cause its downfall in 1918.”228 Instead, he argues, AustriaHungary’s greatest challenges were related to wartime leadership and the “struggle for
democratization” in the face of privileged political classes. But migrant nationalists, even
more than their European counterparts, insisted on casting the Empire’s social
inequalities in ethnic terms – the oppression of Slavs by Germans and Hungarians, as
opposed to the oppression of the landless and smallholders by German- and Hungarianspeaking aristocrats – and the Allied powers ultimately followed suit. To the United
States and Western European governments wary of any association with social
revolution, achieving Austria-Hungary’s democratization through a nation-state solution
to the “nationality problem” was far preferable to other ways of addressing the guilty
Austro-Hungarian government’s aristocratic militarism and chokehold on politics.
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Indeed, fanning the fires of nationalism became an explicit Allied goal to weaken
Austria-Hungary in the very late stages of the war.229
In this way the Allies chose to reinvent Eastern Europe as a collection of nationstates. They did so by essentially empowering nationalists instead of, say, monarchists or
socialists; they favored the creation of bourgeois states over aristocratic or proletarian
ones. Considering the unfolding of Eastern Europe in this way expands interpretive
possibilities and lets us reassess the centrality of “ethnic” conflict in the war, the peace
process, and the diplomatic and nationalist histories written since. This vein of
interpretation reminds us that nations are imagined and states established. They are not
“awakened” and restored to a status they should have had all along. This interpretation
allows us to see more clearly how transatlantic migration contributed to nation-states as
the ideal of twentieth-century statehood and why some migrant nationalists, like CzechAmerican Emaunel Voska, helped make their dreams of nation a reality during World
War I. Since a movement for democracy had to come from the “people,” ethnic
nationalists in the United States were an effective proxy for their “countrymen” and thus
promoted in getting a say as to how the landscape would be redrawn. According to
Voska, while “Bohemia-at-home was divided in its opinions on the character of our
visioned State, no such difference troubled Bohemia-in-America. We agreed . . . in
imagining a democracy.”230
The significance of transatlantic migration, then, to the post-war outcome of
Eastern Europe has two distinguishable phases: the long-durée importance of
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transatlantic migration to Austria-Hungary’s national politics through the building and
promotion of cohesive, recognizable “ethnic” communities in the United States
(discussed primarily in the preceding chapters), and certain migrants’ opportunities to use
wartime military and diplomatic circumstances to influence the war effort, shape the
peace settlements, and influence the nation-building process. Wartime nationalist
propaganda and negotiation profoundly affected the peace settlement because of
widespread changes to East European nationality politics already wrought over three
decades of massive transatlantic migration.
In the second decade of the twentieth century, Slavic national projects in the
United States rather suddenly shifted in aims from broader rights and autonomy within
Austria-Hungary to separatism. The difference between these two positions was dramatic,
and yet the triumph of the nation-state model at war’s end has frequently led politicians
and later historians to think that independence was what all “nations” deserved and
desired from the outset. In reality, as we have seen, the movement of thousands of people
had significantly shifted the scale and aims of many East European national projects in
such a way that made a series of separate states out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire a
possible outcome of an early twentieth-century war. The separatist turn in migrants’
views of European nationality politics was a monumental change in ideas that was
necessary to make the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, rather than its maintenance as a
state, the outcome of the war in the region.231
East European nationalists’ had a cacophony of theoretical plans for AustriaHungary’s future that, could not, of course, co-exist. At war’s end some states found
fruition in somewhat previously articulated forms, like a south Slav state, while others,
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like an enlarged Romania, became far more extensive than ever dreamed; others still,
namely Austria and Hungary, suffered territorially diminished “rump” states, and some
never achieved independent states at all, like Ruthenia. But in several cases, most notably
the creation of Czechoslovakia and the reunification of Poland, the national aims of
American migrants significantly influenced the form and the likelihood of statehood.
What many wartime discussions and histories written since often fail to admit is
that state-building is an inherently subjective process. Paris Settlement politicians
conceded that lines were not drawn strictly on the “national principal” of state boundaries
exactly following linguistic/national boundaries — to do so would be impossible, and the
culprits of the war had to be punished with some truncation of their “rightful” territory,
after all. But they seem to have largely accepted that the creation of states around
nationalities, in national categories forged and known to them in part because of
migration, was somehow natural and objective. This chapter, building on “constructivist”
interpretations in nationalism theory, maintains that post-war nation-states, like AustriaHungary itself, were all constructions, based on a roster of nations influenced by the
presence of migrants in the west and through the role, in part, of migrant nationalists.
Many of the high-level diplomatic discussions about wartime foreign affairs and
post-war treaty-making are absent from this dissertation, as they have been well
documented elsewhere. Also outside the scope of this chapter are the array of debates
among peoples in the Habsburg Monarchy and exile communities in Western Europe.
The more modest focus of this chapter is the often overlooked significance of North
American migrants and transatlantic migration itself to the war and peace process, and
should be considered in conjunction with other scholarship on the Great War.
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Of only secondary importance in the pages below, despite extensive attention to
migrants’ imperial loyalty in previous chapters, is migrants’ loyalty to the Empire or to
the United States. Several excellent works already document migrants’ willingness to
display their American patriotism when called to do so,232 and exemption from armed
U.S. military service sensibly circumvented painful decisions for migrants of fighting
against their kin on the battlefield. The Fourteen Points called for “autonomous
development” for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. Autonomy was anathema to war-time
Austro-Hungarian politicians, especially Hungarian aristocrats; it was enthusiastically
embraced by the Empire’s Slavic immigrants and seldom challenged by HungarianAmerican nationalists, who increasingly saw union with Austria as an undesirable
liability that should have been addressed decades before. The overwhelming majority of
migrants had little reason to defend the imperial status quo, whether Hungarian- or
Slavic-language speakers, making migrants’ imperial loyalty rather irrelevant to the war.
Major points of contention certainly materialized later over what form Wilson’s
suggested self-determination and autonomy should take and many protested where the
boundaries of new states were rather unexpectedly drawn, but only after questions of
wartime loyalties were already moot.
The war and the peace accomplished one thing above all else: making the nationstate the standard of Western statehood. The conflict and post-war settlements also made
citizenship and ethnic identity much more fixed and subject to government control.
Despite continuing evidence that identity was mutable, hybrid, and constructed,
international diplomacy and popular opinion now functioned under the predominant
assumption that it was discernible and biologically fixed and reemphasized the moral
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imperatives of nationalist beliefs.233 Working backwards from there, it is no wonder that
histories of migrant nationalism suggested that migrants had been fighting AustroHungarian oppression all along, and had even left Europe because of it. The chapter
below will examine the transatlantic separatist turn in East European nationalism and
look at successful, semi-successful, and unsuccessful migrant national activism that
attempted to influence Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Ruthenia, respectively.

The Separatist Turn from Empire and Confederation to Nation-States
The expansion of various Slavic national organizations in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries sought greater recognition, rights, and self-government for Slavic
peoples in the Empire, but rarely sought complete separation Austria-Hungary or deemed
a nation-state their goal until late in the First World War. Histories that posit an
independent state as the goal of Slavic nationalists throughout the latter half of nineteenth
century miss the variety of proposals and the creative evolution of nationalists’ goals over
the course of the sixty years following the 1848 revolutions. These decades featured
various proposals for expanded national rights within a Habsburg state and a tremendous
shuffling and reshuffling of affinities and alliances before advocating for a separate
Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovak state, reunified Poland, enlarged Romania, and South
Slav state became the goals at war’s end. German- and Hungarian-speakers in the United
States also had to contend with their mixed and changing views about their AustroHungarian home state. German-speaking migrants from Austria frequently joined
communities of German-speaking migrants from Germany, making their views
particularly difficult for historians to access. More accessible to us are Hungarian233
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speaking migrants’ misgivings about Hungary’s place in the Habsburg Empire. The
Hungarian government’s American Action program, as we saw, did little to emphasize
Hungary’s ties to Austria or the House of Habsburg. As we will see below, Eastern
European national projects in the United States were contradictory and divergent and
completely changed by the outbreak of war in Europe, and then changed again with the
United States’ declaration of war on Austria-Hungary.
Most Slavic national projects before WWI sought a federative Habsburg Empire
or new federative East European state(s), built on shared history and the belief that very
small independent states were not viable. Nineteenth century nationalists believed that
“linguistic nations” could thrive within the framework of multinational Austrian and
Hungarian “political nations.” Even so-called panslavism had separatist and nonseparatist forms, a spectrum emphasizing all Slavs under Russian leadership, the EastCentral European region’s slavs broadly, or the unity of Austria-Hungary’s slavs alone.
Among Slovak nationalists in Hungary, historian Alexander Maxwell firmly establishes
“Hungaro-Slavism” as “the mainstream of pre-1918 Slovak thought,” as a corrective to
“several histories of Slovakia [that] mistakenly equate opposition to Magyarization and
opposition to the Hungarian state.”234 Many South Slavs sought independence from
Austria-Hungary not to start independent states, but to join already autonomous countries
in building a Slavic state or federation; others sought to remain in Austria-Hungary under
a “trialist” (three-part) government that afforded them the same rights as Hungary had
vis-a-vis Austria. In various parts of Imperial Austria in the early twentieth century, local
legislative bodies forged a series of compromises that made many of the concessions that
nationalists were seeking; the Moravian Compromise of 1905, Bukovina Compromise of
234
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1910, and Galician Compromise of 1914235 sought to define representation for various
linguistic groups within a geographic area, recognizing nations (through language) as
political categories but still part of the whole.
The longstanding resistance to separatism in many of the Slavic national projects
gave way to the novel goal of independent Slavic states. In the case of Czecho-Slovakia,
linguistic overlap encouraged mutual efforts between Czech- and Slovak-speaking
migrants to achieve greater linguistic rights in Austria and Hungary respectively, but
cultural cooperation did not readily suggest political union. Hungaro-Slavism kept many
Slovak nationalists in Austria-Hungary from endorsing separatism or Czecho-slovakism
in Europe.236 As American CPI journalist Will Irwin wrote, “Most nationalists in
Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia were still either monarchists, Russophiles or extreme
radicals.”237 While Irwin intended those terms pejoratively, he nonetheless indicates a
variety of political orientations among individuals and elected officials in the Empire,
even among those who considered themselves nationalists. Among the growing group of
nationalists who saw Slovaks’ best interests outside of a centralized and Magyarizing
Hungarian kingdom, autonomy within Hungary, Austria-Hungary, or some federative
Central European state were all options. A political union with Czechs was seldom
endorsed even after the turn of the century. In 1906, Thomas Capek wondered, “wither
do the Slovaks gravitate? Toward the Bohemians, who are their nearest and most natural
allies? Certainly not.”238 Ivan Daxner expressed more openness to the idea but similar
misgivings when he stated, "Away from the Magyars, but not into Czech subservience;
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we want to join Czechs as equals."239 During and after the war several prominent Czech
and Slovak nationalists would argue that Austria-Hungary had kept the Czechoslovak
people cruelly divided from each other in different halves of the empire, but such protests
were largely after the fact. Joint Czech and Slovak political aspirations were a new
product of both migration and wartime opportunities.
Czech and Slovak nationalists achieved a joint state that few had previously
envisioned, but nationalists dreamed of many states that never materialized. National
projects that never achieved a state offer a powerful corrective to the teleology behind
many of the states that the war did indeed establish. While World War I is often heralded
as a story of victory in both United States history and various Slavic national histories —
a failure only for Germany, Austria-Hungary, and their few allies —Maxwell proposes
recognizing a wide range of national failures alongside national triumphs. In his view,
World War I was not the apex of “national awakenings” — a term that he likewise
critiques — but a mixed record of successful and failed nationalisms. Taking Slovakia as
his case study, Maxwell argues that not only Hungaro-Slavism but also All-Slavism
(panslavism) and even Czechoslovakism “failed,” all losing out to the ultimately
triumphant exclusive Slovak national project. These failures, furthermore, are often far
more illuminating than narratives of heroic success.240 Whereas nationalists and scholars
of the immediate post-war era could point to any kind of nationally coded institution as
evidence of their nation’s existence and state-readiness all along, national projects that
never won states remind us that things could have gone very differently. After 1918, there
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was no all-Slav state, no Bohemia or Czechia, no Slovakland or Slovakia, no Ruthenia,
no Croatia, Bosnia, or Serbia, or Slovenia. The post-war struggle of nationalists whose
perceived nations did not achieve states after World War I points to the centrality of
emigré communities and wartime exigencies in garnering the political will and
circumstances to define an independent state. Such analysis is full of counterfactuals: had
Rusyn-speaking migrants been more insistent on separate institutions rather than widely
joining Slovak-speaking communities, might they have been able to lobby for a separate
state that they did not yet perceive they needed to lobby for? Questions of this sort have,
of course, no answer, but serve as reminders — constantly necessary in an era when we
take nation-states for granted as the best and only viable type of state — that they are
constructions.
The American Action’s efforts at maintaining Hungarians’ loyalty to the
homeland notwithstanding, many Hungarian nationalists in the United States also
increasingly held more separatist views toward the Empire, questioning Hungary’s union
with Austria. The legacy of the 1848 revolution and its leader Louis Kossuth provided a
republican model of separatism for those who held little allegiance to the Dual Monarchy
as such. In addition to suppressing Slavic national projects, historian Béla Vassady argues
that the Hungarian government’s American Action’s subsidies to ethnic institutions in the
United States also aimed “to defuse the Magyar immigrants’ anti-Habsburg Kossuthism.”
In much the same way that the Action failed to contain Slavic nationalism abroad,
however, it also proved largely “unable to cool” Hungarian-Americans’ “passionate
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Kossuthism”241 The leading Hungarian-American newspaper, Amerikai Magyar
Népszava [American Hungarian Peoples’ Voice], prominently featured a hand-penned
letter from Kossuth’s son Ferenc of Hungary’s Independence/Independent/Opposition
Party as the very first guest salutation in its twenty-year jubilee anniversary album,
followed only afterward by the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the U.S.242 The cover
featured a single-headed eagle alongside the Hungarian coat of arms – an American
eagle, not a double-headed Habsburg eagle. The Népszava had been central in erecting a
statue of Lajos Kossuth in Cleveland and statues of George Washington and Nathan Hale
in Bupadest, all clearly symbolic of anti-imperial independence.243
This strong vein of Kossuthism in Hungarian-Americans’ national views was
highly problematic for the Hungarian government during the war, particularly when the
central leaders of the government under Prime Minister Tisza were ardent Dualists
committed to the union with Austria. At the same time, migrants’ Kossuthism was
promising to the Independence/Independent/Opposition Party in Hungary, which ran on a
platform of universal suffrage, independence from Austria (though divided into factions
supporting complete separation and merely greater separation than the current
Compromise), and sometimes alliance with Social Democrats. The party’s leftist wing, in
particular, sought to harness the support of Hungarians in the United States, who were
more unified in favor of a greatly expanded franchise than other any other homeland
political issue.
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Debates around migrants’ place in Hungary’s democratization can be clearly seen
during Independence Party politician Count Mihály Károlyi’s tours of the United States
in April and July of 1914. Károlyi’s visits were received with fanfare by HungarianAmerican audiences and the American press, some opposition by Slavic audiences, and
indifference on the part of the American government. Károlyi largely succeeded in
unifying the Hungarian-speakers in the United States through his “homeland cause” of
expanded suffrage and democratization, visiting New York (where he drew a crowd of
3,600), Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Bridgeport and smaller Hungarian-American
communities. Band music on a harbor tugboat greeted Károlyi’s arrival in New York
harbor in April.244 Károlyi sought supporters among emigrants from Hungary by
collecting financial support, utilizing the American and migrant press, and working
through existing institutions to back his movement.
Károlyi’s platform aimed at the common ground between Hungarian-American
nationalists, socialists, and the rather politically indifferent, for all of whom expanded
suffrage and democratization and greater distance from Austria were appealing.
Independent Party member Dr. Sigismund Farkasházy explained to the New York Times
that Hungary was “being oppressed by an oligarchic absolutism.” Austria and Hungary
were “bound by a kind of Siamese twin ligament,” he explained, under which Austria had
“reduced Hungary to a condition of economic bondage.” Farkasházy played explicitly on
the Independence Party’s ties to Kossuth’s legacy, stating, “the death of Francis Kossuth”
-- previously the Hungarian Minister of Trade and Lajos Kossuth’s son, who passed away
in late May of 1914 -- “will have no effect on the progress of the Opposition,” as Károlyi
would carry forward “the great patriotic work of the Opposition Party” (again,
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Farkasházy uses Opposition as the English translation of the Independent Party).245
Prominent Hungarian-American New Yorker Alexander Konta reiterated Farkasházy’s
connection between Kossuth’s revolution in 1848 and the Hungarian Independence
Party’s “Battle Against Austrian Autocracy.” “As an American citizen, I sympathize, of
course, with the party’s aspirations toward a true democracy,” Konta proclaimed.246
Károlyi’s was an attempt to address democratization through governmental
reform by social class instead of nation, based on people’s identities simply as voting
citizens rather than members of ethnic constituencies. This was the opposite approach of
most Slavic nationalists, who tried to gain expanded rights and representation in the
Austro-Hungarian political system. Unlike the Moravian and Bukovina Compromises in
Austria, which created expanded rosters of voters in explicitly ethnic blocks, Károlyi’s
expanded franchise would grant suffrage to all males over the age of 21, to Hungarianspeakers and national minorities simultaneously, without any designated representation
by language or ethnicity.
According to Béla Vassady, by embracing widespread democratization, Károlyi
“hoped to minimize socialist and Slavic immigrant opposition in America” and build a
broader coalition of emigrants from the Hungarian kingdom..247 Konta’s influential
article in the Times argued that “in Hungary’s national life, as in her politics, the
divisions are less and less those of race and increasingly those of party.” A better way for
Konta to phrase the problem, by 1914, however, was that the country now faced greater
divisions by race and party. Konta explained that the oppression that retarded Hungary’s
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peace and prosperity was “not exerted by one race within the kingdom, the Magyars over
all the others, but is exerted by Austria for Austria from Vienna.” For Slavic nationalists
with grievances specifically against the Magyarizing policies of Budapest in the last
several decades, Konta’s explanation of the Independence Party’s aims resonated in its
democratization but likely stung Slavs in its disregard for Hungarian governmental
culpability and scapegoating of Austria alone. “If the Magyars still oppressed the other
races of Hungary for their own profit, the emigration from the country would be made up
almost entirely of non-Magyar Hungarians, of Slovaks, Ruthenians, Rumanians, Croats,
Serbs,” Konta reasoned, noting that the masses of Hungarian-speaking migrants were
escaping that same class-based oppression as national minorities. In much the same way
that democratically-motivated Hungarian nationalists like Konta were too dismissive of
the racialized elements of the aristocracy’s rule in Hungary, Slavic nationalists did not
particularly empathize with the class oppression faced by Hungarian-speaking peasants.
For several decades, Slavic peasants’ poor fortune in Hungary has been continually
explained by nationalists as national oppression. Regardless of how progressively
democratic Károlyi’s program might have been compared to the aristocratic Hungarian
government, by 1914 many Slavic nationalists by saw expressly ethnic representation or
autonomy as the only suitable way to recognize Slavic-language-speakers’ rights and
place in Austria-Hungary, not universal suffrage. The fight for Hungary’s
democratization and escape from “Austrian autocratic rule” was broad enough to earn the
backing of Hungarian-Americans across a broad spectrum of political persuasions, but
not convincing enough to gain the support of Slavic nationalists in joining the
Independence Party to create a “modern State . . . founded under the Hungarian flag.”248
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Károlyi’s tour and political appeal created a “nationalist dilemma” for
Hungarian-speakers who had worked hand-in-hand with the Hungarian government to
support Hungarian cultural life in the United States and also those on the left who
opposed or eschewed homeland aristocratic politics. Unlike with national minorities,
Károlyi’s program hit the right notes with Hungarian-Americans. Károlyi did have some
opponents among Hungarian Americans, but they could not viably challenge his
independence platform and its greater resonance with migrants’ American experiences as
democratic citizens and sometimes voters. Hungarian nationalists who had worked
through the American Action to promote loyalty to Hungary had been supported by the
very Hungarian government that Károlyi was now opposing. Vassady points out the
noteworthy opposition of Father Kálmán Kováts of Pittsburgh, who considered Károlyi’s
attempt to gain support from Hungarian-Americans potentially financially exploitative
and an easy target for Slavic opposition. But in the end, “most” of the Hungarian clergy
supported Károlyi’s program. Károlyi’s success in winning over Hungarian-speaking
socialists was a similarly “major reversal” in migrant allegiances in homeland politics.249
The New York Times reported that “Because [Károlyi] is the most ardent advocate of
universal suffrage in Hungary, the Socialists there have accepted him for a leader. Most
of the Socialists at the meeting last night accepted him in the same spirit,” though “a few
could not forgive him for being an aristocrat and for being wealthy.”250
Hungarian governmental and Slavic opposition did muddy Károlyi’s attempt to
gain the backing of the American government. The National Working Party and the Tisza
government attempted to erode Károlyi’s popularity in the United States using the
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familiar channels of the American Action.251 On the Tisza government’s behalf,
Hungarian nationalist Alexander Gondos penned anti-Károlyi articles to circulate in the
American and Budapest newspapers, under the name A.S. Glenn.252 Gondos tried to bar
Károlyi and his support staff’s entry to the United States by publishing information that
certain party members had engaged in duels, and were therefore criminals. In the press
Gondos openly posed the question of whether “it was right for the minority party of a
country friendly to the United States to solicit money in this country for a political
campaign in that country,” a question that raised complex issues about the United States’
growing agenda as a promoter of Western democracy. U.S. Vice President Thomas
Marshall replied that migrants who had become American citizens “ought not to be
interested in any foreign Government,” but specifically made an exception if it were “an
effort upon the part of the people to change an oligarchy into a democracy.” Gondos’s
attempts on behalf of the Hungarian government to undermine Károlyi’s popularity with
Hungarian Americans failed to erode Károlyi’s popular program, but the Hungarian
government’s opposition to Károlyi did perhaps succeed in blocking his recognition by
the United States. A State Department official noted that Károlyi’s professed purpose in
the United States in the spring of 1914 was to study migrants’ “conditions” in America,
but that they were well aware his aims were “to take the necessary steps to institute a
propaganda in favor of a more democratic regime in Hungary.”253
Since Károlyi was coming to the United States without the formal recognition of
the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry, U.S. officials did not receive him in any official
capacity. Migrant nationalists used Károlyi’s visits to try to endorse him to American
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government officials – State Department files are full of telegrams and written
endorsements from Hungarian-American societies and individuals254 -- but his opponents
sent messages, too. Nonetheless, Károlyi gained thousands of supporters and $30,000 in
donations (many just $1.75 apiece) to run a democratic campaign at home, but over
$16,000 of it was seized by the U.S. government under the Alien Property Act once the
United States joined the war.255 Károlyi’s platform of democratization was meant to
“assure a nervous Washington that his purpose was not violent revolution but victory in a
democratic election in Hungary,” but if national minorities still considered Károlyi-style
universal suffrage within a unified Hungarian kingdom as ethnic oppression, it was of
little value to the United States as it formally entered the war. With the Austro-Hungarian
Embassy’s conspicuous non-recognition of Károlyi’s travels as a state visit and Slavic
migrants’ rejection of Károlyi, the United States government declined to support Károlyi
and pursued Austria-Hungary’s democratization during and after the war through nationstates instead.

Migrant Lobbying in War-Time
When the United States declared war on Austria-Hungary in December 1917,
already three and a half years into the conflict in Europe, it was not yet a war that
promised to dismantle Austria-Hungary. But the war did portend a renegotiation of the
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balance of power among the Empire’s peoples. In Europe and among migrants in the
United States alike, the war encouraged many individuals who were rather nationally
indifferent or non-political in their national life to declare a national identity and embrace
its political implications. “So many of our people,” one Czech nationalist observed, “had
almost forgotten that Bohemia was once a nation, until the World War blew up the flame
smoldering within.”256
The war gave some nationalists – but not all – unprecedented influence in crafting
new political entities, even if they had long ago migrated away from their Central and
East European homelands. When looking at migrant lobbying, scholarship often
emphasizes whom migrants were lobbying, rather than examining the lobbyists
themselves. Thus, here it is not President Wilson or Secretary of State Lansing that take
center stage: their contributions and oversights, triumphs and blunders in aiding,
ignoring, and decimating various nations have been extensively explored, and their roles
have been well documented, even overstated. The Wilson administration largely ignored
the separatist politics of Austria-Hungary, Slavic and Hungarian alike, until 1918.
Lobbying by East European or migrant nationalists at the presidential level before U.S.
entry into the war was indeed largely “ignored,” or, more generously, not acted upon.257
But migrant nationalists were at work, and in 1918 played a significant role in the major
reversal of the American government from maintaining Austria-Hungary as a geopolitical
entity to dismantling it. Wilson, Lansing, and West European diplomats at the Paris
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Settlement made it happen, but the writings and war-time work of migrant nationalists
like Emanuel Voska, Charles Pergler, G.H. Mika, Marcus Braun, and Eugene Szekeres
Bagger, instead, are the focus below. They illustrate the different roles that Czech-,
Slovak-, and Hungarian-speaking migrants played in East European state-building during
World War I, from their positions as leaders in American ethnic circles.
In addition to individuals, the institutional circles they operated in are vital to
understanding migrant nation-building. Many migrant nationalists were involved with
George Creel’s United States Committee on Public Information, most notably Voska,
making them agents of Americanization at the same time as nationalists. Institutionally,
two of the most important organizations to consider are ones that we have already seen in
raising the ethnic consciousness of the Empire’s migrants: the Bohemian National
Alliance of America and the Slovak League of America. Immigrant nation-builders often
had American partners who were not migrants but supported different migrants’ war
aims, like Oberlin College sociologist Herbert A. Miller, who was a strong supporter of
Masaryk and the Czech national movement, and Fiorello LaGuardia, who supported
Hungarian Count Mihály Károlyi and a separate peace to found a democratic Hungary.
Several national programs had American supporters, but with a variety of strengths,
connections, and liabilities. Hungarian-American national leaders and communities had
arguably less experiences with political protest and lobbying, as the government and the
American Action took the lead in promoting Hungarian nationalism, a sharp contrast to
Czech- and Slovak-speaking migrant nationalists.
Czech nationalist Emanuel Victor Voska was among the most influential of
migrant nationalists and thought carefully about his dual role as a European nationalist
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and American serviceman and citizen. Voska had come to the United States at the age of
nineteen supposedly after a brief arrest by Austrian police; while some writers have
attributed his “exile” to his national views, by most accounts he was not yet a nationalist
and was arrested for seditious speech based on his socialist beliefs. Despite his radical
views, Voska shifted his activism from class to nation in the United States, becoming a
successful businessman and a leader in Czech-speaking circles.258 A master of
propaganda, Voska must of course be read critically; for example, his commentary on a
“clique of Hungarian nobles” hatching a “plot” sets his writing firmly in his nationalist
camp.259 He nonetheless offers the most extensive and direct evidence of concerted ties
between Czech nationalists living in Prague and the United States.
Voska went to Prague months before the war broke out in his role as a
correspondent for the Czech-American newspaper Hlas Lidu, apparently perceiving an
impending crisis and traveling all over Europe to collect information. Voska met the first
night of his visit with T.G. Masaryk, leader of the Czech national movement in exile and
later first prime minister of independent Czechoslovakia; Masaryk advised Voska not to
come to his apartment again, lest he be targeted by Austrian police, but they began a
longstanding collaboration. “Then we hatched an idea. The Fourth of July was coming. I
would give a big dinner in honor of the day, inviting not only prominent men of the
American community in Prague but citizens of Prague with American business
connections—and, incidentally, the leaders of Masaryk’s movement.” Voska planned this
to “avert suspicion,” and held “political conferences with Czech leaders under the
disguise of newspaper interviews.” After the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz
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Ferdinand and Princess Sophie in Sarajevo, Voska was able, at Masaryk’s request and
using his American press credentials, to travel and gather information. In Trieste he
learned from “leaders of the South Slavs” that it was not a Hungarian plot against the
royal family, as he had originally thought; they “frankly admitted that Serbians fired the
shots which killed the imperial couple.” With a declaration of war unfolding, the
American consul in Prague happened to be on vacation, and so Voska and his daughter
helped out the assistant in charge for several weeks, furthering his ties with the State
Department. Masaryk next sent Voska to meet with British members of Parliament and
the Russian ambassador to London to indicate Masaryk’s desire to establish a Czech
movement with the Allies. Voska claims to have concealed documents in the soles of his
shoes and wrapped around his daughter’s corset ribs. As Masaryk suggested, he then
returned to New York to “organize support for the revolution among our American
Czechs.”260
Back in New York, Voska devoted himself to collecting intelligence and facilitating
communication for Masaryk’s Czech national movement, building in part on his
experience with social organization as a socialist and unionist in the Empire. A clerk at
the Austrian consulate in New York warned Voska that Austrian spies would be present
in the audience at a public meeting that Voska arranged at the New York’s Sokol Hall.
The clerk, a Czech nationalist, promised to identify other Czech employees at the
Austrian consulate who shared their views. Voska pulled widely from the CzechAmerican community to recruit couriers to carry verbal messages from the Czech
movement in the United States to two parties: Masaryk and his supporters in England,
and Czech nationalists still in Austria. Voska relied heavily on migrants who had become
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U.S. citizens and held American passports. As long as the US was neutral, these migrants
could pass through territory controlled by both the Allied and Central Powers. Voska
explained how his group also issued counterfeit passports, used official Austrian passport
forms purloined from the New York consulate to provide false papers for their agents,
and even arranged for fake arrests of his couriers en route to Europe so that they would
not be suspected as spies by the Germans or Austrians. Voska then sent agents to beg the
Austrian diplomats to issue his couriers visas to return home to see dying relatives.261
Masaryk and Voska used Metropolitan Opera House soprano Emmy Destinn as an agent
to convince “monarchists, Russophiles, clericals, and radicals” among the Czech
politicians in Prague to join Masaryk’s republican movement. She sang Czech folk songs
from the Prague opera house and when arrested, feigned innocence as an American
Czech, claiming that that she had no idea that to do so was a political act.262
Voska was active on the home front as well. He assisted with foreign language
materials and support for Liberty loans, did work for Creel’s Committee on Public
Information, started the magazine The Periscope to inform Americans about Central
European affairs, continued to promote the Czechoslovak national cause in immigrant
industrial circles, and sent dozens of updates to the Wilson administration.263 Various
aspects of the global conflict of World War forced working-class migrants to choose
between their class interests as workers and national interests in addition to choosing
between their duties as Austria-born citizens and new Americans. The socialist-ornationalist dilemma was one that Voska himself likely sympathized with, having
reinvented himself in the United States from socialist to nationalist and businessman; the
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Austrian-or-American dilemma was, for him, an obvious choice. Voska claims that
“Many Czechs and Slovaks who thought they were good union men found in this crisis
that they were better patriots.”264 The question for migrants was overwhelmingly
complex: An Austrian propaganda film screened widely in East European communities in
the United States while the US was still neutral, depicted a bomb made by a SlovakAmerican in an American munitions factory being fired in Europe, killing his brother.
Workers, regardless of nationality, were called to resist longer hours and higher output
quotas without compensation, or otherwise strike. In contrast, Voska’s group printed
hundreds of thousands of pamphlets in several Slavic languages explaining that “victory
for the Allies meant independence for their old countries,” discouraging labor strikes. In
1914 Germany and Austria called “their male nationals of military age to register at the
consulates. Among our people—Czechs, Slovaks and South Slavs born under Austrian
rule—,” Voska explains, “a good many had registered. Then they had joined our
revolutionary societies and wanted henceforth no part of Austria. Now such men began
coming to the secretaries of the Czech National Alliance or the Slovak Leagues to ask for
advice. They had been summoned to the Austrian consulate and . . . ordered to Mexico
‘for service.’”265 Voska’s espionage work exposed a broader array of German-Mexican
connections to Allied intelligence agencies, undermining efforts by Germany and
Austria-Hungary to pull on their migrant population for military purposes using Mexican
ports.
Voska took his efforts back to Europe once the United States entered the war,
officially in the employ of the U.S. Army but working for Czech interests alongside his
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American orders — a dualism that featured at nearly every phase of his life. At the front
lines in Italy, he engineered the distribution of propaganda to the soldiers of “subject
races” serving in the Austrian army, airdropped leaflets in German and Hungarian
encouraging soldiers to surrender and be treated to “sumptuous meals, including coffee
and cigarettes” as POWs in Italy, and worked with the army to bring Czech and
“Jugoslav” politicians to Italy from behind Austro-Hungarian lines.266 After the war,
Voska immediately set out to work for the peace and Czechoslovak state-building. He
claims to have carried loads of archival material from Vienna to Prague, proving AustroHungarian responsibility for causing the war. His office in Prague flooded the city with
pro-Wilson leaflets (“his picture in every cottage”). He bluffed to requisition food rations
from Austro-Hungarian military storage in Bratislava to feed Bohemian coal miners and,
by providing them food during famine, dissuade them from Bolshevik revolution.267 All
of these contributions make Voska among the most influential figures in the transnational
effort for Czechoslovak statehood, in which migrants played an active role. Beyond
Voska’s own exploits, his story reveals a wide network of migrant nationalists who
worked with and through him in the United States to help their “nation” achieve a state
under unique wartime circumstances.
Voska’s work in espionage, propaganda, and the military was complemented by
Czech-American nationalist Charles Pergler’s political work in Washington D.C. and
G.H. Mika’s work in the Slav Press Bureau. Pergler “moved his headquarters to
Washington, where for two years he worked virtually as a lobbyist—for a nation which
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did not exist and a cause which was not demanding legislation!”268 Whereas Károlyi’s
program had argued for the transformation of Hungary through democratic reform, the
outbreak of war had shifted Masaryk, Voska, and a whole host of other Slavic
nationalists’ programs to the dismantling of Austria-Hungary; it was Pergler and Mika’s
jobs to convince American Slavs, the American public, and American diplomatic
officials alike of this position. The Károlyi movement’s critique of Austria in the
American press already did some of Slavic nationalist’s work for them; Slavic-Americans
whose homelands were in territorial Hungary could add critiques of Hungary to Czechs’
critiques of Austria. Pergler and Mika’s writings and speeches emphasized terms like
“oppressed,” “suppressed,” “subject,” and “captive” describing Austria-Hungary’s
minorities, appealing regularly to the United States’ own anti-imperial revolution to
found a republic.269 Pergler spoke before the House Foreign Relations Committee in
February 1916, gaining the type of audience that Károlyi had hoped for but never
achieved. Particularly influential was a February 1918 article in the Times, “Slavs in
Austria Appeal to Allies … Don’t Want Autonomy,” arguing explicitly that “complete
separation from Habsburg Empire Is Demand of the Oppressed Nationalities There.”
Mika explained in no uncertain terms that “only . . . condition . . . under which the
Czechoslovaks will be willing to accept autonomy and to continue within AustriaHungary” was “the transformation of the Dual Monarchy into a Federal Republic.”
Pergler’s characterization of Austria-Hungary described it as “a survival of
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mediaevalism, purely dynastic and artificial”; “its very existence,” he continued, “is a
denial of the principles for which America stands.”270
The main strains of Hungarian-American lobbying, emphasizing a democratic but
unified Hungary through a minority opposition party, were less compatible with
American war aims by 1917 than Slavic-American calls for Austria-Hungary’s
dissolution. This can be one explanation why Hungarian-American lobbying did not
result in the same level of acceptance by the State Department and other Allied
governments as Czech and Slovak efforts did, giving Hungarian-American nationalists
like Konta few of the opportunities available to Voska, Pergler, Mika, and others.
Hungary’s longstanding union with Austria, its wartime military alliance with Germany,
and its intact government were indisputable facts; alternative democratic politicians were
nearly impossible, diplomatically, for U.S. officials to embrace. As historian Tibor Glant
explains, American diplomats with the Wilson administration declined to engage with the
relatively little-known democratic Hungarian Count Mihály Károlyi on his 1914 and
1917 visits to the United States.271 Although Károlyi was popular with HungarianAmerican audiences and could plausibly present himself as an heir to Lajos Kossuth’s
ideals to both Hungarians and, at times, the American public, he lacked the personal
friendship with Roosevelt and respect in international academic circles that had made
Count Albert Apponyi so popular among American diplomats and politicians a few years
before. Many Hungarian nationalists had high hopes for Károlyi’s role in achieving their
vision for Hungary’s post-war future, but not all democratic nationalists and American-
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based East-European nation-builders got the same opportunity to influence post-war state
creation.
Just as Masaryk had immigrant nationalist supporters in the United States and in
American governmental political circles during the war through Voska, Pergler, and
Miksa, Marcus Braun and Fiorello LaGuaradia promoted Károlyi’s movement in U.S.
diplomatic circles during the war, despite the American government’s decision not to
engage with him in 1914. Braun, we know, was a leader in New York City’s Hungarian
community and in diplomatic circles, but less so in church- and fraternal-based
Hungarian circles, while LaGuardia, as we saw above, had been a consular agent in
Budapest, Fiume, and Trieste earlier in the twentieth century. Braun provided the clearest
articulation that a Hungarian independence movement from Austria, supported by
Hungarian Americans, would undermine the Empire’s war effort and best fulfill
Hungarian dreams of self-determination. In a four-page memorandum that Braun
discussed at length with LaGuardia, Braun argued to U.S. Secretary of State Lansing that
Hungarian Americans were in the ideal position to give Hungarians back home the
courage to back away from the Central Powers’ war effort, since the Russian threat to
them, the one practical reason to defend themselves on the side of the Central Powers,
was now gone. Braun envisioned a flood of correspondence from Hungarian-Americans
to their relatives at home and in the trenches to give up the fight. He further envisioned an
“Independent Hungary,” led by Károlyi and others who could lead the country in a postHabsburg democratic future. Following the same tactics that the Hungarian government
had used in attempting to maintain the loyalty of its citizens abroad, the “Independent
Hungary” movement that Károlyi had begun would enter a war-time phase using the
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ethnic press, leaders in the ethnic community, and clergy to preach an independent
Hungary from the newsstands, the fraternal hall, and the pulpit — all means that the
Bohemian National Alliance and Slovak League of America had also employed. Braun
drafted a “Manifesto to American Hungarians to their Brethren of Hungary,”272 but it
seems that it never left the State Department.
The parallels to the Czecho-Slovak movement would be striking, if Braun’s vision
had developed further. Despite LaGuardia’s enthusiastic support, Lansing and Wilson
rejected the plan and LaGuardia’s multiple attempts at a separate peace.273 According to
historian George Barany, Braun’s proposal and documentation of LaGuardia’s support of
it were filed in September 1917 without any official comment. The LaGuardia-Károlyi
partnership never became a Miller-Masaryk partnership; Braun did not get to play the
roles that Voska or Pergler did for Masaryk. For one, the homeland politicians with
whom Braun sought cooperation with were still back in Europe waging war, not traveling
in the West gaining legitimacy and international support as Masaryk was. Károlyi
favored Hungary’s break from Germany and attempted to reach out to Entente diplomats,
with a host of proposals compatible with the direction of Western democracy should he
come to power, including expansion of the franchise, feminism, and recognitions of
labor. George Barany concludes that Károlyi “could not be counted upon as the political
leader of a Hungarian anti-Habsburg national revolution in 1917” from the perspective of
American officials, as he and his party continued to believe in the integrity of Hungary as

272

George Barany, “The Magyars,” in The Immigrants’ Influence on Wilson’s Peace
Policies, ed. Joseph P. O’Grady (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 150153.
273
Ibid., 140, 155.
151

a “geographical unit” irrespective of the nationality questions.274 The interplay between
different national projects is significant in the rejection of Braun, LaGuardia, and
Károlyi’s bid: a Czecho-Slovak national project that had set itself on a course for an
independent nation-state could not coexist with a democratic Hungarian national project
that maintained “Hungary” as a political unit with its current borders. Where one pursued
democratization through national self-determination the other did through universal
suffrage without national distinctions. Geography dictated that they could not both be
achieved.
Károlyi worked for his vision for Hungary’s post-war future without the backing of
the United States. He succeeded briefly in becoming prime minister and provisional
president of Hungary in October 1918, before being deposed by Socialists the following
March. In practice, independence politicians and migrant nation-builders were accorded
recognition much more from “oppressed” nationalities whose goals could be fit more
easily with American and Allied war aims, not opposition party leaders of “nations” that
had an official government that the United States would have to diplomatically bypass.
European “independence,” in the end, would therefore take the form of nation-states,
however constructed, instead of the democratization of existing political entities.
As the war waged on battlefields, in State Department and Foreign Ministry offices,
in migrant fraternal organizations, and on the home fronts, it simultaneously raged in the
press. While the migrant press featured the most ethnic vitriol, the pages of the New
Republic put the debates between articulate nationalists before a wider American
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audience. Eugene S. Bagger boldly wrote in 1918, “I believe in the full victory of the
Allies and in Czecho-Slovak and Jugoslav independence, not in spite of being a Magyar,
but because I am a Magyar.”275 While Slavic nationalists had embraced separatism in
large numbers several years before and Hungarian-American were increasingly inclined
toward Austria, the vast majority of Hungarian migrant nationalists, like Károlyi,
espoused social change within Hungary’s hallowed thousand-year-old borders. Bagger
openly declared that Hungary’s backwardness stemmed from class inequality —
specifically with the “corrupt junker oligarchy” in government — but by 1918 he
believed that Hungary should embrace rather than resist Wilsonian self-determination.
Vladislav R. Savic, writing for the “Jugosalv” perspective the next month in response to
Bagger agreed, further arguing that “The Magyars here in America would do a great
service to themselves and to the world if they should immediately organize and express
themselves for complete independence and equality of all the races of Hungary. The
attitude of the Magyars in this country may influence their people in Hungary and save
the world may thousands of lives and billions of money.”276 In some circles Bagger was
quickly branded a traitor for conceding that the division not only of Austria-Hungary but
of Hungary itself would be an appropriate outcome of the war. His interpretation of
Hungary’s faults, however nuanced or accurate, did not mean much when victory and
punishment were to be doled out by nation, not classes within them, and Hungary’s
borders shrank more than even he thought possible.
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The Cleveland Agreement (1915) and the Pittsburgh Agreement277 (1918)
The Cleveland Agreement, forged between the Slovak League of America and the
Bohemian National Alliance at the Bohemian National Hall in Cleveland on October 22,
1915, was the beginning of the formal movement for an independent unified Czech and
Slovak state. The concept of Czecho-slovakism had longstanding transatlantic roots,
particularly in literary circles, but became politically salient in this American context.
The agreement simply declared the intention of the two organizations to work in concert
for a Czech-Slovak state. Over the past several decades, Czech- and Slovak-speakers had
come to share certain work and living spaces in the United States and formed two highly
organized, nationally conscious ethnic institutions. Just months after the war broke out in
Europe, the Bohemian National Alliance of America and the Slovak League of America
joined forces with the goal of Czecho-slovak statehood. The Cleveland Agreement stands
out as a pivotal moment in which national identity was very transparently constructed,
finally embodying a century of intellectual musings on linguistic relatedness of Czech
and Slovaks and the naturalness for their affinity to one another.
Contrary to after-the-fact interpretations, such an arrangement was by no means
inevitable. The terms Čecho-Slav, Czecho-Slovak, Czechoslovak, and other variations
joining Czechs and Slovaks did not come into use until 1913.278 Thomas Capek wrote in
1920 that “‘Published in the interest of the Čecho-Slavs in America’ is a legend that is
printed under the headlines of pretty nearly every journal, irrespective of religious or
political affiliation. Usually, if not always, that paper is being issued in the interest of one
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Čecho-Slav — namely, the publisher.”279 Nationalists could ride waves of wartime
support, but even a committed nationalist like Capek saw artifice in ethnic pandering.
Capek retroactively applied the concept of Czecho-slovakism to earlier decades which it
had not yet existed, a practice that would be replicated by scores of other Czech and
Czecho-Slovak nationalists, though notably not Slovak nationalists who objected to this
coopting of what had been a separate Slovak national project.
The United States and Slavic Americans were again central to the formation of
Czechoslovakia with the signing of the Pittsburgh Agreement on May 31, 1918. The
agreement envisioned a federative state with Czech and Slovak halves, with both
similarities and notable differences to Austria-Hungary’s dualism. The federative, rather
than unified, state structure had been of utmost importance in achieving a consensus
between Czech-speaking and Slovak-speaking American communities.
Tomaš Masaryk lobbied extensively for the Agreement before the meeting in
Pittsburgh, building on the groundwork of Voska’s efforts and the connections of his
American connections like American businessman and diplomat Charles R. Crane. While
Masaryk was not a conventional migrant himself, he maintained American connections
through Czech-American communities, academic circles, and his American family
through his marriage to Charlotte Garrigue, who he had wed in Brooklyn in 1878.280
After fleeing Austria in 1914, Masaryk traveled to Europe and Russia before arriving in
the United States in 1918. “The United States,” Voska realized, “was momentarily the
center for diplomatic action”; the center would shift later back to England and to Paris,
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but it was an opportune time for Masaryk to visit the United States. “The Czech National
Alliance saw in his visit a new opportunity to make the United States Czechoslovakconscious.” Masaryk’s visit made the most of American interest and temporary centrality
in supporting the Czech national cause. Masaryk’s American appearances – like those of
Counts Apponyi and Károlyi – featured welcome ceremonies, political speeches, and
“picturesque demonstrations in national costume.”281 An editorial in the Chicago Tribune
welcomed Masaryk in glowing terms, and his May 7th arrival was greeted by an “by an
indescribable hurricane of enthusiastic and stormy ovation,”282 while his welcome in New
York featured an “impressive parade” of the city’s immigrant societies.283 Visiting
Chicago in late May 1918, Masaryk explicitly knit together America and Bohemia’s fates
in the war effort. “I am certain,” he declared, “that without a free Bohemia there will be
no free America. This is not talking big. . . . What is Austria? Nine nations and one
dynasty which, assisted by army, bureaucracy and nobility, exploits all, even the
Germans and Hungarians. America has a choice; it can opt for nine free nations or for
one degenerated dynasty.”284 Masaryk largely succeeded in winning over a critical mass
of migrant nationalists and American diplomats to his views.
At the end of the month, on May 31, 1918, the Czecho-Slovak National Council
met under the presidency of Thomas G. Masaryk in Pittsburgh. The participants were not
elected representatives of self-identifying Czechs and Slovaks in Czech- and Slovakspeaking areas of Eastern Europe, but instead mostly representatives of fraternal
281

Voska, Spy and Counterspy, 258.
Slavie, May 7, 1918, translated in George J. Kovtun, Masaryk and America:
Testimony of a Relationship (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1988), 31.
283
"Dr. Masaryk," New York Times, May 27, 1918.
284
Masaryk's speech to Czechs and Slovaks in Chicago, Slavie, May 31, 1918, translated
in Kovtun, Masark and America, 24.
282

156

organizations like the Slovak League of America, the Czech National Federation, the
First Slovak Evangelical League, and the Association of Czech Catholics, associations
that were sometimes rivals for members in the American context but now unified behind
a nationalist cause for their perceived people back in Europe. Among the Pittsburgh
Agreement’s signatories were many of the leaders of the Czech- and Slovak-American
communities. Among Czech-speakers, Vojta Beneš was an organizer of the Bohemian
National Alliance of America, Hynek Dostál was the editor of the Hlas newspaper out of
St. Louis, Clevelander Josef Martínek was editor of the Czech-language socialist
newspaper Americke Delnicke Listy, Charles Pergler headed the war-time Slav Press
Bureau and was a part of the Bohemian National Alliance and the Bohemian Chapter of
the Socialist Party of America (and, much later, Czechoslovak ambassador to the United
States), Rev. Oldřich Zlámal was an influential Cleveland priest, and Jaroslav Joseph
Zmrhal was a principal and superintendent in the Chicago Public Schools. Among
Slovak-speakers, Ivan Bielek director of the New York import company Czecho Slovak
Commercial Corp, Ivan Daxner was the executive secretary of the Slovak League of
America, Ján Adolf Ferienčík was the editor of the paper of Slavonic Evangelical Union
of America, Ignác Gessay was a Cleveland journalist, Milan Getting was a publisher of
the newspaper of the Slovak Sokol, Jozef Hušek worked for the Slovak League of
America, Rev. Ján Kubašek was president of the Association of Slovak Catholics, Albert
Mamatey was the president of the National Slovak Society and the Slovak League of
America, Rev. Jozef Murgaš was a founding member of the Slovak League of America
and a priest in Wilkes-Barre, Cleveland journalist Ján Pankúch worked for the Slovak
League of America. Andrej Schustek was chairman of the first district of the Slovak
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League of America, while Rev. Pavel Šiška was the League’s financial secretary. Twothirds of the signers of the Pittsburgh Agreement were migrant nationalists.
The Pittsburgh Agreement demonstrates migrant nation-building at its apex.
Migrants assumed the prerogative as self-proclaimed members of the nation to act on
European Czechs’ and Slovaks’ behalf. They scarcely admitted that building a European
nation-state in Pittsburgh was not strictly democratic. In its four opening points, the
agreement confidently declared a “Union of the Czechs and Slovaks in an independent
state comprising the Czech Lands, and Slovakia” in a democratic republic, but specified
that Czech Lands and Slovakia would have their own administrative bodies and courts
and assured Slovak as the official language in Slovakia. The fifth and sixth points of the
Agreement displayed more caution by migrant nationalists about acting on their
European brethren’s behalf. “The organization of the collaboration of the Czechs and the
Slovaks in the United States will be amplified and adjusted according to the needs and
according to the changing situation, by mutual agreement,” it explained, while leaving
the “detailed rules” of the new state “to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal
representatives."
The Pittsburgh Agreement and Masaryk gained further recognition through the
establishment of the Mid-European Union, founding on September 16, 1918 as an
“informal union of . . . newly liberated nations,” a sort of joint lobby and think tank to
negotiate territorial disputes between the emerging nations and work for their mutual
economic future. Meeting the next month in Philadelphia, their declaration “was signed
in the same hall and that the same table as the American Declaration of Independence.”
Delegates represented the “Czechoslovaks, Poles, Jugoslaves [sic], Ukrainians, Uhro-
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Russians [elsewhere in the document written as Uhro-Ruthenes], Rumanians, Italian
Irredentists, Unredeemed Greeks, Albanians and Zionists, wholly or partly subject to
alien domination”; other iterations included Lithuanians. Polish representation reportedly
withdrew shortly thereafter over territorial conflict with Ukraine over territory in
Galicia.285 Masaryk became the first president. Oberlin College sociologist Herbert A.
Miller was the only American member of the organization and became its operating
Director. Miller drafted the Union’s resolutions “to resolve mutual differences and to
solve common problems” for aspiring nations, which were adopted by the assembly and
then presented to President Wilson.286 Despite the success of many of these national
projects included in the Mid-European Union in achieving a state in the wake of the war,
not all national projects resulted in states. Gregory Zatkovitch’s attempt to gain a hearing
for a Ruthene state at the Paris Settlement, despite inclusion in the Mid-European Union,
failed,287 while Czecho-Slovakia’s founding was confirmed.
Delegates’ views varied widely on ethnic Czechoslovakism, with the
overwhelming majority maintaining a view of two nations in one federative state, as both
the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Agreements stated. Some appreciated the flexibility of a
hyphenated Czecho-slovakism, and others still embraced Czechoslovaks as one people,
cruelly divided by Austria-Hungary into different halves of the empire, to be properly
reunited again. Although in the overwhelming minority at Cleveland and Pittsburgh, the
language of a single “Czechoslovak nation" (národ československý) emerged in the
state’s founding declaration later on in Europe. The Washington Declaration, officially
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declaring the independence of the Czechoslovak state, was published on October 18,
1918 in Paris and declared a unified rather than federative structure, sidestepping the nonbinding but unambiguous plans of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Many Slovak nationalists,
particularly those in the United States, who were committed to a separate Slovak nation
within the proposed Czecho-Slovak state under the Cleveland and Pittsburgh
Agreements, were outraged and lobbied extensively against the structure of the new state.
But with the backing of migrants, American diplomats, and western European diplomats,
nationalists had succeeded in accomplishing a state for the Czechoslovak national project.

Conclusion
Correspondence in 1918 between President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of
State Lansing referred to Austria-Hungary as the “artificial Austrian Empire.” Moving
ever closer to seeing the western world in terms of nation-states, Wilson wondered “if
even Hungary is any more an integral part of it than Bohemia.” “Hungary should also be
definitely considered to be an independent nationality, no longer united with Austria,”288
he concluded. Wilson’s observation came too late for Károlyi. Even the most pro-Dual
Monarchy Hungarian politicians would have vehemently insisted that Hungarians had
been a separate “nationality” from Austria all along. Commentators the world over had
printed thousands of pages and drawn millions of breaths debating which nations were
“independent” nationalities and which were mere off-shoots. Comments like Wilson’s
indicate that they failed to realize that their musings on ethnicity was itself a process of
further construction, not some excavating of objective ethnic truth.
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The Paris Peace Settlement left some migrants elated at the success of their
national projects, others unsure about the new order, and still others bitterly disappointed.
In 1920, Thomas Capek confidently wrote, “a Pole to Pole, no matter whether in the old
country your John Lubomirski owed allegiance to Austria, Prussia, or Russia; a Čech to
Čech; the Magyar to his own; the Austro-German to the Germans from the Fatherland.
That State idea to which Austro-Hungarian statesmen have clung as tenaciously as the
dervish holds fast to his fetich, is that moment proved an illusion, or rather a delusion:
political boundaries that had separated people of the same race are seen to disappear as a
rainbow fades. Only two binding ties survive: race and language.”289 Capek’s assessment
shows how far the world had come so quickly in recasting Europe as a land of nationstates, however imperfect. The Allies maintained their privileges to Empire in nonwestern parts of the world, but no German Empire or Austro-Hungarian Empire would
further threaten their vision of Europe. Race and language certainly won in theory, but
the linguistic intermixture made the reality far messier. More political boundaries now
separated “people of the same race” than before the war, since now thousands more miles
of political boundaries existed in Europe, with sizable minority populations. In several
cases, migrants’ war-time lobbying shifted to post-war revisionism. This is not surprising
for those whose nations were “losers” in the war, like Hungarian-speakers seeking
“Justice for Hungary,” but Slovak nationalists in the United States also became bitterly
divided between those accepting of a single Czechoslovak nations and those insistent that
Slovaks had been promised autonomy in a Czecho-Slovak federation.290
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Studying war can be sad business, a tragedy alongside a drama. Embarking on
this project, studying nationalists, I expected to find few loyal migrants truly committed
to the Habsburgs or to Austria-Hungary in my research. The accounts are littered with
German nationalists, so easy to vilify as the culprits and enemies, especially since
Americans tend to conflate most things historically German with Nazism. But here and
there were migrants who were indeed committed to Austria-Hungary. Voska’s spies
uncovered several. Many were from borderlands areas or had mixed identities. One
medical doctor in New York City, still a reserve officer in the Austrian army, lamented
all the treason among his fellow migrants against the Empire and offered confidential
information against separatists.291 Other imperial loyalists, too, showed up at AustroHungarian consulate in New York, before the United States had entered the war, asking
for help in dealing with consequences of problems with their loved ones in the troubled
homeland, or offering to help stop those trying to break it apart.
Reflecting back on his work for the American war effort and the creation of the
Czechoslovak state, Voska was confident about what “our patriotic Czechs and Slovaks”
had accomplished: “popular acceptance of Habsburg rule . . . [was] as full of holes as a
honeycomb.” By his estimates, 50,000 “aliens belong to the subject Slav people of
Austria” and had joined the American army, and 320,000 immigrants had joined the
Bohemian National Alliance or Slovak National League.292 “To a degree with few on this
side of the water realize, the young Czechoslovakia regarded the United States as her
motherland. The influence which made her a republic, not a monarchy . . . , came from
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the Czech and Slovakia colonies in the United States.”293 Voska’s own position as a
migrant — an ardent Czech nationalist but U.S. citizen — had given him the ability to
work in many circles and even to be a hero for his nation without being a resident or a
citizen. Voska described his status during the war as a “peculiar position,” “under
command of the American army but responsible also . . . to the Czechoslovak provisional
government.”294 In much the same way that it was only a small handful of nationalized
individuals who emigrated from Austria-Hungary to the U.S. because of nationalist
reasons, it was likewise a small group of devotees like Voska who would return to take
part in the national triumph. “I , for one, wanted to watch the baby grow up and to lend
what help I could,” he recalled, referring to the new Czechoslovak state. Having
bankrupted himself in the cause of establishing that state, he sought in the post-war era to
capitalize on his transnational connections now as a return migrant. And yet, he could not
so easily abandon his identity as an American, cultivated over several decades of living in
the United States and serving the US army and government. “The feeling of a naturalized
Czech or Slovak toward the country of his birth and that of his adoption was not so much
a divided allegiance as a welded allegiance.” He kept his American citizenship, alongside
acquiring Czechoslovak citizenships, and established in Prague the most New York of
businesses: the city’s first large taxi company.295
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While Voska comfortably embraced the fuzziness of simultaneous Czecho-slovak
and Czech and Slovak identities at home and abroad, migrant communities struggled to
make sense of a single Czechoslovak identity, as ethnic divergence had been a strong
feature of their ethnicization in the United States. At the second anniversary celebration
of the Pittsburgh Agreement in Chicago in 1920, a Slovak speaker addressed the
continuing divide, blaming the Austro-Hungarian past for the belated discovery of
Czecho-Slovak mutual support. But the article reveals continued unease with the question
of whether Czechs and Slovaks and Czecho-Slovaks were indeed one and the same. “He
assured us, the Bohemians, that every Slovak is a sincere brother of ours, a son of one
mother - Slovakia. He referred to the frequently overlooked fact that until recently, the
Slovaks did not have their own Slovak schools, that ever since childhood they were
brought up to hate Bohemians and everything Slavic. Therefore, it is not surprising that
many of them are still against us today, especially when they are continually instigated by
hired or voluntary agents."296
“Failed” migrant nationalists licked their wounds in the aftermath of war. Many
Hungarian Americans watched with dismay as Károlyi’s democratic government fell and
the kingdom was reduced to one-third its former size, putting many of their home villages
outside of Hungary’s new borders; those same Hungarian-American socialists saw
opportunity in Hungary’s 1919 Bolshevik revolution to bring about a classless society,
even if in a much smaller territory, before that too fell to a conservative resurgence under
noble-born Miklós Horthy, who ruled as Regent of Hungary through World War II. Rusin
nationalists in the United States mourned the loss of Rusin nationalists at home who died
296
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while interned during the war at the Austria’s Thalerhof camp, after being accused of
association with Russia. The Thalerhof experience prevented any cooperation between
Rusin nationalists in the US and those in Austrian Galicia and Hungary; their national
projects would develop instead under the circumstances of the interwar period, having
missed the war-time opportunities to make a claim for a state.
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Chapter 5
Quotas and Borders: The Dual Effects of the Paris Settlement and American
Immigration Quotas
After the First World War, two factors drastically changed how Eastern
Europeans might migrate to the U.S.: first, new geopolitical borders in the region,
outlined in the Paris Settlement treaties; and second, restrictive immigration legislation in
the United States. While numerous historians have studied the effects of the break up of
Austria-Hungary and the effects of U.S. quotas on East European migration separately,
rarely have they explained the effects that these two major post-war developments had on
transatlantic migration together.297 It is a curious oversight, as the combination of new
state borders and quotas were of huge significance for many would-be emigrants and
return migrants.
An American quota system was first passed in the Emergency Quota Act of 1921
and then revised in the Immigration Act of 1924 (also known as the National Origins Act
and the Johnson-Reed Act). This quota restricted emigration to the United States just as
new political borders impelled many to leave. Especially in borderlands areas, thousands
of individuals’ home villages did not end up in the new state they identified with
nationally. For migrants who had gotten stuck in Europe for the duration of the war, the
location of new borders determined, in part, whether they desired to remigrate to the
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United States afterwards. New borders also mattered tremendously for migrants already
in the US deciding whether to return to Europe. Before the war, migration to the United
States had served as a safety valve in Austria-Hungary for economic hard times. After the
war, as the European economy was still reeling, the valve had been pulled almost shut.
As historian Mae Ngai has argued, and Nicole Phelps has greatly expanded, “The U.S.
immigration quota system helped to reinforce categories of racial nationalism, and the
border controls it involved helped to discourage international movement, contributing to
the governments’ desires to align of citizenship, race, and place.”298
One of the great ironies of the Paris Settlement was that, rather that creating
homogenous nation-states aligned with so called self-determination, it instead reshuffled
heterogeneous Eastern Europe into new states that had massive minority populations.
This situation heightened irredentism, or a desire for border revision based on
ethnographic or historical claims to territory. Indeed irredentism became one of the most
prominent political ideologies in interwar Europe. While the United States’ entry into the
war ground transatlantic migration nearly to a halt, the war’s end and the Paris Peace
Settlement brought no definitive resolution to questions of migration, nationalism, and
sovereignty. In fact, the immediate post-war period saw widespread upheaval and
attempts by individuals and families to migrate quickly to reunite war-torn families,
finally pursue pre-war migration plans, move across new borders to end up on the “right”
side, and get to the United States before legislation made it impossible.
Furthermore, as historian Tara Zahra explains, the new states of East Central
Europe sought to “‘filter’ their populations, retaining only the most desirable national
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citizens.” As a result, she continues, “Emigration policy became an explicit tool of new
and more violent forms of nation building and population politics.” In some cases,
therefore, minorities might have greater mobility to leave, but were not welcome to return
home.299 In other ways, however, access to migration services were often more accessible
to member of the titular nation than to minorities. Nevertheless, Zahra’s observations
offer a useful starting point for digging into deeper detail about the consequences of the
First World War on transatlantic migration from former Austro-Hungarian territory.
As transatlantic migration became possible again after the war, nativists in the
American Congress rode a wave of isolationist, xenophobic, and anti-Bolshevik
sentiment to pass laws reducing the sanctioned arrival of migrants to the United States,
including those from “ex-Imperial Austria.” Representative of the genre of racialized
exclusion in the 1920s quota laws is a report collected by the Secretary of Labor. The
author concluded that continued “immigration of German and Magyar elements . . .
would certainly . . . be appreciated due to the good elements of civilization, of
intelligence, and activity of the two mentioned races,” but also warned of the “migratory
flux” of the “numerous element of the Slav ex-Austrian peasantry, now all united in the
two Republics of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and in complex, Serbian-Croatian-Slovene,
composing the Yugoslav Kingdom.” “Almost all the Slavs can, for the present at least, be
considered as dangerous vehicles for bolshevik infection.”300 (Other commentators were
far less generous toward Germans and Hungarians.) The House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization, chaired by Congressman Albert Johnson of Washington,
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became an active agent of restriction, despite the staunch dissent of select Congressmen
representing their immigrant constituents.
Across the Atlantic, European lawmakers, too, turned to questions of whether and
how to legislate mobility in the post-war era. Czechoslovak Minister of Welfare Gustáv
Habrmann argued in a 1922 speech that it was necessary to differentiate between
Czechoslovak emigration before and after 1918, reinforcing that the conclusion of World
War I had altered migration. Habrmann retold Czechs’ and Slovaks’ history of
emigration for the last three hundred years in light of the recent developments. In the
former period, Slovaks “groaned under the Hungarian yoke.” The reasons behind the
1905 peak in emigration, he argued, could be found in Hungary’s “political and cultural
repression”; “no wonder the Slovaks left home lightheartedly to search for a new home
for themselves in America.” But after the “grisly war” had concluded, he argued, Slovaks
emigrated because of poor “European conditions.”301 Habrmann’s argument that
economic privation was a new factor ignored the importance of economic considerations
before the war, and the fact that that many Slovak nationalists objected to the
Czechoslovak state’s handling of Slovak autonomy after the war. We see in both periods
an interplay between economic well-being and cultural questions, not to mention the way
in which laws produced and constrained emigrants’ decisions.
The far-reaching effects of new East European borders and restrictive
immigration legislation in the United States opened a new chapter in the issues that we
have explored over the previous several decades, including home governments’
relationship to migrants, return migration, and new phases of nationalist projects. These
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issues now confronted the postwar issues of self-determination and the expanding and
protecting of new states. The successor states to Austria-Hungary continued many of the
practices of the pre-war period, and now migrants had to contend with greater restrictions
from the American government alongside their home governments.

Legislating Nativism, Restriction, and Isolation
At war’s end, in November 1918, it was not clear where the victorious Allies
would draw the borders of new states to succeed Austria-Hungary and how far the United
States would go in restricting the entry of migrants from the Eastern hemisphere. The
unsettled details in both of these matters created a prolonged period of confusion, as
potential migrants tried to maneuver how best to end up where they wanted to be while
the opportunities existed to do so.302 Further, the perceived radicalism of the Russian and
communist revolutions in Eastern Europe strengthened the position of isolationists in
restricting the continued arrival of Southern and Eastern Europeans, who might bring
what historian William Appleman Williams has called a “rising tide of Revolution” to
American shores.303
Especially for potential first-time migrants, the American quotas were a game
changer. Already before the U.S. entry into the war, the Immigration Act of 1917 largely
barred migration from Asia and the Pacific Islands, as well as some categories of
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individuals labeled “homosexuals,” “idiots,” “feeble-minded persons,” "criminals,"
“insane persons,” “alcoholics,” and the illiterate. Prostitutes and anarchists were already
barred. Building on previous legislation, Congress imposed new quotas on migrants from
Europe.
The 1921 Emergency Quota Law capped immigration to the U.S. at 350,000
annually, assigning each country a quota of 3% of the population of its nationality in the
1910 census. The crafters of the law, most notably Washington Senator Albert Johnson,
argued that post-war conditions in Europe were causing the “influx” in post-war
migration that went against the United States’ best interests. The legislation allowed for
just over 50,000 migrants from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire to enter each year
(down from 200,000 some years), divided between successor states and neighboring
states: 7,451 from Austria, 14,557 from Czechoslovakia, 71 from the port city of Fiume,
5,638 from Hungary, 5,786 from Eastern Galicia, 7,419, from Romania, and 6,426 from
Yugoslavia.304 “To allow any great portion of the discontented millions of Europe to
come here is not likely to aid the constructions of Europe,” the report accompanying the
bill argued.305 The reasons for the act included American unemployment, a shortage of
housing facilities in the United States, “the presence . . . of 10,000,000 or more
unnaturalized aliens,” “the danger of spreading contagious and loathsome diseases,” and
“the inadvisability of admitting aliens of the nationalities of the world, speaking their
various languages faster than they can be assimilated.” In the committee phase the bill
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was amended to allow migrants claiming “religious persecution in the country of their
last permanent residence, whether such persecution be evidenced by overt acts or by laws
or governmental regulations that discriminate against the alien or the race to which he
belongs because of his religious faith” to enter outside the quota.306 This important
provision later facilitated entry for several thousand Jews displaced by earlier pogroms
and new bursts of anti-Jewish violence like Hungary’s White Terror.
The 1921 legislation had to account for new borders in Eastern Europe, since the
map of the region in 1890 and in 1921 was markedly different. The law stated as follows:
“In case of changes in political boundaries in foreign countries occurring subsequent to
1910,” the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Labor would jointly “estimate the
number of persons resident in the United States in 1910 who were born within the area
included in such new counties or in such territory so transferred, and revise the
population basis as to each country involved in such change of political boundary.” The
birthplace of those individuals would retroactively become whatever country the physical
territory of their birth now belonged to.307 But as we will see below, the information in
the U.S. Census and other government documents made approximating birthplaces
difficult. While seeming so precise, they were entirely figures of “guesswork.”308
Complications from the new borders and quotas were apparent in the bill even
before it passed. State Department documents apprised the Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization during their deliberations that while Jewish Romanians had “no
difficulty in securing permission to depart, Transylvanians,” previously citizens of
Hungary but now suddenly of Romania, “encounter great difficulty in obtaining the
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authorization to emigrate.” The Bucharest consulate saw a marked uptick in these
applications specifically “due to the fear of anti-immigration laws” in the United States.
Reports from Zagreb indicated that in Yugoslavia, the number of prospective emigrants
would double if the restrictions against the emigration of former Austrian soldiers were
lifted,309 presumably because men who had fought for the Emperor were less likely to
support a Yugoslav state in their political sentiments. The Commissioner General for
Immigration for the Department of Labor Anthony Caminetti noted that peasant
migration was likely to be higher from the “ceded districts” of Hungary, again tying
migration explicitly to territorial change.310
As the United States Congress debated immigration restriction in 1921, two
notable voices of opposition were Jewish-American Representatives Democrat Adolph
Joachim Sabath of Illinois and Republican Isaac Siegel of New York. Sabath had been
born in Zabori, in Bohemia, and became a U.S. Democratic senator for Illinois in 1907.
Although best remembered for his opposition to the Volstead Act, financial contributions
to Czech-American girl Elsie Paroubek’s 1911 kidnapping/murder investigation, New
Deal work, and promotion of American military action against Germany early in WWII,
Sabath was a voice of continued opposition to Johnson. Siegel had been born and raised
in New York, but had thousands of Eastern European migrants among his constituents
and sought to aid Europe’s Jews, in particular, in successfully immigrating to the United
States through organizations like the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and U.S. law. It was
Siegel who successfully argued for the reclassification of the Polish and Russian quotas
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in 1923, as the status of eastern Galicia and Bessarabia were still contested at the time
that the 1921 quotas had been drawn up,311 a single instance of remediation for a
widespread new problem.
The dissenting members of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization -Siegel, Sabath, and their colleague Rep. Robert S. Maloney – argued that Congress
“should deliberate first and legislate afterwards.” If existing laws were “properly
enforced,” there would be no need to put such restrictive new measures in place. They
argued that “practically all who are coming to the United States are leaving Europe in
order to join their families” and that “the reunion of families who have been separated
since the war will be retarded, if not in many cases practically prevented” by the
legislation.312 Because of a continued belief in family reunification, a number of
different categories of potential migrants fell outside the quotas or allowed family
members to receive preference for visas; for example, wives’ and children’s citizenship
was usually dictated by the head of the family, often allowing them to arrive outside the
quota. But Siegel, Sabath, and Maloney were firmly in the minority. In Congressional
hearings, Sabath regularly defused hostile questioning against immigrant witnesses. He
argued openly against the division of Europe into northern and southern and eastern
categories and the racial assumptions that imbued those divisions; “I do not like to have
any reflection cast upon people who do not deserve it,” he retorted.313 But the Emergency
Quota Act was just the beginning, and Johnson’s policies would become even more
restrictive in the coming years.
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The debates preceding the passage of the National Origins Act of 1924 continued
to grapple with the problem of new Eastern European boundaries in assigning quotas to
Austria-Hungary’s successor states. The law further reduced the quotas, allowing each
country a quota of just 2% of the population of that territory in the 1890 US census,
rather than 3% of the 1910 census, and renewed debates about how the quota system
discriminated against the region. The most significant debates in deliberations over the
law were whether the 1890 or the 1910 census should be used in determining the quotas.
While the 1910 census already listed hundreds of thousands of East European migrants
arriving for industrial jobs, the 1890 census mostly encompassed only older, significantly
smaller waves of migrants from Austria-Hungary, like agricultural Bohemians attracted
by the Homestead Act, before industrial migration had really taken off. The switch to an
earlier census was clearly intended to limit Central and Eastern Europeans at a time when
the region was still facing massive upheaval with new borders.
Johnson and his fellow nativists thoroughly succeeded in putting a racialized
rationale for exclusion into U.S. law. Johnson explicitly sought to “maintain the racial
preponderance of the basic strain on our people and thereby to stabilize the ethnic
composition of the population.”314 The apportioning of nationality quotas for new states
based on geography as opposed to ethnicity in Europe was clearly inconsistent with the
logic of trying to maintain a “basic strain” of American “ethnic composition,” but such
inconsistencies did not trouble American nativists. As Ngai concluded, “race and
nationality disaggregated and realigned in new and even ways” under the quota
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system.315 In the end, the annual quotas for the region were set at 785 for Austria, 3,073
for Czechoslovakia, 473 for Hungary, 5,982 for Poland, 603 for Romania, and 671 for
Yugoslavia.
In congressional hearings, questions about how to handle the problem of
assigning quotas based on new borders continually popped up. While Johnson and his
allies insisted that the necessity of restriction outweighed the finer details of quota
allocation, even staunch restrictionists on the Immigration and Naturalization Committee
occasionally betrayed their skepticism about the portioning of quotas for new states.
Colorado Congressman William Newell Vaile noted that changing territorial borders
made the census nearly useless for quota figures. “It is impossible to carry the country
along for either Poland, Austria-Hungary, Germany, or Russia,” he complained. “Are
those figures available elsewhere—the actual immigration from those four countries from
the year 1890 on?”316 “Do you think it would be all right to let the boundaries . . . [of] all
of Austro-Hungary be Austro-Hungary for the purpose of determining the quota?”
Johnson asked one witness. “How, then, would you determine?” Mr. Nathan Grosshand,
a printer and newspaper publisher from Youngstown, Ohio, replied. Forcing the former
empire to share a quota, Grosshand explained, would create even bigger problems than
bad estimates for each country. “Your fight will come in between Yugoslavia, Hungary,
Austria, and Czechoslovakia; each will claim more; that is the trouble you will have,
Congressman.”317
Committee members Congressmen Raker and Watkins displayed their utter lack
of knowledge about the map and peoples of Europe on numerous occasions throughout
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the hearings. “What do you mean by Bohemians,” Raker asked one witness; “What are
they? Bulgarians?” “What kingdom and what king did they renounce when they assumed
naturalization in this country?”318 Watson questioned. O.D. Koreff, a Pittsburgh
newspaperman speaking on behalf of the Slovak League of America, called to testify in
favor of basing quotas on the 1910 census rather than the 1890 census, faced an uphill
battle getting the committee members to even understand the concept of Czechoslovakia.
Speaking about the low crime rate among Slovaks in Allegheny County, PA, he was
asked, “You mean including the Czechoslovaks?” “I am coming to the Czechoslovak part
of it in a short time,” he replied; “I am at present speaking of the Slovaks only, as a
distinct national group. . . . It is for them that I am asking consideration in the shaping of
this bill, because if it should be based on the quota of 1890 it would not give them a fair
showing.” Koreff argued that, even by the 1921 law, the figures for calculated the quota
for newly created states were “not reliable and [were] unjust to Czech and Slovak
immigration.”319
The representatives of the Census Bureau had to admit several times during their
hearing that data from the 1890 census made setting European quotas nearly impossible.
While the 1920 census asked for the province or city of birth, earlier censuses had asked
only for country.320 In the 1890s the list of options for nationality on the U.S. census had
included “Bohemian” and “Slovak” as separate language categories. This made it easy
enough to merge for a Czechoslovak quota, but it is unclear how many “Ruthenian”speakers -- now divided into several new states -- could emigrate. The Immigration
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Bureau’s reports in the 1880s and ‘90s had complained of widespread irregularities in
assigning nationality, mother tongue, and home place names to arrivals – such as
sometimes continuing to list Bohemia as a country of origin long after the Immigration
Bureau and Census Bureau had agreed to classify those migrants as coming from
“Austria.” Now, this highly problematic data from the late 19th century was being used to
set firm caps on the number of entrants from Central and Eastern Europe in the 1920s. In
response to Sabath’s questioning, Census Bureau representatives also admitted that while
the 1910 census collected information on mother tongue, the 1890 one did not, and that
census data on mother tongue had not been used in drawing up the nationality quotas for
the 1921 Quota Act anyway. Estimates were further off, questioning eventually revealed,
because wives’ naturalization followed their husbands’ and therefore added and removed
them from the rolls of the foreign-born depending on who they married.321
Hungarian officials kept tabs on unfolding debates in the U.S. Congress
surrounding Johnson’s bills, noting Siegel and Sabath’s objections on the grounds that it
was an “injustice” to categorize individuals by race and religion and went against the
“American spirit.”322 Nevertheless, the era of mass transatlantic migration was ending.

The Post-War Transformation and Truncation of Migration Bureaucracies
In the early twentieth century both Austria-Hungary and the United States had
created massive governmental bureaucracies devoted to migration; the restrictionist
period and the reshuffling of states in Eastern Europe would bring about a thorough
revision of these arms of government on both sides of the Atlantic. Given Austria321
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Hungary’s long arm in managing migration and migrant loyalty, the end of the Empire
required the dismantling of Austria-Hungary’s wide support networks for migrant
institutions. The war had ceased nearly all official Austro-Hungarian governmental
activity in the United States, but supposedly only temporarily; even if Austria-Hungary
lost the war, there was little reason to believe, at the outset, that it would not survive it.
Now, Austria and Hungary had to disentangle the Austrian and Hungarian strands of their
joint foreign office, while the governments of the new successor states had to formalize
their acting war-time governments and foreign ministries into legitimate post-war
governments. And at war’s end, the exclusionary terms of the 1924 National Origins Act
were still far ahead in the future.
Once the war ended, European and American shipping companies immediately
set out to resume passenger travel across the Atlantic for migrants. Companies required
permits from the new governments of the post-Habsburg states to operate. Hungary, as
before, serves as an instructive case study, even if now a much smaller country. U.S.
Consul Grant-Smith worked hand in hand with American shipping companies to try to
assure that they would have rights to carry Hungarian passengers to American shores.
One American company objected vehemently that the British Cunard Line, which had
enjoyed a monopoly contract for Hungarian emigration for several years out of the
Hungarian port of Fiume, once again had the first and preferential permit from the
Hungarian government to carry Hungarian citizens, even though Hungary no longer had a
domestic port. Even war had not disrupted the economic interests between passenger
liners and Hungarian governmental officials engaged in the business of emigration. To
counteract the Hungarian government’s measures, U.S. Consul Grant-Smith went as far
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as to give visa preference to Hungarian emigrants who purchased their tickets with
American shipping lines. Grant-Smith was chastised by officials in Washington for the
action, but defended himself, saying that it was necessary to protect the United States’
economic interests.323
When the Emergency Quota Act took effect in 1921, Hungary’s quota was still at
5,638, but by the time the Johnson-Reed Act went into law in 1924, Hungary’s quota was
down to 437 migrants annually, making all the work that Grant-Smith and American
shipping lines had put into obtaining permits nearly worthless. While obviously more
than 437 individuals would travel each year —previous migrants or family members
visiting, tourists, business travelers — the low numbers made Grant-Smith’s extensive
economic-diplomatic efforts moot. In this way, the post-war era posed unique challenges
to migrants, businesses, and governments alike.
Austria-Hungary’s prewar network of eleven consulates and three branch offices
was shut down in late 1917 when Austria-Hungary and the United States declared war on
each other. Until the fall of 1921 the neutral Swedish legation handled the affairs of
Austro-Hungarian citizens in the U.S. to the extent they could. Austria and Hungary, now
both independent, had to establish separate offices in cities where they both wanted to
maintain a presence, while new states established offices for the first time. AustriaHungary’s sprawling, far-reaching system serving its diverse constituents all over the
country was replaced with several offices for small Eastern European countries in big
cities, with far less reach outside of major metropolitan areas.
Austria reestablished consular offices only in Washington, New York, and
temporarily in Chicago, despite earlier plans to reopen permanent operations in
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Washington, New York, one major Midwestern city (Chicago, Minneapolis/St. Paul, or
Milwaukee), Pittsburgh, and San Francisco. Imprecise US Census statistics made
estimates of Austrian citizens difficult for Edgar Prochnik, sent to the United States in
1921 to assess Austrian consular needs. On the one hand, Prochnik argued that the US
Census “was of particular value for us. It finally touches on the theory to which we
adhered for many years with an incredible thoughtlessness,” he explained, “that of all
nationalities of the former Dual Monarchy the German element had been the smallest and
completely unimportant.” The number of Austrian Germans, it seemed, was higher than
Habsburg authorities had thought. The census, he continued, “eliminates a fable, which
until now has been responsible for the gross neglect of purely Austrian interests in the
United States.”324 On the other hand, the 1920 US Census failed to make many of the
distinctions he needed: it was impossible to distinguish between Austrians who had been
naturalized as US citizens and those that were now Austrian citizens; distinguishing
between Germans and German Austrians was still exceedingly difficult to do accurately;
and “Ruthenes” and “Eastern Jews” in Pennsylvania and New York had “obstinately
declare[d] [themselves] Austrian,” in protest of new Polish and Czechoslovak borders.
This supranational Austrian imperial identity was, in fact, what the Habsburg Empire had
desired from its subjects for generations, but Ruthenes, Galician Jews, and non-Germans
broadly were not to be part of the independent new Austrian nation. The Empire’s former
minorities, Prochnik wrote to his superiors in Vienna, were “persons who today can be
disregarded.”325
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Dismantling the old Austro-Hungary consular system required physical
considerations, too. Hungary took its half of the consular furniture from the joint offices
to its newly established operations in Washington, New York, Pittsburgh, Chicago, and
Cleveland, while Austria retained some for its new offices in New York and Chicago and
sold off the remainder to Czechoslovakia.326 Although quicker to reopen operations in the
United States than Austria, Hungary was operating two consular offices out of hotel
rooms in 1922.327 Czechoslovakia replicated more of the geographical breadth of AustriaHungary’s former networks, establishing consulates in Washington, New York, Chicago,
Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Omaha, as well as a short-lived office in St. Louis.
The fate of properties and assets in the United States seized from the AustroHungarian government and former Austro-Hungarian citizens remained contested for
years, even decades, after the war’s end. Austro-Hungarian Consul Alexander von Nuber
became embroiled in one of the most notable of the alien property cases because of
confusion over what was Austro-Hungarian consular property, held in his name as the
leading governmental official, and what was his own personal property. Also tied up in
the courts was $16,000 that Count Mihály Károlyi had collected from HungarianAmericans to support his campaign for democratic reforms in Hungary, well before the
declaration of war between the United States and Austria-Hungary. Once war was
declared, the balance of the account was seized by the U.S. Alien Property Custodian.
“Legally, this money is mine,” Károlyi explained, “as it was given to me with out any
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restrictions.”328 Károlyi had served as Prime Minister and then president of Hungary for
five months, until rival conservatives established a regency under Admiral Miklós
Horthy, whose administration waged a “White Terror” against liberals, socialists, and
communists. Four Hungarian-Americans had filed requests with the Alien Property
Custodian to have their contributions returned, as Károlyi had been exiled from Hungary
in 1923 and his movement was essentially over; their claim was dismissed by the District
of Columbia Supreme Court, but was not awarded to Károlyi at that time.329 Six years
later, in 1931, Károlyi was still requesting the money, eventually filing suit in the District
of Columbia Supreme Court.330
Although consular services slowly resumed operations, the wartime absence of
assistance from homeland bureaucracies for over five years had left many ethnic
institutions in the United States in the lurch. In particularly, the extensive financial aid
that the Hungarian government had extended to American churches, national clubs, and
newspapers under the “American Action” was sorely missed and had to be renegotiated.
While the end of the war and the loss of much of its historical kingdom might have
served as a natural moment for Hungary’s American Action to begin to deal with
Hungarian-speakers alone, this was far from the case in reality. Hungarian irredentists
sought to reinforce Hungary’s claim on adjacent territories by courting the former
Empire’s minority populations in the United States.
Unlike Austrian officials like Prochnik who proposed turning inward, Hungarian
officials continued to promote pro-Hungarian political sentiments not only among
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Hungarian-speakers but also Slovenes, Slovaks, Ruthenes, and other Slavic minorities.
The post-war Hungarian government continued to use the tactics of the long nineteenth
century in its post-war quest to right some of the wrongs of the Trianon Treaty. In a 1923
report, a Hungarian governmental official blamed British historian and political activist
R.W. Seton-Watson’s Racial Problems in Hungary for misleading Western opinion on
Slovak-Hungarian relations and argued that everyone was underestimating “Czech
imperialism” and that Slovaks had been “chased into the Czech net.” The report argued
that, if possible, the Hungarian government should support and even “exploit anti-Czech
sentiment” among American Slovaks. So long as disagreement continued between
Czechs and Slovaks, the commissioner believed, Hungary would still have a chance to
gain back Slovakia.331 For at least the next sixteen years, the government retained a
Hungarian Royal Commissioner for Hungary’s Slovak Speakers, who kept abreast of the
actions of the Narodny Slovensky Spolok and the Slovak League of America.
In addition to surveillance and propaganda, Hungarian officials attempted to
resume many of the pre-war services that Austria-Hungary used to provide for its people
in America while it still had the jurisdiction to do so. Governmental and religious
authorities endeavored to comply with requests to supply priests speaking the Prekmurje
dialect of Slovene to a congregation in Bridgeport, Connecticut, a community of 4,000
Slovene-speakers, 2,500 of whom were Catholic, and another in South Bend, Indiana, a
community of 3,000. The majority of the former Empire’s Slovene-speakers, often
referred to as Vends, now resided in the new Kingdom of Croats, Serbs, and
Slovenes/Yugoslavia, though the new borders retained a minority in Carinthia in Austria
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and in Vas County in Hungary.332 Slovene Americans were increasingly mirroring this
split of more pro-Hungarian Prekmurje Vends and Yugoslav-oriented Krajina Slovenes in
their church and social affiliations. At the same time, American religious authorities were
now in a more powerful position to assert control over ethnic institutions in the United
States. In many ways, the key figures to win over to the Hungarian side were no longer
the leading Slovene-Americans, but the Bishop of Hartford.333
The jockeying for affiliations suggests how many migrant institutions continued
to depend on homeland support. József Krampáts, publisher of a historically proHungarian Slovene-American newspaper, wrote a scathing letter to the Royal Hungarian
Legation in 1922 about the betrayal he felt that his entreaties for financial support for the
newspaper now fell on deaf ears at the Hungarian consulate, while the new Yugoslav
government had pledged over $15,000. “Because from Hungary I receive nothing and the
Hungarian consulate now does not consider me worthy of even correspondence, I am
forced to change sides,” he explained, after faithfully serving Hungary for seven years.
The “Prejkmurje American Vend Society’s” new banner was to be red, white, and green,
modeled on the Hungarian flag, with a star in the center to represent the Vend people and
rays emanating from it representing their continuing “fidelity and loyalty to Hungary.”
But now, he would have to change the flag’s colors and send it to Belgrade rather than
Budapest. He gave the Hungarian consulate a deadline of May 20 to comply with his
requests for $6,000 in support to “stay what I was: a Hungarian-Vend.” Krampáts was
apparently well aware of the post-war restrictions on the Hungarian government to
continue to engage in propaganda in the United States. “Don’t think: we won’t give
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anything to Krampáts, in place of Zvejzda [Vogrszki Szlovencov] we can put other
another newspaper instead. . . . You know well that Hungary cannot exert any kind of
propaganda and if you put out a newspaper, deportation awaits you. For this reason it
would be much better to come to an agreement with me and everything will be in order.”
Krampáts’s words bordered on blackmail, and at the same time argued for a continuation
of a stance that Austria-Hungary had espoused for decades: that soft power diplomacy of
behalf of the homeland in the United States was work, and should be compensated as
such.334
The care that Hungarian governmental and religious officials had put into migrant
churches in the U.S. suffered the greatest difficulties in separation after the war. Many
Hungarian Reformed churches, in particular, we saw in chapter 2, had officially joined
and taken out or refinanced their mortgages with the National Bank of Budapest, and now
had to make new arrangements for both their churches’ ecclesiastical membership and
finances. As we saw, the Hungarian government had the closest relationship with
Protestant churches because there was no centralized equivalent of a Vatican to contend
with; now, those churches had to completely separate from the religious bureaucracy in
Hungary. But how? Hungarian American congregations eagerly awaited the advice of the
home church on how to move forward. Hungarian Consul János Pelényi supported union
with the Presbyterian church body in the United States, who had supported several
Hungarian-American congregations as “home” (domestic) missions; prominent minister
Rev. Sándor Kalassay with the Reformed Church, with which they shared Calvinist
theological views; and Rev. Zoltán Kuthy, with whom the Hungarian government had a
decades-long working relationship, proposed an independent Hungarian Reformed
334

Letter of József Krampáts, May 2, 1922, in ibid.
186

Church body.335 The decision was pressing, as the ministers of several smaller
congregations had been forced to take day jobs to support their families during the war
when their salary supplements from Hungary stopped coming. Although the Reformed
Church offered the Hungarian-language congregations greater autonomy, the bigger
coffers at the Presbyterian Church made them more able to stabilize the churches’ loan
situations. Hungarian officials recognized that giving up a formal relationship with the
American congregations would mean “radically changing our church politics.”336
In the end, the Reformed Church of Hungary decided not to choose at all, but to
sign an agreement with both the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and the Reformed
Church in the U.S.A., and leave it up to American synods and congregations to decide
where to go. Under the terms of the agreement, the Reformed Church of Hungary would
receive payment in full for all of the outstanding loans on all of its churches in the United
States, and the new American denominations would also pay ministers’ back pay for
1919! Furthermore, the Hungarian American congregations would “be free to maintain
and to cultivate amongst themselves such a unity as would serve best their common
interest,” as well as to “maintain a free and frequent intercourse with the Reformed
Church of Hungary.” Ministers at these congregations would have to acquire knowledge
of the history of Protestantism in Hungary, with candidates from both the United States
and Hungary eligible if they met this requirement.337
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The consequences for churches on the local level could be dire. While dozens of
immigrant congregations had remained multilingual communities up through the end of
the war, the break-up of homeland religious governing bodies had ripple effects in the
United States. The Perth Amboy Hungarian Reformed Church, founded in 1903, serves
as a useful example. In the album for the church’s 25th anniversary, celebrated in 1928,
the historical profile for the church noted that “the Slovak speaking Reformed element
took an active part in the churchlife from the very beginning.”338 Slovak language
services were offered one Sunday a month and even expanded as late as 1911. But “in
1924 the Slovak members, who had been connected with the church from the very
beginning, seceded from the church. This action was taken by them on account of the
political troubles and antagonism in Europe,” the yearbook explained. “The great
majority went into the [Slovak] Presbyterian Church and a few remained with us who
were satisfied with Magyar services.”339 The 1951 Golden Jubliee Book of the Slovak
Calvinist Presbyterian Union reveals more of the story behind the post-war Perth Amboy
split. When the Perth Amboy pulpit became vacant in 1923 with the bilingual pastor,
Rev. Nánassy’s, return to Europe, there was no longer a mechanism to secure a bilingual
minister and only Hungarian-speaking candidates applied for the position. It was then
that Slovak speakers withdrew from the church and arranged for a Slovak Presbyterian
minister from Jersey City to hold weekly services for them, founding the Slovak
Presbyterian Church of Perth Amboy.340
In dismantling the Austro-Hungarian consular network and the overlapping
networks of support for migrant institutions in the United States, Austria and Hungary
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disambiguated their joint offices into separate ones, but resumed many of the same
activities on a smaller scale. The Hungarian government continued to collect intelligence
on and attempt to influence Hungarian-speakers, as well as the minorities that had
belonged to the Hungarian kingdom historically, even if it could not match pre-war levels
of financial support. Hungary endeavored to begin anew its support of leaders in ethnic
communities loyal to the Hungarian state and their publications, even if on the level of
“child’s play” compared to pre-war initiatives.341 And they were joined in this
transatlantic propaganda effort, now, by new states like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia,
looking to consolidate their own perceived migrant communities in the United States and
protect against any threats to their generous new borders at home.

Leaving and Returning to the European Borderlands
Putting counts and percentages aside, the personal experiences of post-war
migrants and their post-war relationships with governments reveal the many
complications that new borders, quotas, and mixed identities created for individuals who
did not fit neatly into national categories or new states. The lived experiences of
migration after the war, as before, often defied the ethnic categories of the census and
highlight the non-alignment of post-war nations and states.
The Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon guaranteed most residents of the AustroHungarian successor states the right to repatriate to their ethnic homeland if they found
themselves residing outside of it after the borders were redrawn. However, most of these
ethnic minorities (primarily German- and Hungarian-speakers) were encouraged to
341
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remain where they were by their “homeland” governments in order to provide
ethnographic justifications for future territorial revisions. Post-war governments, like prewar Austria-Hungary, largely sought to keep people of the titular nation at home rather
than migrating. As Zahra explains, “While claiming to represent the nation in a liberatory
revolution in 1918, many national leaders worried that citizens would not stick around for
the hard work of reconstruction. More than just a matter of national security or labor
supply, emigration was now considered a threat to the very existence of Eastern Europe’s
new states. Jan Žilka, from the Czechoslovak Masaryk Academy of Labor, praised the
“positive consequences” of the quotas keeping people home.342
“In their determination to create nationally homogeneous populations,” Zahra
explains, “East European governments also sought to reverse the prewar exodus to the
West, encouraging ‘valuable’ expatriates to return home.”343 Czechoslovak officials
hoped for at least 100,000 returnees from America. Hungarian officials initially estimated
300,000 return migrants, and eagerly awaited the capital they would bring home.344 As
early as 1916, Hungarian Minister of Commerce and Professor of Economics Béla Földes
was already planning a labor exchange and ways to save Hungarian migrants from the
wartime discrimination they were facing in the United States. Földes reported that “many
of the Hungarians now in America did not feel at home there and that such people should
be the first to be repatriated and that opportunities should be given them to make a
satisfactory living in Hungary.”345 Dr. Károly Mészáros had been working on return
migration for the Hungarian government since 1914, and in 1919 embarked on a renewed
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campaign to draw migrants home after the war. Mészáros recognized that there were both
pessimistic and optimistic interpretations of post-war return migration: pessimists would
argue that migrants need not return home now to share in Hungary’s sorry post-war fate,
but Mészáros was an optimist. After a five-year hiatus in transatlantic travel because of
the war, thousands of Hungarian-Americans would return home to help aging family, to
mourn the loss of loved ones who had died in the interim, to feed their curiosity, and to
help rebuild the homeland. He estimated that up to 200,000 might return, and crunched
the numbers also for the counties in northern Hungary that had produced large numbers
of emigrants and were now under Czechsoslovak control. Writing to the ministers of the
Interior, Finance, Commerce, and Agriculture, Mészáros calculated each return migrant
would reliably bring a thousand dollars into the Hungarian economy, as workers in the
United States all had had good-paying wartime jobs.346
But emigration continued even as European governments sought to draw migrants
home, necessitating a two-pronged plan that simultaneously curbed continued emigration
and promoted return migration, or at least compensated for the former with more of the
latter. The Hungarian government found that opportunities abroad like employment in
Westphalia mines and rebuilding projects in France could draw Hungarian workers away
for as long as 16-20 years. “Tempting promises” of opportunities in the United States,
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Australia would also entice migrants to leave Hungary,
especially in areas where there was a dearth of work. The Hungarian Interior Minister
feared that the intelligentsia and the most valuable workers would leave, while those most
likely to engage in return migration were “former peasants.” He also recognized that,
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though many emigrants had gained industrial experience working in factories in the
United States, they were coming home to escape that kind of work, pay off their debts,
and buy a house and maybe some land, not to continue in hard industrial labor at home.
Thus, the best way to encourage return migration was to potentially reauthorize the 1909
law setting up a migration council, rebuild the Hungarian consular network in the United
States as quickly as possible to expedite return migration, and facilitate the process for
return migrants for acquiring land.347 Not surprisingly, these plans harkened back to the
Ministry of Agriculture’s plans from before the war, discussed in the previous chapter,
emphasizing the sale of estates rather than acreage here and there, as well as putting
migrants’ dollars to work “for the home economy.”348
And so the Hungarian government and allied organizations began rebooting some
of their migration-related initiatives just as the American Congress was working on
legislation to staunch immigration, despite the fact that Hungary was still dealing with a
postwar refugee crisis and land shortage. The Hungarian League for the Protection of
Territorial Integrity issued a 1920 pamphlet titled “What does the aspiring return migrant
need to know?,” sending 19,000 copies to the United States from the first printing
alone.349 The Hungarian Emigrants’ and Return Migrants’ Protection Office (not unlike
American Travelers Aid Societies) began operations again in July 1921, as part of these
Hungarian efforts. Their yearbook offered concrete advice on sources of mortgage
providers for setting up a farm back in Hungary, listing at least five land credit agencies
and advertising cheap, easy credit. “We would like for every return migrant to find once
347
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again a happy and warm home here and not to deal in uncertain and adventurous plans.”
That said, the Migrants’ Protection Office seems to have aided migrants whatever
direction they desired to travel in: advice for emigrants was listed before advice for return
migrants, and among their listed services was helping Hungarians over the new border
with the acquisition of Czech visas.350
In reality, however, the number of returners never came close to European
governmental imaginations and border dissatisfaction added strongly to the emigrating
side of the equation. “In the first few years of our state’s existence, everyone in America
was saying: don’t go back,” one Czechoslovak stated.351 The reasons were manifold, but
the implementation of quotas encouraged those already in the United States to stay, since
it became increasingly uncertain whether they would be able to return to America later.
From the beginning of July 1921 to the end of February 1922 (after the 1921 Quota Act
but before the 1924 act), 2,913 Bohemians and Moravians came to the United States
while 3,203 returned, a net gain for Czechoslovakia of only 290 individuals in an eightmonth period. This was more than offset by the continued emigration of Slovaks, 5,859
of whom came to the United States while only 2,311 returned.352 The Slovak-American
paper Obrana reported in 1925 that among the Slovak Americans who did return home to
Czechoslovakia, many trickled back to America.353 The Czechoslovak quota for 1922 had
350
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filled before October,354 with Slovaks taking a significantly higher proportion of the
quota, in part because of unfulfilled promises for Slovak autonomy. According to
Hungarian reports, the Slovak League of America received a plea from Slovaks in
Slovensko, who were frustrated at the continued shortcomings of the Czechoslovak
government in ensuring rights and behaving democratically, and that they were “morally
and spiritually decaying.”355
Other new states fared no better. Among Croatians and Slovenians, the numbers
of migrants entering and leaving the United States were nearly equal.356 Poles,
Romanians, and Serbians – winners in the peace treaties after the war – saw higher
numbers of people returning to Europe than leaving, but Hungarians were fleeing, with
5,866 arriving to the United States and only 3,633 returning in the same period.357
Emigrants from Burgenland, the small section of former Hungary that had been
transferred to Austria after the war, reportedly made up just over 50% of Austria’s
emigrants in 1922, which the Hungarian government ascribed to the change in territorial
sovereignty.358 A year later, another Austrian report indicated that Burgenland had
produced 42% of all of Austria’s emigrants since the war. “With the annexation,
Burgenland’s inhabitants have befallen difficult circumstances,” a Hungarian report
concluded; “otherwise so many of them would not have taken the wanderer’s staff into
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their hands, to find a happier home for themselves. How wisely they arranged the
people’s fate at Trianon,” he concluded sarcastically.359
Even among those migrant nationalists who did decide to uproot themselves again
and return to Europe from the United States, their time abroad could permanently mark
them as somehow outside the nation. Dr. Charles Pergler, who had been among the
Czech-Americans most ardently fighting for the Czech national causes during the war,
returning to Czechoslovakia after the war, served several diplomatic posts, and then,
upon winning a seat in the Czechoslovak Parliament, had his citizenship status
investigated by political opponents. (Pergler had indeed been an American citizen, but
renounced it after the war when he took a position as the Czechoslovak minister to
Japan.360) Several Hungarian return migrants filed complaints about difficulties that they
faced upon returning to Hungary. Post-war return migrant Antal Lindenberger had tried
to buy a new home three times, only to have the local Housing Office invalidate the
purchase each time as he was “unauthorized” to do so. Two other families bought new
homes in Hungary only to receive eviction notices, while others were refused residence
permits. Even this small samplings reveals the frustrations of both return migrants and the
chairman of Hungary’s Emigration Council, Jenő Gaál. Gaál fumed at the pettiness of
local officials in rejecting return migrants for the necessary permits because of small
errors and omissions in paperwork formalities and at the long delays at the Ministry of
Welfare in seeing to return migrants’ grievances. His documented cases feature dozens of
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individuals who had made the move to permanently relocate to Hungary from the United
States, only to be driven back.361
The quotas were a deterrent to mobility even for those looking only to visit
relatives, not relocate. In 1925, a group of Slovak American Catholics from Perth
Amboy, NJ wanted to make a spiritual pilgrimage to Rome, followed by a return visit to
Slovakia, but feared that, among those who were still not full-fledged American citizens,
the Czech government would not allow them to leave and that the United States would
not allow them to return! Father Szuchy reportedly wrote to President Coolidge asking
for special visas for the non-citizen pilgrims assuring their reentry.362
While some European governmental officials hoped to push minorities out
through the limited quotas and keep members of the titular nation at home, more often it
was migrants themselves who sought to find alternative paths to America through
ambiguities in their ethnic identity or creative use of various quotas in the region. Mary
Bócán Chaty was born in the village of Hardicsa, near Kassa, in Hungary in 1904, which
was Czechoslovak territory by the time of her emigration in 1921. Despite identifying as
Hungarian and coming from a village that was labeled as two-thirds Hungarian before the
war, she came on the Czechoslovak quota. “I was in Prague,” she recalled, “because I
couldn't go in Budapest because I was in the Czechoslovakia territory.” These changes in
administrative centers between the old empire and nation-states made migration
considerably more difficult in some ways for her but more convenient in others. Whereas
Budapest is three hours from Hardicsa on modern highways, it is over seven from Prague.
With quotas in place, migrants had to travel to their respective new capitals multiple
361
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times before managing to get a visa. On the other hand, Mary’s migration was actually
facilitated by coming on the Czechoslovak quota rather than the Hungarian one.
Hungary’s annual quota was only 473, but Czechoslovakia’s was over 3,000. Chaty was
able to join her uncle in Trenton in 1921, and the very next year married a man who
happened to be from her village of Hardicsa who had immigrated to the US as a child,
under a completely different immigration regime without quotas.363
In 1925 a Slavic coffee merchant based in Fiume managed to have his daughter
and son come to the United States on the German and French quotas, respectively, both
departing from Fiume/Rijeka, because of where the children had been born as the family
traveled for his business. After the death of his wife from tuberculosis, he had gone to
New York and, since he spoke five languages, had gotten a job at the Italian Commercial
Bank in the Foreign Department, leaving his children to be raised by their maternal aunts.
By 1925 Mr. Greiner sought to bring his family to join him in the United States, his
children and his sisters-in-law. "You're out of your mind if you think four people can
come from one country!" a local councilman told him. But examining their papers, he
noticed that the children had been born in Germany and France, enabling them to enter on
the significantly more generous western European quotas.364
When Nick Frendreis and his family arrived in 1921, Ellis Island was still figuring
out how best to deal with migrants who arrived after a quota had already been filled.
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Frendreis remembered staying at Ellis Island for over a week waiting for the calendar to
turn, to get in on the next month’s quota. Apparently authorities had decided that it was
more effective to hold them at Ellis Island for a week than to send them home. The
German-speaking Frendreises came from the Banát region where they had lived in mixed
German-Serbian and Hungarian-Serbian village just miles from the new HungarianYugoslav border.365
Max Schnapp came to the United States in 1923 from Austrian Galicia, suddenly
part of Romania (and now part of Ukraine), from a small city with a majority Jewish
population and a largely Ukrainian-speaking surrounding countryside. The surviving
Schnappses had wound up in Vienna as refugees during the war after crossing the
Carpathian Mountains on foot to escape Russian occupation; with the signing of the
peace treaties, they were forced to leave Austria and go back “home,” to Romania. They
did not arrive in the approved window to retain citizenship, and so lost their citizenship
and all their property. They identified culturally as German. One of the only men
remaining in his family, his grandmother said to Max, "You're the only one that's left
over. You will not be in the army if it's my last penny. You'll go to America.” Because he
had relatives that emigrated in 1911 and with the help of the JDC, he and his sister were
able to join their uncle there, but they could not get additional relatives over for several
years. “Imagine, from 1924, according to your quota, they had to wait till 1936 to be able
to come to America.”366
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Examples like these confirm that so much of the ethnic categorization tied to
migration before and after was fluid or even artificial, even in an era when new European
states and the U.S. were trying to control the movement of people. The Greiners,
Frendreises, Schappses, and others all arrived on quotas that did not match their personal
ethnic identification but their new state affiliations, although the quotas were capping
entry based on the concept of “national origins.”

Conclusion
The complicated interplay between the Habsburg Empire’s dissolution, Trianon
borders, and restrictionist US immigration laws continued to have similar consequences
throughout the interwar era, as can be seen in Istvan Bacher’s case in 1940. “My mother
was born in a town called Fiume, . . . and that was the best thing she ever did,” he
recalled later in life. Bacher himself had been born in Vienna and grown up primarily in
Budapest, but his mother’s birthplace played the greatest role in his mobility as a migrant.
“That had a lot to do with our ability to leave Hungary and get on the Italian quota,” he
explained. Fiume’s wild history in the aftermath of Austria-Hungary’s dismantling shows
the difficulty of ethnic disambiguation of a multiethnic port that served a vast empire.
While part of the Kingdom of Hungary through the First World War, both Italy and the
newly established Kingdom of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes made claims to Fiume at the
Paris peace conference. After a two-year period as a free state with its own quota, Italy
annexed Fiume practically in 1922, and officially in 1924 by treaty with Yugoslavia. It
was because of this that Vienna-born, Hungarian-identifying Bacher and his family could
come to the United States as Italians. When Bacher’s family sought to leave in the 1930s,

199

the Hungarian quota was already full for the next six or seven years. “The Italian quota,”
on the other hand, was over three times the size and “… was open and relatively free,” he
explained, “…because Mussolini discouraged any immigrations.” And so by this “fluke,”
he, his mother, and brothers received their visas in 1940, just a month before Hungary
officially entered World War II. But his father could not go with them. While Bacher’s
father was “quite the patriotic Hungarian,” the interwar period saw the further
racialization of ethnicity, making his status and his ability to emigrate precarious. The
criteria for who counted as Jewish kept changing, too. “My father was Jewish,” Bacher
explained, “And then he was non-Jewish. And then he was Jewish again.” Bacher’s
parents divorced to make it easier for his non-Jewish mother Renee, István, and his
brothers to leave on the Italian quota, since with the divorce and her custody they
acquired her claim to Italian citizenship instead of retaining their father’s Hungarian
citizenship. His first job in the United States, after arriving at Ellis Island as an “Italian,”
was washing dishes in a Hungarian restaurant at the New York World's Fair in Queens.
The Bachers serve as a prime example of the diversity of the Empire and its lasting
consequences for migration. We know, of course, that the Trianon borders failed to create
ethnically exclusive nation-states. We also see how the quotas – meant to be ethnic
quotas – could only do so much to enforce ethnic criteria when applied geographically to
new states that still featured mixed populations, as part of their Austro-Hungarian legacy.
The oral history interviewer decades later asked Bacher what his mother’s maiden name
was: “Levinsky,” he replied; “It sounds very Polish to me.”
Both new state borders in Central and Eastern Europe and immigration legislation
in the United States must be considered together to understand post-war migrants’
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experiences. The view from Ellis Island and the view from European ports, both
drastically different in the 1920s than the 1900s, was the result of developments on both
sides of the Atlantic. The interplay between European geopolitical borders and American
regimes of exclusion had profound effects on the mobility on several generations of
Central and Eastern Europeans in the 20th century, and transformed the bureaucracies of
migration in the region. While many migrants in the United States rejoiced that their old
homes were now nation-states, others sought to rebuild the glory of their homeland as it
was before the war. In the end, ironically, many migrant nation-builders contributed to
the hardships that their communities in America and at home faced in the post-1924 era:
tighter restrictions on mobility, more limitations and longer wait times in reuniting
transatlantic families, and less support from European and American governments for
migration services.
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Conclusion
“Austria has the advantage of having kept her well-known name from the
collapse,” soon-be-Austrian ambassador Edgar Prochnik explained to officials back home
in 1921. “Austria is a name having a good ring to it, a name one was accustomed to hear
and use . . . . It is not so foreign a name as e.g. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, . . . strange
sounds foreign to an American ear.”
After decades of migration and years of world war, with hundred of thousands of
migrants from the former territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the United States,
most Americans still had little understanding of the peoples of Eastern Europe. On the
one hand, the categories of race, ethnicity, nationality, mother tongue, and other markers
are all fluid and fraught, and the map of Europe changed dramatically in the World War I
era – who could fault Americans for confusing Hungarians and Bulgarians, Slovaks and
Slovenes? On the other, even American policy makers who made decisions with lifechanging consequences for Eastern European migrants displayed shocking levels of
misinformation.
The United States had played a hand in crafting the borders of new states to
succeed the Austro-Hungarian Empire, only to fail to ratify many of the peace treaties or
join the League of Nations; Congress passed legislation greatly restricting migration for
southern and southeastern Europeans based on admittedly inaccurate estimates of their
so-called “national origins.” The new borders, rather than easing ethnic tensions by
separating peoples into different states, tried and failed to put people into neat ethnic
boxes and ramped up irredentism to one of the most important political ideologies in the
region. And in the United States, post-war labels for people took their place alongside
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Habsburg-era identities, adding even more variety.
Two institutions illustrate how starkly different views could be of the peoples of
Eastern Europe: the University of Pittsburgh’s Nationalities Classrooms in the Cathedral
of Learning and the Cultural Gardens in Cleveland’s Roosevelt Park. Both constructed in
the 1920s-30s in cities well known for their Central and Eastern European immigrant
communities, they nonetheless took completely different routes in enshrining those
immigrant groups in public space. The Cathedral of Learning offered European states the
opportunity to decorate “nationality classrooms,” based on political sovereignty in the
post-war era. The Cleveland Cultural Gardens, conversely, offered local communities the
opportunity to design gardens by self-proclaimed ethnic groups. The Cathedral featured a
single Czechoslovak classroom; Roosevelt Park featured separate Czech, Slovak, and
Ruthenian gardens.
Both projects stemmed from a post-war impulse to celebrate American
multiculturalism and the triumph of America’s melting pot over the kind of nationalist
conflicts that World War I had just wrought, serving as multicultural spaces in an era of
restriction. The Cathedral and the Gardens are not simply proxies for American opinions
of state legitimacy, but the fact that two projects chose such different methods to
represent and codify the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe demonstrates that
ethnicity and its place in defining people was still actively being constructed.
The University of Pittsburgh’s Cathedral of Learning was commissioned in 1921
and began being used as a place of instruction in 1931. The nationality rooms were
designed to celebrate a different culture that had an influence on Pittsburgh's growth,
reflecting the significance of the city’s immigrant population. “Each group had to form a
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Room Committee, which would be responsible for all fundraising, designing, and
acquisition.” Thus, while the Cathedral as a whole was a unifying project, the distribution
of classrooms based on new political borders in Europe formally divided Pittsburgh’s
immigrants. Pittsburgh residents hailing from Austria-Hungary could be represented by
Austrian Nationality Room, Czechoslovak Nationality Room, Hungarian Nationality
Room, Polish Nationality Room, Romanian Nationality Room, Ukrainian Nationality
Room, or the Yugoslav Room. Governments contributed financially to some of the
rooms.367
Cleveland’s Cultural Gardens differed markedly in their apportioning of the
peoples of Eastern Europe after the Great War. The Cleveland immigrant communities
represented with individual gardens include Polish, Czech, Rusin, Slovak, German,
Hungarian, Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Romanian gardens. The Hebrew and German
gardens were built first, both in 1926. Unlike the Czechoslovak Nationality Classroom, a
Slovak Garden was dedicated in 1932 and a separate Czech one in 1935. Similarly, a
Rusin Garden was dedicated in 1939 and a Ukrainian Garden was dedicated in 1940. The
gardens “reveal the history of immigration to, and migration within, the United States,”
historian Mark Tebeau explains. “They comment on how we have built communities and
constructed our identities as individuals and collectives. The gardens reveal the stories of
the major conflicts that gave shape to the century. . . . The gardens often have
incorporated symbolism or design elements that subverted the message of unity and
reflected ethnic tensions in Europe and Cleveland.” “It was no mistake,” he continues,
367
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“that the Czech, Slovak, and Rusin gardens were arrayed themselves across a boundary
street from the contiguous German and Hungarian gardens, suggesting how powerfully
old cultural conflicts were felt.”368 More recently, the Yugoslav garden, dedicated in
1938, was refashioned as the Slovenian garden in 1991. A new Serbian garden dates to
2008, a Croatian garden to 2011.
The Nationality Classrooms at Pitt and the Cleveland Cultural Gardens are just
two examples of the American spaces where debates about Eastern European immigrant
identities continued to be played out in the United States, even as the numbers of brothers
and sisters who could join them from overseas was greatly diminished. Migration from
Austria-Hungary to the United States (and often back again) had a tremendous influence
on the societies, and governments, of both places.
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